James Young v. Happy Money, Inc.

United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-6011
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In re: James C. Young; Tahnee R. Young
Debtors
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James C. Young; Tahnee R. Young, also known as Tahnee Rhea Higgins
Debtors - Appellants
v.
Happy Money, Inc.
Creditor - Appellee
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Appeal from United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of North Dakota - Fargo
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Submitted: February 17, 2026
Filed: April 8, 2026
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Before NORTON, JONES, AND KULM ASK, Bankruptcy Judges.
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JONES, Bankruptcy Judge.
Appellants James C. Young and Tahnee R. Young (the “Debtors”) appeal the
order of the bankruptcy court1 denying their request to allow James Young, who is
not an attorney, to represent or advocate on behalf of Tahnee Young in a bankruptcy
matter involving a debt held solely in the name of Tahnee Young and prohibiting
Mr. Young from providing legal counsel to Tahnee Young during the hearing. For
the reasons stated below, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On January 27, 2025, the Debtors, husband and wife, filed a joint voluntary
petition for bankruptcy relief under the provisions of Chapter 13 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code. The Debtors filed the joint bankruptcy petition pro se. As of the
petition date, Tahnee Young, alone, owed a debt to Happy Money, Inc. (“Happy
Money”). The bankruptcy court entered an order converting the case to Chapter 7
on February 14, 2025, and five days later the Debtors, pro se, filed a joint motion
seeking sanctions and punitive damages against Happy Money alleging Happy
Money violated the automatic stay by contacting Tahnee Young to collect a debt she
owed to Happy Money (“Motion for Sanctions”).2 The Motion for Sanctions
requests the Court to, inter alia, “[a]ward actual damages to the Debtors for the
distress and harassment caused by Happy Money’s repeated collection attempts.”
The bankruptcy court held a scheduling conference on the Motion for
Sanctions on May 29, 2025. 	During the scheduling conference Happy Money
questioned whether James Young intended to represent Tahnee Young at the hearing
1 The Honorable Shon Hastings, Chief Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of North Dakota.
2The Motion for Sanctions was not designated as part of the record but was
the matter involved in the informal discovery conference before the bankruptcy court
on June 5, 2025. A transcript of this hearing was included in the record.

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on the Motion for Sanctions. The bankruptcy court informed the Debtors that James
Young would not be able to represent Tahnee Young at the hearing. 	Shortly
thereafter, the Debtors filed their joint “Motion to Confirm Joint Debtor James
Young’s Right to Participate Pro Se and Opposition to Improper Attempt to Silence”
(“Motion”).3 At an informal discovery conference, the bankruptcy court addressed
this Motion. The Court found that James Young, who is not an attorney, could not
represent Tahnee Young on the issues related to Happy Money because she is the
only person liable on the Happy Money debt and the only debtor Happy Money is
claimed to have sought collection from in violation of the automatic stay.
On June 5, 2025, the same date as the informal discovery conference, the
bankruptcy court entered an Order Denying Debtor James Young’s Request to
Appear on Behalf or Represent Tahnee Young at Hearing (the “Order”). 	The
bankruptcy court held it would constitute the unauthorized practice of law under
applicable North Dakota law for James Young to compose documents, give legal
advice, or act as Tahnee Young’s legal representative in the Happy Money dispute
involving solely Tahnee Young and Happy Money, and denied the Debtors’ Motion
“[t]o the extent James Young seeks to represent Tahnee Young or advocate on her
behalf in a bankruptcy proceeding that relates solely to her debt and alleged
violations of the automatic stay that relate solely to efforts to collect a debt from
Tahnee Young.” 	The Debtors appeal the portion of the Order restricting James
Young’s pro se participation in denying his request to represent and advocate on
behalf of Tahnee Young and provide legal counsel to Tahnee Young during the
hearing.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court has jurisdiction to hear appeals “from final judgments, orders, and
decrees[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), (b)(1). The order before the Court is a final order.
See, e.g., Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35, 37 (2020); Bullard
3 The Motion was not designated as part of the appellate record.

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v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 501 (2015). 	Cf., In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods.
Liab. Litig., 612 F.2d 377, 378 (8th Cir. 1980) (recognizing in dicta an order granting
a motion to disqualify counsel is appealable), vacated on other grounds, Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981). 	We review the bankruptcy
court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Ridings v.
Casamatta (In re Allen), 628 B.R. 641, 642 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2021) (citing Brown v.
Luker (In re Zepecki), 277 F.3d 1041, 1045 (8th Cir. 2002)). A decision granting a
motion to disqualify counsel is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Midwest Motor
Sports v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc., 347 F.3d 693, 700 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Petrovic v.
Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140, 1154 (8th Cir. 1999)).
DISCUSSION
Although Tahnee Young and James Young are joint debtors, the Motion for
Sanctions is a discrete matter that provides context for analyzing the requests made
in the Debtors’ Motion. This discrete matter involves a debt owed to Happy Money
that only Tahnee Young was obligated to pay, who was the only person alleged to
have been contacted by Happy Money, and who was the only person alleged to have
received collection notices from Happy Money. 	To be clear, James Young is not
liable on the debt owed to Happy Money and is not alleged to have received any of
the communications from Happy Money in violation of the automatic stay. Even so,
the Debtors do appear to be jointly seeking damages for the alleged distress and
harassment.
“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own
cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are
permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654. Rule 9010(a)
of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provides:
(a) In General. 	A debtor, creditor, equity security holder,
indenture trustee, committee, or other party may:

