TX2022-000378 8/4/2026 Sheely v. Maricopa County

Clerk of the Superior Court
*** Electronically Filed ***
08/05/2026 8:00 AM
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
IN THE ARIZONA TAX COURT
TX 2022-000378 08/04/2026
Docket Code 019 Form T000 Page 1
CLERK OF THE COURT
HONORABLE ERIK THORSON J. Zinkowich
Deputy
TED D SHEELY DOUGLAS S JOHN
v.
MARICOPA COUNTY JAMES M SUSA
JUDGE POLK
JUDGE THORSON
RULING
The following rulings were issued previously on July 29, 2026, but as the proper parties
were not endorsed, the Court reissues said ruling with the correct endorsements.
The Court has received and reviewed Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and
Motion to Exclude, filed April 21, 2026 (“Plaintiffs’ Motion”), and Defendant’s Motion to
Exclude the Testimony and Expert Report of William M. Dominick, filed May 13, 2026
(“Defendant’s Motion”), as well as subsequent filings related thereto. Plaintiffs’ Motion was
fully briefed on June 1, 2026; Defendant’s Motion was fully briefed on June 2, 2026. No party
requested oral argument, and the Court can decide the issues raised without oral argument. See
L.R. Prac. Superior Ct.—Civ., Maricopa County, 3.2(d); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
The Court has considered the filings and arguments of the Parties, the relevant
authorities and applicable law, as well as the entire record of the case, and—considering all
facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-movants,
respectively—hereby finds as follows regarding the Motions.
The Subject Property is a single parcel of land totaling 111.38 acres located at 2209
North 99th Avenue just south of Thomas Road. (Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts, filed April 21,
2026 (“PSOF”), at ¶¶1, 5, undisputed.) Sixty acres of the Subject Property are used for field
crops. (PSOF ¶2, undisputed.) 51.38 acres are used for recreational fields. (PSOF ¶2, disputed

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY
TX 2022-000378 08/04/2026
Docket Code 019 Form T000 Page 2
as to Plaintiffs’ characterization of the use.) The Subject Property has been used for
recreational purposes such as sports fields, a corn maze, and a haunted house. (PSOF ¶6,
disputed that the events cited would qualify as recreational in context.)
Plaintiffs ask the Court to find as a matter of law that:
(1) the Subject property should be valued according to its current
use; (2) the current use of the Subject Property on the valuation
date was as fields for recreation purposes; and (3) the
Defendant’s appraisal and expert testimony should be excluded
under Rules 401 and/or 702 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence.
(Pls.’ Mot., at 10.)
Plaintiffs contend that the County’s appraiser, Steve W. MacDonald, appraised the
Subject Property according to its highest and best use for mixed use development and not based
on its current use. (Pls.’ Mot., at 4.) As a result, Plaintiffs contend that Mr. MacDonald’s
appraisal does not comply with Arizona law and the Department guidelines, is not based on
reliable principles and methods, and is inadmissible. (Pls.’ Mot., at 9–10.)
The Court ruled on similar motions in Sheely v. Maricopa Cty., TX2021-000409, 2025
WL 1173735 (Ariz. Tax Ct. Apr. 22, 2025) (“Sheely I”). Sheely I involved an adjoining parcel
to the Subject Property consisting of 49 acres at the corner of 99th Avenue and McDowell Road.
Id. at 1. The property in Sheely I was also used for recreational purposes and agricultural
purposes during the recreational off season. Id.
In Sheely I, Plaintiffs had filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Exclude
and Defendant Maricopa County filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-
Motion to Exclude. Id. The Tax Court found that the property’s current use was fields for
recreation and excluded Mr. MacDonald’s opinion of value because he did not value the
property based on its current use. Id. at 2. Plaintiffs ask for the same relief here. (Pls.’ Mot., at
1–3.)
Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a); General
Motors Corp. v. Maricopa Cty., 237 Ariz. 337, 339 ¶7 (App. 2015).
Arizona law requires real property be assessed according to its current use. See A.R.S.
§ 42-11054(C)(1). Therefore, THE COURT FINDS that summary judgment is appropriate
that the Subject Property should be valued according to its current use.

