Jacqulin Butler v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Children

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 36
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-25-37

JACQULIN BUTLER Opinion Delivered January 21, 2026

APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT
V. SMITH DISTRICT
[NO. 66FJV-23-231]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR HONORABLE ANNIE POWELL
CHILDREN HENDRICKS, JUDGE
APPELLEES
AFFIRMED; MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GRANTED

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge

Appellant Jacqulin Butler timely appealed the Sebastian County Circuit Court’s

order terminating her parental rights to her minor children, MC1 and MC2. Butler’s

counsel filed a motion to withdraw and a no-merit brief pursuant to our rules and case law

stating that there are no meritorious grounds to support an appeal. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9

(2025); Linker-Flores v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004). Our

court clerk mailed certified copies of counsel’s motion and brief to Butler’s last-known

address informing her of her right to file pro se points for reversal. Butler did not file pro se

points; accordingly, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (“DHS”) has not filed a

brief. We affirm and grant the motion to withdraw as counsel.
I. Background Facts

A protective-services case for MC1 and MC2 was opened with DHS on October 26,

2022, for inadequate supervision and drug use. DHS referred Butler and her live-in

boyfriend, Charles Smith, for a drug-and-alcohol assessment and related classes and

performed several home visits. During the visits, Butler and Charles were drug screened with

negative results; however, the drug screens were sent for laboratory confirmation, and those

results were positive for methamphetamine. DHS referred Butler to additional services in

April 2023. Charles and Butler attended only one drug-and-alcohol session in April, and

Butler had a positive drug screen for methamphetamine and amphetamines. In May, Butler

had a positive drug screen for methamphetamine and buprenorphine, and Charles had two

positive drug screens for THC and methamphetamine.

On May 8, DHS implemented a safety plan that required Butler to remain in the

home with her neighbor to adequately supervise MC1 and MC2 until a team decision-

making meeting could be held. The meeting was held on May 10. Charles reported that he

smoked THC in his car but denied using methamphetamine. Butler admitted using

methamphetamine in the past and taking “Roxy” for a headache but denied that she

currently used methamphetamine or smoked THC.

Due to the history of the family, including consistent drug use and noncompliance,

DHS filed a petition for dependency-neglect on May 17; at the time, MC1 was seventeen

years old and MC2 was two. DHS filed an amended petition on May 24 alleging that the

minor children were dependent-neglected as a result of “abuse, neglect, or parental

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unfitness.” At the request of the attorney ad litem, an emergency hearing was held on May

31. The circuit court found that, although the neighbor had agreed to check on the family,

more supervision was needed given Butler’s positive drug screens. The circuit court further

found that emergency conditions necessitated the removal of the children and ordered them

into the custody of DHS. The court ordered both Butler and Charles to submit to hair-

follicle drug testing and set an adjudication hearing for June 28.

On September 30, the circuit court entered an adjudication order finding the minor

children dependent-neglected on the basis of parental unfitness due to substance abuse. The

goal was set as reunification with Butler, and both Butler and Charles were ordered to

comply with the case plan; submit to drug-and-alcohol assessments and complete any

recommended treatment; attend parenting classes; attend counseling; and obtain and

maintain stable housing, employment, income, and transportation.

A review hearing was held on November 29. At this time, Butler had completed

parenting classes, a drug-and-alcohol assessment, and counseling. She had also submitted to

urine drug screens, but the urine consistently did not present at the proper temperature.

Charles had not worked the case plan, and Butler reported they were no longer together.

Charles was ordered to have no contact with MC1 and MC2. The goal of the case continued

as reunification.

A permanency-planning hearing was held on May 8, 2024. The court found that

although there were some services completed in Butler’s plan that showed significant

progress, she still had many obstacles to overcome. Butler had completed parenting classes,

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a drug-and-alcohol assessment, and counseling. However, she had not completed drug

treatment. She never went into residential treatment, despite the referral made on November

29, 2023, following her positive hair-follicle test for methamphetamine.

Butler was also admittedly living with Charles again, who the court noted had not

made himself available to DHS for services and was arrested at Butler’s residence during the

review period. Butler had also been difficult for DHS to reach during the review period and

could not verify employment with paystubs. Accordingly, the court ordered Butler to

provide DHS with her paystub, present a copy of her prescriptions to DHS, and sign a release

of information for DHS to access her medical records. Butler was also ordered to complete

another drug-and-alcohol assessment and comply with any recommended treatment. Charles

was ordered to work the case plan as long as he and Butler continued to live together. The

goal of the case remained reunification with a concurrent goal of another planned

permanent living arrangement (“APPLA”) for MC1 and a concurrent goal of adoption

following termination of parental rights for MC2.

