In Re: Mh2024-008242

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE: MH2024-008242

No. 1 CA-MH 24-0188
FILED 04-20-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. MH2024-008242
The Honorable Terri L. Clarke, Commissioner

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Sean M. Moore
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Robert S. Shipman
Counsel for Appellant
IN RE: MH 2024-008242
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Mental health patient A.G. appeals the superior court’s order
imposing on him mandatory mental health treatment. For the following
reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 A.G. has a history of mental illness and is designated
seriously mentally ill. In the fall of 2024, he was scheduled for release from
the Maricopa County Jail when two licensed social workers, D.G. and D.L.
met with him. A.G. displayed concerning behavior: he was “initially not
verbal” and responding to internal stimuli, then began talking to himself
and acting aggressively, cursing at a social worker. Law enforcement took
him from the jail to a behavioral health facility. Observation at the facility
revealed that A.G. continued to respond to internal stimuli, and a crisis care
manager applied to have A.G. admitted for an involuntary evaluation.
Attached to that application was a witness information form listing D.G.
and D.L. as potential witnesses. A psychiatric mental health nurse
practitioner petitioned for a court-ordered evaluation, which the court
granted.

¶3 Upon evaluation, a physician petitioned for court-ordered
treatment. Attached to this petition was a witness list including D.G. and
D.L. A.G.’s counsel moved to preclude D.G. and D.L. from testifying,
arguing that because they were licensed social workers, they were subject
to confidentiality requirements preventing them from testifying. The
motion stated that “should the court permit the testimony . . . [A.G.] hereby
requests additional time to voir dire the witnesses” about their
confidentiality obligations. Citing Matter of Commitment of Alleged Mentally
Disordered Person, 181 Ariz. 290, 293 (1995), counsel argued that “the
proposed acquaintance witnesses conducted mental health evaluations []
for the sole purposes of determining commitment” and thus failed to meet

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the petitioner’s obligation to provide acquaintance witnesses who did not
“participate[] in the psychological evaluation of the patient for commitment
purposes.”

¶4 The court held a hearing on the petition. At the hearing, the
court noted that A.G.’s counsel amended the motion to include the
argument about acquaintance witness eligibility at the last minute, that
neither the court nor the State had time to review the amended motion
before the hearing, and that a similar issue was pending before this Court.
The court determined that it would “have the witnesses testify, subject to
the objections” and proceed depending on guidance from this Court. The
State called D.G. and D.L. who both testified that they were licensed social
workers working at the Maricopa County Jail who met with A.G.

¶5 D.L. testified that his position included completing
assessments for “emergency and nonemergent mental health needs . . .
follow-up care” and “if they’re being released, as in this case, we assess for
safety.” He clarified that “[t]his was an assessment for safety, for that
purpose. We were aware [A.G.] had been released on his charges. And so
that was the purpose of the meeting.” When asked to clarify if the purpose
of his meetings was to determine if a petition was necessary, D.L. testified
that:

[w]e have to see everybody to determine—anybody we’re
concerned about. We see to determine their safety for release
because the [] jail is intake, transfer, and release. So everybody
who comes in and everybody who leaves, we’re making that
mental health judgment for safety.

¶6 He testified about A.G.’s behavior throughout his meetings
with him. At their first meeting, A.G. was “not verbal,” “[d]idn’t seem to be
responding to any of [the] questions,” and was not “capable of having a
coherent conversation.” At the second meeting, A.G. was “much more
agitated,” aggressive, and talking to himself.

¶7 D.G. then testified that the purpose of her meeting with A.G.
was to assess him to “see if he was stable enough to be released.” She also
testified that she met with A.G. three times. All three meetings occurred on
the same day around thirty minutes apart, “relatively close to each other.”
At their first meeting, A.G. “wasn’t answering any questions, and didn’t
appear stable to be released.” Then, at the second meeting “he banged his
head really hard against the [cell] door.” D.G. explained that once A.G. hit

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his head, the possibility of a petition became relevant. After this, at their
third meeting, A.G. would not respond to her.

¶8 At the end of the hearing A.G.’s counsel re-raised the motion,
requesting that the court excise D.L.’s and D.G.’s testimonies because their
conversations with A.G. were confidential and they were not proper “lay
witnesses.” Although the State did not file a written response, it argued that
its witnesses gave A.G. disclaimers and “did not establish a counseling or a
therapeutic relationship” but “testified that they were there to do an
assessment of [A.G.’s] mental stability for safety.” The court denied the
motion, finding no therapeutic or counseling relationship. The court
ultimately ordered A.G. to undergo treatment, finding that he was a danger
to himself and persistently or acutely disabled.

¶9 A.G. timely appealed and we have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 12-
120.21(A)(1), 36-546.01(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶10 On appeal, A.G. does not re-raise the confidentiality
argument he made to the superior court but contends that, because the
social workers’ “primary contact was to assess and evaluate [A.G.] for
mental health treatment” they were prohibited from testifying as
acquaintance witnesses. We stayed this appeal pending a decision in In re
MH2023-004502, 583 P.3d 744 (Ariz. 2026) (as amended) from the Arizona
Supreme Court addressing a similar issue. The supreme court ultimately
held that a licensed social worker may testify as an acquaintance witness
regarding their evaluation of a patient before an application for court-
ordered treatment was filed. Id. at 748 ¶ 14. Following the supreme court’s
decision, we granted the parties supplemental briefing. In his supplemental
briefing, A.G. conceded that D.G. and D.L. “were not part of the evaluation
process” and “were not disqualified from testifying as acquaintance
witnesses due to their roles.” See id. at 746, 748 ¶¶ 4, 14 (a licensed social
worker who meets with an individual before a petition for court-ordered
treatment is “not disqualified from testifying as an acquaintance witness”).
But he maintains his argument that D.G. and D.L. “lacked the perspective
required of acquaintance witnesses” “because the only interaction they had
with Appellant were for mental health assessment.”

