State v. Nealy

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

PARIS ANTONIO NEALY, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0144
FILED 04-23-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. CR-2024-00889
The Honorable Lee Frank Jantzen, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Joshua C. Smith
Counsel for Appellee

Jill L. Evans Attorney at Law, Flagstaff
By Jill L. Evans
Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. NEALY
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 Paris Antonio Nealy (“Nealy”) appeals his conviction for
aggravated assault resulting in serious physical injury. Nealy argues the
State presented insufficient evidence that he caused a serious physical
injury and the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. Because there was
sufficient evidence from which a jury could find Nealy caused serious
physical injury, and Nealy has not shown prosecutorial error causing
prejudice, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 C.G. worked as a security guard at a library in Kingman. On
April 22, 2024, while on duty, an employee informed C.G. that Nealy was
smoking in the library. C.G. reviewed surveillance footage confirming
Nealy was smoking. C.G. advised Nealy he had to smoke outside. Nealy
got upset, so C.G. told him to leave. Nealy left and C.G. reported the
incident to his supervisor.

¶3 Later that day, while C.G. remained on duty, a patron
informed him that Nealy was outside the library. C.G. went outside to give
Nealy his supervisor’s business card. Nealy knocked C.G. backwards onto
the concrete sidewalk. As C.G. got up, Nealy threw his bag on the ground
and punched C.G. in the head, again knocking him onto the concrete. Nealy
continued punching C.G. in the head. C.G. remained on the ground and
moved between a bike rack and a short concrete wall. After he stopped
punching C.G., Nealy picked up his bag and walked away.

¶4 A library employee took C.G. to the emergency room. The
following day a specialist informed C.G. that his jaw was broken in two
places and required emergency surgery. Medical staff wired C.G.’s jaw
shut, so he could not move his mouth. This impacted C.G.’s ability to eat,
drink, and sleep and caused him pain. C.G. also could not work until the
wires were removed nearly three months later. At the time of trial ten

2
STATE v. NEALY
Decision of the Court

months later, C.G. still experienced soreness and difficulty chewing certain
foods.

¶5 Officers detained Nealy the same day as the assault and
observed blood on his hands and pants. The State charged Nealy with: (1)
aggravated assault causing serious physical injury (“count one”); (2)
aggravated assault causing temporary but substantial disfigurement
(“count two”); and (3) aggravated assault by use of a deadly weapon or
dangerous instrument (“count three”). See A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(1)–(3).

¶6 During trial, C.G. and one of the responding officers testified.
C.G. testified about his interactions with Nealy, the ensuing assault, and his
resulting injuries. The responding officer testified about his interactions
with Nealy and C.G. after the assault. The State introduced video
surveillance footage of the confrontation inside the library and Nealy’s
assault outside. The State also introduced photos showing C.G.’s injuries.

¶7 Nealy moved for a directed verdict on all three counts. He
argued the State failed to meet its burden of proof. The court granted
Nealy’s motion as to count three, concluding there was insufficient
evidence that Nealy used a dangerous instrument or weapon during the
assault. See A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(2).

¶8 During closing arguments, the State discussed the elements of
count one and defined a serious physical injury. See A.R.S. §§ 13-105(39)
(defining serious physical injury), 13-1204(A) (classifications of aggravated
assault). The State then argued that “by striking someone repeatedly in the
head while that head is up against or near a concrete wall or sidewalk, there
is a reasonable risk of death.” To explain how the evidence supported a
finding that C.G.’s injuries caused a “serious physical injury,” the State
summarized the extent and duration of C.G.’s injury.

¶9 The court instructed the jury that statements from counsel are
not evidence and on the elements of proof for both remaining counts. The
court instructed that aggravated assault causing serious physical injury
requires proof that “[1] [t]he defendant committed an assault; and [2] [t]he
assault was aggravated by. . . [t]he defendant caus[ing] serious physical
injury to another person.” The court also instructed the jury that a serious
physical injury “includes physical injury that creates a reasonable risk of
death, or that causes serious and permanent disfigurement, serious
impairment to health or loss or protracted impairment of the function of
any bodily organ or limb.”

