Myers v. Huang

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

CLARENCE HARVEY MYERS,1 Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

GUOYU HUANG, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0622 FC
FILED 05-28-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FN2025-000169
The Honorable Melissa Zabor, Judge

AFFIRMED

PARTIES

Clarence Myers-Huang, Phoenix
Petitioner/Appellant

Guoyu Huang, Tempe
Respondent/Appellee

1 On the court’s own motion, the caption is amended as set forth above
to reflect the appellant’s restored name.
MYERS v. HUANG
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Andrew J. Becke joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Clarence Myers appeals from the decree dissolving his
marriage to Guoyu Huang, challenging the award of spousal maintenance
in favor of Huang. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Myers and Huang were married in April 2024. Myers
petitioned for dissolution in January 2025, less than one year later. After an
evidentiary hearing at which both Myers and Huang testified, the superior
court entered a dissolution decree ordering Myers to pay Huang spousal
maintenance of $1,000 per month for 6 months. The decree also made
Huang fully responsible for paying rent for the parties’ once-shared
apartment from January 2025 (when Huang ousted Myers from the
property) through the end of the lease term.

¶3 Myers timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §
12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶4 Myers challenges the spousal maintenance award, asserting
that the court failed to consider or properly assess Huang’s ability to
support himself, the marriage’s short duration, or the alleged financial
hardship the award causes Myers. We review the award for an abuse of
discretion. See Leathers v. Leathers, 216 Ariz. 374, 376, ¶ 9 (App. 2007). We
defer to the superior court’s weighing of the evidence and assessment of
witness credibility. Andrews v. Andrews, 252 Ariz. 415, 417, ¶ 7 (App. 2021).
And because Myers did not provide a transcript of the dissolution trial, we
presume that transcript would support the superior court’s findings. See
ARCAP 11(c)(1)(A)–(B); Baker v. Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73 (App. 1995).

¶5 A party is eligible for spousal maintenance if the superior
court finds the existence of any one of the grounds listed in A.R.S. § 25-
319(A). See Cullum v. Cullum, 215 Ariz. 352, 354, ¶ 11 (App. 2007); see also

2
MYERS v. HUANG
Decision of the Court

Arizona Spousal Maintenance Guidelines, A.R.S. § 25-319 app.
(“Guidelines”) I.D. The court here found two such statutory grounds: that
Huang lacked sufficient property to meet his own needs and temporarily
lacked the earning capacity to be self-sufficient. See A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(1),
(2). Specifically, the court found that Huang relied on public assistance for
food and health insurance (although he had a car and some savings) and
was not authorized to work in the United States (although he had applied
for labor certification, a process he anticipated would take six months).

¶6 Myers challenges the spousal maintenance eligibility
decision, asserting that the court improperly ignored rental income that
Huang receives from property he owns in China and Huang’s voluntary
choice not to work despite having the ability to do so. But Myers did not
provide a transcript of the trial, so we presume the transcript would
support the court’s findings. See Baker, 183 Ariz. at 73. And to the extent
Myers presented contrary evidence of Huang’s actual or potential income,
we defer to the superior court’s resolution of evidentiary conflicts. See
Andrews, 252 Ariz. at 417, ¶ 7.

¶7 Once a spouse is found to be eligible for maintenance, the
court calculates the appropriate duration and amount of an award (if any)
under the Guidelines and considering the relevant factors in § 25-319(B).
See Guidelines I.D; see also Cullum, 215 Ariz. at 355, ¶ 15. The Guidelines
yield an amount range (based on family size, income, and expenditures)
and a duration range (based on length of marriage and other factors). See
Guidelines I.D (Step 1–4, Step 5), IV.B.2. The court then determines the
appropriate amount (within the range, or outside the range by deviation)
and duration to enable the receiving spouse to become self-sufficient.
A.R.S. § 25-319(B); see also Guidelines I.D (Step 6), IV.C, V.C.

¶8 Here, the superior court awarded Huang $1,000 per month for
6 months. Myers asserts that this award was excessive given the short (less
than one year) duration of the marriage. But the court expressly
acknowledged the length of the marriage and chose a duration on the lower
end of the Guidelines’ applicable standard range. See Guidelines IV.B.2.a.i.
Moreover, the 6-month duration directly tracked the amount of time the
court found Huang would need to secure work authorization and thereby
become self-sufficient. See A.R.S. § 25-319(B), (B)(10); Guidelines IV.C.9.

¶9 As to amount, Huang requested less than the low end of the
Guidelines range, and the court’s $1,000 per month award was significantly
below the range calculated from the parties’ actual income ($45,000
annually for Myers, $0 for Huang).

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MYERS v. HUANG
Decision of the Court

¶10 Myers asserts that the superior court should have attributed
income to Huang because his unemployment was wholly voluntary. But
the court found that Huang could not work because of his immigration
status and that he was actively pursuing the certification necessary to
resume working (a plan to which Myers had previously acquiesced)—all
considerations that support the court’s decision not to attribute income to
Huang. See Guidelines III.B.2.a, .f. To the extent Myers claims Huang
received rental income for which the court failed to account, absent a trial
transcript, we presume the record supports the court’s contrary findings.
Baker, 183 Ariz. at 73.

¶11 Finally, Myers argues that the superior court improperly
failed to consider whether he could afford to pay spousal maintenance,
asserting that the obligation caused him financial hardship.2 In
determining a spousal maintenance award, the superior court must
consider the spouses’ comparative financial resources as well as the payor
spouse’s ability to meet his own needs. See A.R.S. § 25-319(B)(4)–(5);
Guidelines IV.C.4–.5, V.C.4–.5. The court did so here, acknowledging
Myers’s limited earnings but expressly finding that he was capable of
paying the spousal maintenance award. Again, absent a trial transcript, we
presume the evidence supports those findings. Baker, 183 Ariz. at 73.

CONCLUSION

¶12 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

2 Myers also asserts that the spousal maintenance award caused him
housing instability because he remains on the lease and is liable to pay rent
for the parties’ once-shared apartment. The decree, however, made Huang
(not Myers) 100% responsible for the apartment lease and rent obligation.

4