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY
TX 2022-000378 08/04/2026
Docket Code 019 Form T000 Page 3
The County contends that the Sheely I ruling is flawed. (Def.’s Resp., filed May 12,
2026, at 2.) The County contends that the Planned Unit Development approved by the City
Council on January 30, 2013, provides evidence that the Subject Property is being held solely for
development. (Def.’s Resp., at 2–4.)
The County also contends that “highest and best use” and “current use” are not mutually
exclusive and that Mr. MacDonald’s conclusion that the “highest and best use” of the Subject
Property is the same as its “current usage” does not invalidate his appraisal. (Def.’s Resp., at
4.)
Plaintiffs contend that an owner’s future plan or intent does not play a part in
determining current use. (Pls.’ Mot., at 8.) The County contends that the cases cited by
Plaintiffs—namely, Stewart Trust & Title of Tucson v. Pima County, 156 Ariz. 236 (App. 1987)
and General Motors Corp. v. Maricopa County, 237 Ariz. 337 (App. 2015)—are
distinguishable. (Def.’s Resp., at 9.) Although the circumstances in Stewart and General
Motors are distinguishable, the Court finds the analysis in both cases persuasive in determining
current use.
In Stewart, the Court of Appeals found that “leased land which otherwise meets the
Department’s guidelines for agricultural property . . . must be given that classification and
valued using solely the income approach set forth in the statute, notwithstanding the fact that
the owner intends ultimately to sell or develop the property for other purposes.” 156 Ariz. at
243.
In General Motors, the Court of Appeals analyzed use under A.R.S. § 42-16002(B) and
stated, “Interpreting ‘use’ as an objectively verifiable, physical use or activity on the property
promotes clarity. An owner may have many, even contradictory or rapidly changing, subjective
intents for the property.” 237 Ariz. at 341 ¶21.
Here, Mr. MacDonald states, “The existing structures, soccer fields, and agricultural
fields provide an interim use until a mixed use project is developed on the site It is the
appraiser’s
opinion that the highest and best use of the subject property is for development of a mixed use
project that includes a mix of retail, industrial, and multifamily uses.” (PSOF ¶22, disputed as
selectively quoted and misleading.) But whether the property will ultimately be developed is
irrelevant to determination of its current use. See Stewart, 156 Ariz. at 243; General Motors,
237 Ariz. at 341 ¶21.
Both appraisers acknowledge that the Subject Property is being used for recreational

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY
TX 2022-000378 08/04/2026
Docket Code 019 Form T000 Page 4
purposes. Mr. Dominick stated in this appraisal, “The subject has been utilized for over 10-
years, for numerous outdoor activities, including soccer fields, corn maze and haunted house,
farmers markets and carnivals.” (PSOF, Exh. 1, TX2022-000378 000038.) Mr. MacDonald
stated in his appraisal, “The property is primarily land that is used for soccer field use.” (PSOF,
Exh. 2, “Salient Facts”.)
THE COURT FINDS that summary judgment is appropriate that the Subject
Property’s current use is fields for recreation purposes.
As to the exclusion of Mr. MacDonald’s appraisal and expert testimony, THE COURT
FINDS that Mr. MacDonald’s opinion of value should be precluded because Mr. MacDonald
failed to value the Subject Property based on its current use as fields for recreation purposes,
as required by Arizona law.
The County disputes that Mr. MacDonald’s report ignores the Subject Property’s
current use as Plaintiffs assert. (See PSOF ¶¶22–23; Resp. to PSOF, filed May 12, 2026, at
¶¶22–23.) However, the County does not point to anything in Mr. MacDonald’s report showing
he valued the Subject Property according to its current use as fields for recreation purposes. The
County contends multiple times that the current usage is “unimproved commercial property.”
(Def.’s Resp., at 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 11.) And Mr. MacDonald’s report repeatedly references “highest
and best use.” (See PSOF
¶¶14, 18, 19.)
Therefore, given the foregoing discussion,
IT IS ORDERED granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to
Exclude, filed April 21, 2026.
The County seeks to exclude Plaintiffs’ expert, William M. Dominick, and his report.
(Def.’s Mot., at 1.) The County contends that Mr. Dominick’s opinion of value is irreparably
flawed because Mr. Dominick analyzes the business conducted on the Subject Property rather
than the value of the Subject Property. (Def.’s Mot., at 1–2.) The County further contends that
the current usage of the Subject Property is unimproved commercial property and that Mr.
Dominick failed to properly apply “current usage” under Arizona law. (Def.’s Mot., at 2.)
Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Dominick appraised the property according to its current
use—recreational fields. (Resp. to Def.’s Mot., at 2–3.) Plaintiffs also contend that the alleged
flaws do not rise to the level necessitating exclusion of Mr. Dominick’s appraisal. (Resp. to
Def.’s Mot., at 3–7.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY
TX 2022-000378 08/04/2026
Docket Code 019 Form T000 Page 5
THE COURT FINDS that Mr. Dominick’s opinion of value is permissible under Ariz.
R. Evid. 702. “[A]lleged flaws in the application of a reliable methodology should not result
in exclusion of evidence unless they so infect the procedure as to make the results unreliable.”
State
v. Bernstein, 237 Ariz. 226, 230 ¶17 (2015) (internal quotations omitted). Although the County
contends that Mr. Dominick's expert opinion of value is fatally flawed, THE COURT FINDS
that the alleged flaws do not rise to the level requiring exclusion of his testimony.
“Moreover, ‘cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky
but admissible [expert] evidence.’” State ex rel. Montgomery v. Miller, 234 Ariz. 289, 298 ¶20
(App. 2014) (quoting Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 152 (3d Cir. 1999)). Therefore,
given the foregoing discussion,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the
Testimony and Expert Report of William M. Dominick, filed May 13, 2026.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Parties meet and confer through counsel and
submit a revised Joint Report and Word-format proposed Scheduling Order regarding
resolution of the remainder of the case, for review by the Honorable Jay Polk, no later than
August 28, 2026.