3
STATE v. NEALY
Decision of the Court

¶10 The jury convicted Nealy on both remaining counts. A.R.S.
§ 13-1204(A)(1), (3). The court sentenced Nealy to six years’ imprisonment
on count one and two years’ imprisonment on count two, to run
concurrently.

¶11 Nealy timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 12-
120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, 13-4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶12 Nealy appeals only his conviction on count one for
aggravated assault causing serious physical injury. A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(1).
He makes two primary arguments. One, the State presented insufficient
evidence that C.G. suffered a “serious physical injury.” Two, the
prosecutor engaged in misconduct when explaining the law and facts
during closing arguments.

I. Insufficient Evidence

¶13 We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing
all facts and resolving all evidentiary conflicts to support the verdict. State
v. Pena, 235 Ariz. 277, 279 ¶ 5 (2014). We determine only whether
substantial evidence supports the verdict. Id. “Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla and is such proof that reasonable persons could accept
as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 134 ¶ 65 (2006)
(citation omitted). “The substantial evidence required to support a
conviction may be direct or circumstantial,” and we do not “reweigh the
evidence to decide if [we] would reach the same conclusions as the trier of
fact.” State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 27 ¶ 40 (App. 2007); State v. Barger, 167
Ariz. 563, 568 (App. 1990). We reverse “only where there is a complete
absence of probative facts to support the conviction.” State v. Allen, 253
Ariz. 306, 341 ¶ 109 (2022) (citation omitted).

¶14 To convict Nealy for aggravated assault causing serious
physical injury, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
(1) Nealy intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly committed an assault, and
(2) the assault caused “serious physical injury” to C.G. A.R.S. §§ 13-1203, -
1204(A)(1). A serious physical injury “includes physical injury that creates
a reasonable risk of death, or that causes . . . serious impairment of health
or loss or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily organ or
limb.” A.R.S. § 13-105(39).

4
STATE v. NEALY
Decision of the Court

¶15 The State presented evidence that Nealy’s assault broke C.G.’s
jaw in two places. Those fractures required emergency surgery to install
wires to allow C.G.’s jaw to heal properly. C.G. wore a wire device on his
jaw for three months, during which he could not move his mouth. This
impacted his ability to eat, drink, sleep, and work. Even ten months after
the assault, C.G. still experienced impairment in the form of soreness and
difficulty chewing certain food.

¶16 In State v. Mwandishi, 229 Ariz. 570 (App. 2012), we affirmed
a conviction for aggravated assault causing serious physical injury. In that
case, the perpetrator broke the victim’s orbital bone. Id. at 570 ¶ 2. We
concluded that injury was a “protracted impairment of the function of any
bodily organ or limb” because the victim’s injury could not heal normally
without surgery and the victim “continue[d] to experience side effects from
the injury that impair[ed] the function of her eye[.]” See id. at 572 ¶ 10.

¶17 Based on the evidence that C.G.’s injuries would not heal
normally without surgery to wire his jaw shut, and that C.G. spent three
months recovering and still experienced some impairment months later, a
jury could reasonably conclude that Nealy’s assault caused C.G. a
“protracted impairment” (i.e., a serious physical injury). See State v. Dodd,
244 Ariz. 182, 186–87 ¶ 16 (App. 2017) (jurors could use “their collective
common sense” to conclude that a “broken and dislocated femur and hip
socket” requiring surgery at a “high-level trauma center” were protracted
impairments); cf. State v. Cooke, 259 Ariz. 45, 52–53 ¶¶ 33, 41 (App. 2024)
(“substantial evidence would allow a properly-instructed jury” to find a
“serious physical injury” when a “shattered” shin from a gunshot required
two surgeries and the victim spent several months in recovery); State v.
Miller, 16 Ariz. App. 92, 93-94 (1971) (the jury could decide whether there
was a “serious bodily injury” when the defendant broke an officer’s jaw).

¶18 Nealy relies on State v. George, 206 Ariz. 436 (App. 2003), for
his argument that there is insufficient evidence to find a “serious physical
injury.” In that case, we concluded that a gunshot wound causing two days
of impaired mobility did not support a finding of a “serious physical
injury.” Id. at 442–43 ¶¶ 13–14. George reasoned that a “serious impairment
of health” must be graver than the “usual temporary impairment caused by
[a] fracture,” and a “protracted impairment” of an organ or limb must last
longer than “the healing time of a normal fracture.” Id. at 441 ¶ 9. Based
on the evidence presented about the severity of C.G.’s injuries, the steps
needed for those injuries to heal properly, and the duration of the
impairment (which still existed to some extent at trial), George is inapposite.