DHS filed a petition for termination of parental rights as to MC2 on July 14, 2024,

alleging three grounds in support of its petition for termination: (1) the juvenile had been

out of the home for twelve months with the parent having failed to remedy the reason for

removal; (2) other factors or issues arose subsequent to the filing of the original petition for

dependency-neglect that demonstrate the placement of the juvenile in the custody of the

parent is contrary to the juvenile’s health, safety, or welfare, and the parent had manifested

an incapacity or indifference to remedy those subsequent factors; and (3) that the parent

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subjected the juvenile to aggravated circumstances with little likelihood of successful

reunification despite services being provided.

The termination hearing was held on August 21, 2024. DHS’s only witness was

family-service worker Kristen Hill, who had been assigned as the caseworker for the family

since July 2023. She testified that DHS offered Butler parenting classes, counseling services,

drug-and-alcohol assessment, and bus passes. Butler completed her parenting class, her first

drug-and-alcohol assessment, and her counseling in October 2023 as part of her treatment;

however, she had a positive hair-follicle test for amphetamines and methamphetamine on

November 13, 2023. Hill testified that DHS made a referral for residential drug treatment

on November 23, 2023, but Butler elected not to go to an inpatient facility at the time.

Butler also had a positive hair-follicle test for methamphetamine on May 14, 2024, and DHS

referred her for a new drug-and-alcohol assessment; she completed the prescreen on May 17

but failed to attend the in-person assessment on May 20. On June 4, she rescheduled the

assessment but then failed to attend on June 7. On July 15, she completed the drug

assessment. However, on July 30, she canceled her appointment, and on August 6, Butler

failed to attend her subsequent treatment.

Butler testified on her own behalf. She testified that the last time she and Charles

lived together was around May 2024. She alleged that after an argument, Charles took her

phone and broke it, so she did not have a phone for a while. Butler testified about her

employment history but could not remember when she was cleaning apartments. She said

she gave DHS a statement from her manager. She did not remember when she worked at

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Burlington Coat Factory. She had been working at Family Dollar since June or July 2024

and worked between thirty-two and forty hours a week. She was unsure of her average pay

and could not explain why she failed to give DHS proof of her employment.

Butler testified that she completed her first drug-and-alcohol assessment and that

DHS did not recommend that she attend inpatient drug treatment but merely mentioned

that it was a possibility. She could not remember the last time she had used an illegal

substance. She testified that she completed her co-occurring treatment in October 2023 but

was unsure when she started using methamphetamine again. She acknowledged that she had

tested positive for methamphetamine on a hair-follicle test in May 2024 and had tested

positive for amphetamines when she submitted to her drug-and-alcohol assessment in July

2024. Butler testified that she was presently clean and would not test positive for illegal

substances—she was drug screened during the hearing with negative results. Butler testified

that she had started going back to Western Arkansas Counseling and Guidance Center for

treatment the Monday before the termination hearing. She acknowledged that she had

missed some appointments and explained that she had just started working at Family Dollar

when she was scheduling those appointments, and she missed them because she didn’t want

to lose her job.

The attorney ad litem called MC1 to testify. MC1 testified that Butler and Charles

were messaging each other on and off through his Facebook account from March 26, 2024,

through August 8, 2024, and that they had calls on May 8, May 13, July 5, and July 11. MC1

also testified that Butler’s “phone situation” was a lie because she was texting him all the

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time; therefore, she could have messaged her caseworker. MC1 testified that he was placed

with MC2 and that MC2 was doing very well.

At the close of all the testimony and evidence, the circuit court granted DHS’s

petition and terminated Butler’s parental rights. The termination order was subsequently

entered on October 24, 2024. Butler filed a timely notice of appeal on November 13, 2024.

Her appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw and a no-merit brief; this appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

This court reviews termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Roland v. Ark. Dep’t of

Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 333, 552 S.W.3d 443. An order terminating parental rights

must be based on a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the sought-after

termination is in the children’s best interest. Id. The circuit court must consider the

likelihood that the children will be adopted if the parent’s rights are terminated and the

potential harm that could be caused if the children are returned to a parent. Id. The circuit

court must also find that one of the grounds stated in the termination statute is satisfied. Id.

In dependency-neglect cases, if, after studying the record and researching the law,

appellant’s counsel determines that the appellant has no meritorious basis for appeal, then

counsel may file a no-merit petition and move to withdraw. The petition must include an

argument section that lists all adverse rulings that the parent received at the circuit court

level and explain why each adverse ruling is not a meritorious ground for reversal. Id.; see also

Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(j)(1)(A).

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III. Discussion

In her no-merit brief, Butler’s appellate counsel asserts that after a conscientious

review of the record, she has determined that there are no issues of arguable merit for appeal.

Counsel identified the failure-to-remedy ground as having the least potential for arguable

merit. Because only one ground is needed for termination, she correctly maintains that any

argument regarding the remaining grounds are moot. See, e.g., Westbrook v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 352, 584 S.W.3d 258. The failure-to-remedy ground allows for

termination when a juvenile has been adjudicated by the court to be dependent-neglected

and has continued to be out of the custody of the parent for twelve months, and despite a

meaningful effort by the department to rehabilitate the parent and correct the conditions

that caused removal, those conditions have not been remedied by the parent. Ark. Code

Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) (Supp. 2023). With respect to the failure-to-remedy ground,

the circuit court stated, in part, as follows:

The Court finds that the mother has dodged multiple drug screen attempts by the
Department, and the drug screens she has completed have been positive for
methamphetamine. She has had multiple phone numbers and has had inconsistent
contact with the Department. She has not remedied the issues that caused removal.