¶11 We note that, during the pendency of this appeal, “the
Legislature amended § 36-539(B) to clarify that licensed behavioral health

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professionals may testify as acquaintance witnesses.”1 Id. at 747–48 ¶ 11.
Thus, this matter is arguably moot. See State v. Sweet, 143 Ariz. 266, 269
(1985) (generally, we do not apply statutes retroactively “unless expressly
specified by the legislature,” but an amendment that clarifies a statute may
be applied retroactively in certain situations). Given “the important liberty
interests at stake in matters involving involuntary mental health evaluation
and treatment,” MH2023-004502, 583 P.3d at 748 ¶ 11, and that A.G.’s
argument extends to the facts of this specific case, we consider the merits of
his remaining argument.

¶12 “We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo, but we
view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the superior court’s
judgment and will not set aside its findings unless clearly erroneous.” In re
MH2020-004882, 251 Ariz. 584, 586 ¶ 12 (App. 2021) (as amended). We do
not require “strict compliance” with statutory requirements in the mental
health context, only “complete compliance with each statute’s
requirements, even when that compliance is technically different from what
the statute requires.” In re Pima Cnty. Mental Health No. 20200860221, 255
Ariz. 519, 524 ¶ 11 (2023).

¶13 A petition for court-ordered involuntary mental health
treatment requires testimony from at least two evaluating health
professionals and two acquaintance witnesses. A.R.S. § 36-539(B). A.G.
argues that, because in his view the social workers were not proper
acquaintance witnesses, “[t]he court order for treatment must be vacated
because no qualified acquaintance witnesses testified at the hearing.”

1 The relevant section of § 36-539(B) now reads:

The evidence presented by the petitioner or the patient shall
include the testimony of two or more witnesses, regardless of
the witnesses’ professional licensure, if any, who observed or
were acquainted with the patient at the time of the alleged
mental disorder before the submission of the current
application for evaluation pursuant to § 36-520 or, if after the
submission of the current application, who were not formal
participants in the evaluation process. The testimony of the
witnesses shall be limited to observed facts and may not
include expert opinion or conclusions.

A.R.S. § 36-539(B) (emphasis added).

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¶14 A.G. maintains that D.G. and D.L. were disqualified from
testifying because they met with him only when he was in a suicide watch
cell and thus could not “provide the trial court with informal, day-to-day
observations” about his behavior and were thus “not qualified
acquaintance witness[es].” But “[t]he statute does not impose a specific
length of time over which the acquaintance or familiarity with the patient
must take place or the manner in which the witness’s familiarity with the
patient must be acquired.” In re MH 2008-002596, 223 Ariz. 32, 36 ¶ 17 (App.
2009). Rather, an acquaintance witness is anyone “acquainted with the
patient at the time of the alleged mental disorder.” A.R.S. § 36-539(B). “The
core question when analyzing whether a witness may satisfy the statutory
‘acquaintance’ requirement is whether the prospective witness has
relevant, personal knowledge of the mental disorder alleged.” In re
MH2012-002480, 232 Ariz. 421, 423 ¶ 9 (App. 2013).

¶15 A.G. claims that because D.G. and D.L.’s “interactions with
[him] were formal, evaluative in nature, structured for a particular purpose,
and conducted while [he] was under the strains of being evaluated for
potential mental health treatment in a suicide watch jail cell” that they
could not provide the court with testimony about “informal, day-to-day
contact” with him. But where a “particular event or occurrence, such as [a]
conversation” going to the witnesses’ knowledge exists “at the time of the
alleged mental disorder,” the witness need not provide “informal day-to-
day observation[s].” MH 2008-002596, 223 Ariz. at 33–34, 36–37 ¶ ¶ 3, 19 n.2
(holding that a nurse who took a single, fifteen-minute crisis-intervention
telephone call from the appellant qualified as an acquaintance witness).
Here D.G. and D.L. both had meetings with A.G. that contributed to their
understanding of his mental state, and they both provided personal and
relevant knowledge of his behavior “at the time of the alleged mental
disorder.” Id.

¶16 Arizona jurisprudence does not support the contention that
an individual who observes a patient only in unique or stressful
circumstances is not qualified to testify as an acquaintance witness. See
MH2020-004882, 251 Ariz. at 585, 586–87 ¶¶ 7, 18 (finding that social
workers who spoke to distressed patients in the emergency room may
testify as acquaintance witnesses); MH 2008-002596, 223 Ariz. at 35–37,
¶¶ 12, 15–16, 19 (finding that a nurse who took a single, fifteen-minute
telephone call from the appellant qualified as an acquaintance witness); In
re Pima Cnty. Health No. MH 862-16-84, 143 Ariz. 338, 339 (App. 1984)
(permitting acquaintance testimony from two hospital employees who did
not know the appellant before she self-admitted to a psychiatric hospital for
suicidal thoughts). D.G. and D.L. both had relevant personal knowledge of

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A.G.’s mental state and were thus able to testify as acquaintance witnesses.
See A.R.S. § 36-539(B); MH2012-002480, 232 Ariz. at 423 ¶ 9.

CONCLUSION

¶17 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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