5
STATE v. NEALY
Decision of the Court

II. Prosecutorial Error

¶19 Nealy argues the State committed prosecutorial misconduct
by misstating the law and evidence during closing argument. We instead
decide whether prosecutorial error justifies a new trial. See In re Martinez,
248 Ariz. 458, 470 ¶ 47 (2020) (“When reviewing the conduct of prosecutors
in the context of ‘prosecutorial misconduct’ claims, courts should
differentiate between ‘error,’ which may not necessarily imply a concurrent
ethical rules violation, and ‘misconduct,’ which may suggest an ethical
violation.”). Nealy did not object at trial, so we review for fundamental
error. State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 140 ¶ 12 (2018). To show fundamental
error, Nealy must show there was error at trial, the error was fundamental,
and he was prejudiced. Id. at 142 ¶ 21. Nealy has not made that showing.

¶20 Nealy challenges the following statement the prosecutor
made to the jury during closing arguments: “[B]y striking someone
repeatedly in the head while that head is up against or near a concrete wall
or sidewalk, there is a reasonable risk of death.” Prosecutors have “wide
latitude” when making arguments to the jury. State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324,
336 ¶ 51 (2007) (citation omitted). During closing arguments, the
prosecutor may “summarize the evidence, make submittals to the jury, urge
the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and suggest
ultimate conclusions.” State v. Smith, 250 Ariz. 69, 100 ¶ 144 (2020) (citation
omitted). But a misstatement of the law is not permitted and is error. State
v. Murray, 250 Ariz. 543, 549–50 ¶ 19 (2021). In evaluating closing
arguments for prosecutorial error, courts consider whether the remarks
“called to the jury’s attention matters it should not have considered in
reaching its decision” and “the probability that the jurors were in fact
influenced by the remarks.” Smith, 250 Ariz. at 100 ¶ 144 (citation omitted).

¶21 Nealy argues, and the State concedes, that the prosecutor
misstated the law because “serious physical injury” requires that the injury
create a reasonable risk of death. It does not require that the defendant’s
actions create a reasonable risk of death. Accepting that the prosecutor’s
statement was error, we determine whether that error was fundamental
and prejudicial.

¶22 The prosecutor said more than the challenged statement. He
correctly explained the elements the jury would have to find to convict
Nealy of aggravated assault causing serious physical injury, and he
explained how the evidence about the severity and duration of C.G.’s
injuries established a “protracted impairment of his mouth[.]” Plus, the
court correctly instructed the jury on the elements of aggravated assault

6
STATE v. NEALY
Decision of the Court

causing serious physical injury, including the statutory definition of
“serious physical injury.” See supra ¶ 9; see also A.R.S. §§ 13-105(39), 13-
1204(A)(1).

¶23 Because the State correctly explained the elements of the
crime and the court correctly instructed the jury on those elements, any
confusion caused by the prosecutor’s misstatement about the applicable
law was cured. See State v. Prince, 226 Ariz. 516, 538 ¶ 89 (2011) (concluding
that any confusion caused by the prosecutor’s misstatement of law was
cured by proper jury instructions). We presume the jury followed the
court’s instructions and was not influenced by the prosecutor’s fleeting
misstatement of the law. State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 403 ¶¶ 68–69 (2006).
Nealy has not shown fundamental error. See Prince, 226 Ariz. at 538 ¶ 89.

¶24 Nealy also argues the prosecutor’s statement misrepresented
the facts because Nealy did not strike C.G.’s head while it was “up against
or near a concrete wall or sidewalk.” Nealy instead contends that C.G. fell
on the concrete and hit his head. But the State introduced video
surveillance footage of the assault. So the jurors could see and discern for
themselves what occurred. And the court instructed the jury that
statements from counsel are not evidence. On this last point, Nealy has not
shown error, let alone error that was fundamental and prejudicial.

CONCLUSION

¶25 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

7