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(1) appear in a case and act either on the entity’s own
behalf or through an attorney authorized to practice
in the court; and
(2) perform any act not constituting the practice of law,
by an authorized agent, attorney-in-fact, or proxy.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9010(a). 	Both 28 U.S.C. § 1654 and Rule 9010(a) cited above
allow a party to appear and act on his or her own behalf, but nothing in the language
suggests a joint debtor, who is not an attorney, may appear and act as an attorney
representative on behalf of the other joint debtor.
The Debtors advanced five arguments on appeal as to why the bankruptcy
court erred in denying their Motion.
First, the Debtors argue the bankruptcy court’s reliance on state law rules
governing the unauthorized practice of law was inappropriate. Despite the Debtors’
argument to the contrary, “[i]n determining whether one has engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law, bankruptcy courts look to state law.” In re Herrera,
194 B.R. 178, 191 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (first citing In re Skobinsky, 167 B.R. 45,
49 (E.D. Pa. 1994); then citing Foulston v. Jones (In re Robinson), 162 B.R. 319,
325 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993); then citing In re Bachmann, 113 B.R. 769, 772 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1990); and then citing In re Chas. A. Stevens & Co., 108 B.R. 191, 193
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989)). 	See also In re Simons, No. 09-01428, 2009 WL 3055280
at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Sep. 21, 2009) (looking to state law to determine when the
actions of a party constitute the unauthorized practice of law). Here, the bankruptcy
court correctly relied on the law of North Dakota to conclude James Young could
not represent Tahnee Young or advocate on her behalf on matters solely involving
Tahnee Young’s debt and her allegations of stay violations in matters not concerning
James Young.
In addition, the Supreme Court of North Dakota has clearly stated the rule that
“a party who is not represented by a licensed attorney cannot be represented by

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another person, including their spouse, in any court of record in this state, absent
authorization provided by state law or supreme court rule.” Am. Express Centurion
Bank v. Corum, 2017 ND 261, ¶ 10, 903 N.W.2d 710, 712. See also Jones ex rel.
Jones v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., et al., 401 F.3d 950, 952 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating an
individual who is not an attorney “may not engage in the practice of law on behalf
of others”); Knoefler v. United Bank of Bismark, 20 F.3d 347, 348 (8th Cir. 1994)
(finding a pro se individual who is not a lawyer does not have a right to represent an
entity in a court of the United States). “[A] person may not practice law, act as an
attorney or counselor at law in this state, or commence, conduct, or defend in any
court of record of this state, any action or proceeding in which the person is not a
party concerned[.]” N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-11-01 (2001). 	The bankruptcy court
correctly applied this rule in analyzing the Debtors’ Motion.
Second, the Debtors argue the bankruptcy court’s reliance on North Dakota’s
rules governing the practice of law violated the “supremacy of federal bankruptcy
law.” 	This argument is misplaced. 	The federal bankruptcy rules, themselves,
reference state court laws and rules governing the practice of law. The local rules
of the bankruptcy court for the District of North Dakota provide that “the bar of this
court consists of those attorneys who are admitted to practice and who remain in
good standing before the United States District Court for the District of North
Dakota.” D.N.D. Bankr. L.R. 9010-2(A). The general local rules of the United States
District Court for the District of North Dakota provide “[t]he bar of this court
consists of those attorneys admitted to practice in this district.” D.N.D. Gen. L.R.
1.3(A). 	Therefore, the bankruptcy court’s reliance on state law does not offend
federal bankruptcy law.
Third, the Debtors argue the bankruptcy court’s decision infringes upon their
constitutional rights of free speech and due process and their statutory right to self-
representation. 	These arguments are also unpersuasive. 	The regulation of “the
practice of law is not related to the expression of ideas, rather N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 27-11-01 is aimed at preventing harm caused by unqualified persons performing
legal services for others.” 	Am. Express Centurion Bank, 2017 ND 261, ¶ 9,

