Hendershot v. Whyte

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

DIANA JUNE HENDERSHOT, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

JOSEPH PATRICK WHYTE, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-1050 FC
FILED 06-29-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
Nos. FC2018-054263
FC2018-095360
The Honorable Andrew J. Russell, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Charles A. Kellers, PLLC, Scottsdale, AZ
By Charles A. Kellers
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Joseph Patrick Whyte, Howell, MI
Respondent/Appellant
HENDERSHOT v. WHYTE
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Joseph Patrick Whyte (“Father”) appeals the superior court’s
vexatious litigant designation. Father has failed to comply with Arizona
Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 13 in his opening brief and
has therefore waived any legal issues he seeks to present for review.
Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father and Diana Hendershot (“Mother”) have one minor
child in common. Following Mother’s petition for paternity, legal decision-
making, parenting time, and child support, the parties engaged in
considerable litigation. In November 2023, the superior court designated
Father as a vexatious litigant.

¶3 Father filed his notice of appeal in November 2025, in which
he stated he was appealing “the [c]ourt’s order designating him as a
vexatious litigant.” We stayed the appeal pending entry of a signed order
corresponding to the minute entry designating him vexatious, which the
superior court entered in February 2026. Because only the ministerial act of
entering a signed order remained, Father’s premature notice of appeal was
deemed effective after entry of the signed order. See Barassi v. Matison, 130
Ariz. 418, 422 (1981); see also Engel v. Landman, 221 Ariz. 504, 508, ¶ 11 (App.
2009) (holding that a premature notice of appeal need not be dismissed
when “only ministerial tasks remained to accomplish the entry of a final
judgment”); ARCAP 9(c) (“A notice of appeal . . . filed after the superior
court announces an order or other form of decision—but before entry of the
resulting judgment that will be appealable—is treated as filed on the date
of, and after the entry of, the judgment.”). We have jurisdiction under
Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised
Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 12-2101(A)(1).

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HENDERSHOT v. WHYTE
Decision of the Court

DISCUSSION

¶4 “An appellant who fails to make a ‘bona fide and reasonably
intelligent effort to comply with the rules’ will waive issues and arguments
‘not supported by adequate explanation, citations to the record, or
authority.’” Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522, ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (citing In
re Aubuchon, 233 Ariz. 62, 64-65, ¶ 6 (2013)). Although we prefer to decide
cases on the merits rather than dismiss on procedural grounds, “there is a
limit to which judicial leniency can be stretched.” Adams v. Valley Nat’l Bank
of Ariz., 139 Ariz. 340, 342 (App. 1984). And we hold unrepresented litigants
to the same standards as attorneys. Ramos, 252 Ariz. at 522, ¶ 8.

¶5 We consider only those issues properly designated and timely
brought in the notice of appeal. See ARCAP 8(c)(3) (requiring appellant to
designate the judgment they are appealing from); Premier Fin. Servs. v.
Citibank, 185 Ariz. 80, 87 (App. 1995) (holding that we do not have
jurisdiction to review rulings not contained in the notice of appeal).
Father’s notice of appeal indicates he is appealing his vexatious litigant
designation, but his opening brief fails to include any argument on this
issue. See ARCAP 13(a)(7) (requiring briefs to contain “citations of legal
authorities and appropriate references to the portions of the record on
which the appellant relies”). Instead, his opening brief argues only that the
superior court committed legal error by failing to (1) make required
findings, (2) provide him with a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and
(3) consider relevant material and evidence in “post-decree proceedings in
the Maricopa County Superior Court involving disputes related to financial
disclosure, discovery, and court rulings affecting Respondent/Appellant’s
rights and obligations.” Father provides no reasoning beyond general
assertions of error or misconduct for any of his contentions. And instead of
supplying the required references to the record, Father simply states, “you
guys can review the record I dont give a shit anymore [sic].” Accordingly,
he has waived his arguments. See Ramos, 252 Ariz. at 522, ¶ 9.

¶6 Mother requests attorneys’ fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324.
After considering the reasonableness of the parties’ positions and their
respective financial resources, we award Mother her reasonable attorneys’
fees and costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21.

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HENDERSHOT v. WHYTE
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶7 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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