Counsel argues that Butler undoubtedly failed to remedy her ongoing drug use throughout

the case despite DHS’s offer of services including a drug-and-alcohol assessment, drug

treatment, random drug screens, and continued monitoring of Butler’s home. We agree.

The record is replete with noncompliance regarding Butler’s continued drug use and positive

drug tests for various substances—specifically, methamphetamine—as well as her admitted

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refusal to attend residential drug treatment. Finally, at the time of the termination hearing,

MC2 had been out of Butler’s custody for approximately fifteen months. Therefore, we agree

with counsel that no meritorious argument can be made that the circuit court erred in

terminating Butler’s parental rights on this statutory ground.

In addition to finding the existence of at least one statutory ground in order to

terminate parental rights, a court must also find that termination of parental interest is in

the child’s best interest, taking into consideration two statutory factors: (1) the likelihood of

adoption if parental rights are terminated and (2) the potential harm caused by continuing

contact with the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A). Here, the court considered

both statutory factors in light of the overall evidence, finding that termination was in MC2’s

best interest. Counsel contends that there are no issues of arguable merit for reversal in

challenging this best-interest finding. We agree.

Regarding adoptability, the circuit court heard testimony from the family-service

worker that MC2 is adoptable and that MC2’s current placement desired to adopt him.

DHS also did a data match for MC2 that resulted in 331 potential matching families. A

caseworker’s testimony that a child is adoptable is sufficient to support an adoptability

finding. See Strickland v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 608, 567 S.W.3d 870.

Regarding potential harm, the circuit court is not required to find that actual harm

would result or to affirmatively identify a potential harm. Ross v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,

2017 Ark. App. 503, 529 S.W.3d 692. Potential harm must be viewed in broad terms, and

“potential” necessarily means that the court is required to look to future possibilities. Id. This

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court has frequently held that continued drug use and instability demonstrate potential harm

sufficient to support a best-interest finding in a termination-of-parental-rights case. Beaird v.

Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 415, 585 S.W.3d 172; Murphy v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 426, 560 S.W.3d 465; Robinson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark.

App. 262, 520 S.W.3d 322.

Finally, counsel notes that, other than the termination decision itself, she has

reviewed the record for all adverse rulings to Butler made by the circuit court on all

objections, motions, and requests made at the termination hearing. First, Butler objected to

the relevance of the caseworker’s testimony regarding the protective-services case that led to

DHS’s filing the dependency-neglect petition. The circuit court overruled the objection and

allowed the testimony. Counsel argues that this ruling does not provide a meritorious basis

for appeal because the testimony was relevant to Butler’s drug use, which was the cause of

removal, and one of the elements DHS was required to prove was that Butler failed to remedy

the cause of removal. We agree. This court has held that a parent’s history with DHS is

relevant in a dependency-neglect proceeding. See Brown v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2015 Ark.

App. 725, 478 S.W.3d 272.

Next, testimony was elicited from MC1 regarding conversations between Butler and

Charles that were occurring on MC1’s Facebook account. Butler objected that the testimony

was hearsay. The circuit court sustained the objection, in part, ruling that no statements by

Charles would be admitted, but it overruled the objection as to Butler’s statements. Counsel

maintains that this adverse ruling does not provide a meritorious basis for appeal because a

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statement is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is her own statement. Ark. R.

Evid. 801(d)(2) (2025). We agree. Furthermore, counsel is correct that neither of these

adverse rulings resulted in prejudice to Butler—even if they had been made in error—because

there was sufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s termination order without the

testimony that elicited the objections. Thus, any alleged error would be harmless.

Finally, as discussed by counsel, the only remaining adverse ruling was the

termination itself, which operated as a denial of Butler’s requests for additional time to prove

her sobriety. We agree that there is no meritorious basis for appeal of the court’s refusal to

allow Butler additional time. Partial compliance with a case plan does not justify reversal if

the parent continues to make decisions adverse to the child, such as abusing illegal drugs

and testing positive for drug use. Hollinger v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 458,

529 S.W.3d 242. A child’s need for permanency and stability may override a parent’s request

for more time to improve the parent’s circumstances. Kloss v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019

Ark. App. 389, 585 S.W.3d 725.

IV. Conclusion

Having carefully examined the record and the no-merit brief, we hold that Butler’s

counsel has complied with the requirements for a no-merit termination-of-parental-rights

appeal and that the appeal is wholly without merit. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion

to withdraw and affirm the termination order.

Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.

KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and BROWN, J., agree.

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Elizabeth James, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.

One brief only.

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