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903 N.W.2d 710, 712 (citing State v. Niska, 380 N.W.2d 646, 649 (N.D. 1986)).
“The right of free speech does not encompass in-court advocacy by a non-lawyer on
behalf of another person, including a spouse.” Id. at ¶ 10 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 27-11-01). 	See also 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1948) (citation omitted). 	The Supreme
Court of North Dakota has acknowledged that while the regulation of the practice of
law “limits speech, the limitation is incidental and not directed at suppressing the
expression of ideas.” Id. at ¶ 9. The Supreme Court of North Dakota has also held
the regulation of the practice of law “does not violate free speech guaranteed by the
North Dakota Constitution and the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution.” Id. (citing Niska, 380 N.W.2d at 650). We agree.
Next, the Debtors advanced two related arguments based on their joint
bankruptcy filing. First, the Debtors argue the joint filing created what they refer to
as a “unified joint estate” and pursuing the matters related to Happy Money affects
the unified joint estate. 	Debtors’ App. Br. at 2. 	They contend that because the
unified joint estate is affected, the bankruptcy court erred in not allowing James
Young to participate to protect “his direct interest as a principal party to the estate.”
Debtors’ App. Br. at 2. They also argue that not allowing James Young to participate
hinders the Debtors’ ability to protect the joint estate from alleged creditor and
attorney misconduct. 	Both arguments are premised on a misunderstanding of a
jointly administered bankruptcy case.
Section 302 of the bankruptcy code provides a “joint case . . . is commenced
by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a single petition . . . by an individual that
may be a debtor under such chapter and such individual’s spouse.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 302(a). 	The local rules of the bankruptcy court for the District of North Dakota
provide “[w]hen a debtor and his/her spouse file a single petition in a joint case, the
bankruptcy estates will be jointly administered without further court order” unless
an objection is filed. D.N.D. Bankr. L.R. 1015-1.
Indeed, “[a]lthough § 302(a) allows a husband and wife to file a petition
together which is given only one case number, their two estates remain separate.” In

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re Portell, 557 B.R. 161, 165 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2016) (quoting In re Pruitt, No. 09-
65328, 2011 WL 2292205, at *6 (Bankr. D. Or. June 8, 2011)). 	A jointly
administered case does not “create a single pool of assets out of which all creditors
of the two individual debtors will be paid, but merely allows the two estates to be
jointly administered.” Id. (citing 2 C OLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 302.01 (Alan N.
Resnick and Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.)). Due to their two estates remaining
separate, the Debtors’ arguments are without merit.
Finally, 	the 	Debtors 	argue 	the 	bankruptcy 	court 	“erroneously
mischaracterized and dismissed relevant federal authority” cited by the Debtors in
support of their Motion. 	The Debtors are incorrect. 	The two cases cited by the
Debtors were “In re Pringle, 377 B.R. 308 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007)” and “In re
Johnson, 276 B.R. 367 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002).” 	The bankruptcy court correctly
described the case that is found by inserting the Debtors’ citation “377 B.R. 308”
into a legal research database as a “New Mexico case” with issues that are
completely unrelated to this appeal. 	Similarly, the bankruptcy court correctly
described the case found when the second citation, “276 B.R. 367,” is entered into a
legal research database as a “Delaware opinion.” The New Mexico and Delaware
cases address issues that are not relevant to this appeal. 	The cases, as cited and
described by the Debtors, do not exist.4 Citing cases incorrectly or citing to
4 The Debtors continue to cite to cases that do not exist in their Appellate Brief,
citing to “In re Steward, 475 B.R. 518 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2012).” 	In searching for
this cited case in a legal research database, the case of Swanson v. Applied Process
Technology International, LLC (In re Delta-T Corp.), 475 B.R. 495 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 2012), was retrieved. The Swanson case begins on page 495 of volume 475 of
the Bankruptcy Reporter and ends on page 535. 	The case concerns a Uniform
Commercial Code issue, not the imposition of sanctions for discovery violations as
argued by the Debtors in their brief. The citation for In re Cherrett, 873 F.3d 1060
(9th Cir. 2017), did retrieve the In re Cherrett case; however, the case involves the
issue of whether the purchase of a second residence was a business debt or a
consumer debt and does not involve sanctions against an attorney as stated by the
Debtors in their brief.

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nonexistent cases is the type of harm rules governing the unauthorized practice of
law are designed to prevent.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we find the bankruptcy court did not err in
denying the Debtors’ Motion to the extent that James Young was seeking to
represent Tahnee Young or advocate on her behalf in a bankruptcy proceeding that
relates solely to her debt and involves alleged violations of the automatic stay that
relate solely to efforts to collect a debt from Tahnee Young.5 Nor did the bankruptcy
court abuse its discretion in setting parameters for James Young’s participation. We
affirm.
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5 As noted above, in the Motion for Sanctions the Debtors appear to seek joint
damages. 	Discovery and other procedural deadlines were stayed during the
pendency of the appeal. 	The question of the extent James Young may participate
during the hearing in seeking his own damages or as a witness is not before us and
nothing in this Order is intended to address this question.