In Re Term of Parental Rights as to H.B.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.B.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0180
FILED 05-26-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS520869
The Honorable David J. Palmer, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Law Offices of Robert Casey, Phoenix
By Robert Ian Casey
Counsel for Appellant

Barreda Law, PLLC, Gilbert
By Bonnie Platter
Counsel for Appellee

Law Office of Joseph Ramiro-Shanahan PLLC, Scottsdale
By Jessica Elizabeth Strain
Counsel for Appellee Child, H.B.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.B.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Andrew Gaona delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David B. Gass and Judge Anni Hill Foster joined.

G A O N A, Judge:

¶1 Cheyenne B. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights to H.B. Mother doesn’t challenge the
juvenile court’s legal conclusions that Kyle F. (“Father”) proved a statutory
ground for termination and that termination was in H.B.’s best interest. She
also doesn’t challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting those
findings. She argues only that we should reverse because the juvenile court:
(1) violated Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 353 by not
”identif[ying] the ultimate facts supporting its legal conclusions”; and (2)
relied on an erroneous factual finding.

¶2 Neither argument convinces. The juvenile court’s order
contains sufficient factual findings to support the termination of Mother’s
parental rights. And although that order included one erroneous factual
finding, its inclusion was harmless. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the
juvenile court’s order. See Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 479
¶ 32 (2023).

¶4 Mother and Father are the biological parents of H.B., born in
2019. Mother is also the biological parent of H.B.’s sibling, born a few years
after H.B. (“Sibling”).

¶5 Sibling died in July 2023; the autopsy identified injuries to
Sibling’s head, torso, genitals, and abdomen. Maricopa County’s medical
examiner concluded a probable febrile seizure from respiratory viruses
caused Sibling’s death. Gilbert Police and the Arizona Department of Child
Safety (“DCS”) investigated, and Mother gave differing accounts to friends
and family about when and how Sibling died.

¶6 After taking emergency custody of H.B., Father filed a
petition seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights to H.B. He alleged

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.B.
Decision of the Court

that Mother: (1) neglected to protect H.B. and Sibling resulting in Sibling’s
death; (2) lacked capacity to protect H.B.; and (3) had a history of drug and
alcohol abuse.

¶7 The juvenile court held a contested termination hearing over
eight days. It heard testimony from law enforcement, Maricopa County’s
medical examiner, a private medical expert, Mother, Mother’s then-
boyfriend (now her husband) Bailey, and Father. The juvenile court also
admitted various exhibits, including the investigation reports completed by
Gilbert Police and DCS regarding Sibling’s death, and an expert witness
report on the cause of Sibling’s injuries and death.

¶8 After considering all the evidence, the juvenile court issued a
written order terminating Mother’s parental rights to H.B. It found Father
proved abuse or neglect of H.B. under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) by clear and
convincing evidence and that termination was in H.B.’s best interests by a
preponderance of the evidence.

¶9 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §
8-235.

DISCUSSION

¶10 On appeal, Mother contends we should reverse because the
juvenile court violated Rule 353 by failing to include adequate written
factual findings supporting termination and erred by relying on an
erroneous fact.

I. We Consider Mother’s Rule 353 Argument on the Merits.

¶11 Father first argues Mother waived her Rule 353 challenge by
raising it for the first time on appeal.

¶12 We generally consider issues not raised in the juvenile court
as waived, “but the decision to find waiver is discretionary.” Logan B. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 532, 536 ¶ 9 (App. 2018). Because of the
fundamental liberty interest at stake in a termination case, we exercise our
discretion to address the merits of Mother’s Rule 353 argument. See Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982).

II. The Juvenile Court’s Findings of Fact Satisfy Rule 353.

¶13 Mother doesn’t challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting termination. She argues instead that the juvenile court violated

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.B.
Decision of the Court

Rule 353 by issuing conclusory findings without identifying supporting
facts.

¶14 Whether a termination order includes sufficient written
findings of fact is a legal question we review de novo. See Logan B., 244 Ariz.
at 536 ¶ 11; Ruben M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 230 Ariz. 236, 240 ¶ 20 (App.
2012). To terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must find at least one
statutory ground by clear and convincing evidence and that termination is
in the child’s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. Brionna J.,
255 Ariz. at 474 ¶ 1; A.R.S. § 8-533. If the petitioner meets that burden, the
court must enter written findings supporting its ruling. A.R.S. § 8-538(A);
Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 353.

¶15 Rule 353 requires the juvenile court to “make specific findings
of fact in support of the termination of parental rights.” Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct.
353(h)(2)(A). Those findings suffice if they permit meaningful appellate
review by identifying at least one factual finding supporting each legal
conclusion. See Logan B., 244 Ariz. at 537 ¶ 14; Ruben M., 230 Ariz. at 240 ¶
24. The relevant question is thus whether the juvenile court’s order
identifies the “ultimate facts” and allows us to determine what that court
decided and whether it correctly applied the law. Ruben M., 230 Ariz. at 241
¶ 25. The order here meets that standard.

¶16 The juvenile court’s order features several pages of factual
findings supporting its findings of abuse or neglect under A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)(2) and that termination was in H.B.’s best interests. In sum, it found:
(1) Sibling suffered repeated and serious injuries while in Mother’s care; (2)
Mother’s explanations for Sibling’s injuries and death were inconsistent
and unsupported; (3) Mother (and Bailey) failed to protect Sibling and H.B.
and continued exposing them to unsafe conditions; (4) Mother failed to
recognize and respond to threats to both children’s safety; and (5) H.B. was
safe only because Father had custody and Mother’s contact was limited and
supervised.

¶17 As to the statutory ground under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), the
court found that Sibling was abused and neglected while in Mother’s care,
including exposure to multiple unsafe caregivers resulting in significant
injuries and ultimately in Sibling’s death. It also found that Mother failed
to protect Sibling and that H.B. was at risk of abuse if placed in Mother’s
care.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.B.
Decision of the Court

¶18 As to best interests, the juvenile court found that termination
was in H.B.’s best interests because of Mother’s long history of failing to
care for and protect her children and the circumstances of Sibling’s death.

¶19 Read in isolation, some of the juvenile court’s conclusions
may appear brief. But reading those conclusions together with the extensive
written factual findings (as we must) leaves no doubt about the basis for
termination. See, e.g., Neal v. Neal, 116 Ariz. 590, 594 (1977) (“It is a
fundamental rule of construction that the decree must be read as a whole,
so as to give effect to each word and part in order to effectuate the intention
of the court.”). Rule 353 requires findings sufficient to permit meaningful
review, not a separate factual paragraph keyed to each legal conclusion.
And even if the juvenile court’s order doesn’t expressly articulate a
particular finding, we look to the record to determine whether it supports
implicit findings necessary to sustain the ruling. Mary Lou C. v. Arizona
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50 ¶ 17 (App. 2004). The record here does,
and the juvenile court’s order thus satisfies Rule 353’s requirements.

III. The Juvenile Court’s Mistaken Reference to Grand Jury Testimony
Was Harmless Error.

¶20 Mother also argues the juvenile court committed error
requiring vacatur by referencing testimony before a grand jury that didn’t
occur.

¶21 We review the juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error.
Raymond F. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 376 ¶ 13 (App. 2010).
We will affirm if reasonable evidence supports the ruling, id., even where a
finding is mistaken, so long as the record permits us to conclude the court
would’ve reached the same result absent the error. See id.; Alice M. v. Dep’t
of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 70, 73 ¶ 12 (App. 2015).

¶22 The juvenile court’s written ruling contains ample support for
termination independent of the erroneous grand-jury reference. So does the
record. Mother doesn’t challenge the sufficiency of the evidence or the legal
basis for termination. She thus waived any challenge to those grounds.
See Crystal E. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 577–78 ¶ 5 (App.
2017). And nothing in the juvenile court’s order suggests that the grand-
jury reference was in any way dispositive of the court’s legal conclusions.
Any error was thus harmless.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.B.
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶23 We affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s
parental rights to H.B.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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