Timothy Lee Noble and Amanda Deann Noble v. Jeremy Mayes, as Next of Friend to Mm

Cite as 2020 Ark. App. 517
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
Reason: I attest to the
accuracy and integrity of this
document
Date: 2021-07-21 11:10:59 DIVISION III
Foxit PhantomPDF Version: No. CV-20-118
9.7.5

Opinion Delivered: November 18, 2020
TIMOTHY LEE NOBLE AND
AMANDA DEANN NOBLE
APPELLANTS APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 72PR-19-179]

JEREMY MAYES, AS NEXT OF
FRIEND TO MM HONORABLE BETH BRYAN,
APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED

RITA W. GRUBER, Chief Judge

Appellants Timothy Lee Noble and Amanda Deann Noble appeal a decision of the

Washington County Circuit Court denying their petition to adopt AMN finding that

consent of the putative father was required. On appeal, the Nobles argue (1) that the putative

father’s consent was not required because he did not meet the mandatory requirements of

Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-9-206 (Repl. 2015) and (2) that the putative father was

not thwarted in his efforts to comply with the mandatory requirements of the statute. We

affirm.

RG, the natural mother of AMN, and MM, the putative father of AMN, had known

each other since the beginning of tenth grade and had been best friends for six months

before they began to date in February 2018. In late June 2018, RG, accompanied by her

mother, went to the hospital to get on birth control at which time a pregnancy test revealed

that RG was pregnant. RG called MM immediately after the appointment to tell him she
was pregnant. RG was about four weeks into the pregnancy at that point. MM and RG

were both sixteen years old.

Shortly thereafter, MM brought up the possibility of abortion, which was rejected

by RG. Adoption was also discussed. In October 2018, MM, RG, and RG’s mother met

with an adoption agency. The meeting took place at RG’s home. At this point in time,

MM had not told his parents about the pregnancy at the request of RG and her family. After

the meeting, MM became firm in his decision to keep the baby and told his parents about

the pregnancy. Upon advice from an attorney, MM filed with the putative father registry

on November 2, 2018, and a letter was issued November 20. MM and RG continued to

be in a relationship through Christmas 2018, at which point almost all communication

ceased both in person and by phone.

On March 5, 2019, prior to the birth of the child on March 6, the Nobles filed a

petition for adoption and appointment of attorney ad litem for RG. They alleged in part

that (1) the biological mother had expressed a desire to execute a prebirth relinquishment

and termination with power to consent to adoption; (2) paternity had not been established

by a court; and (3) the putative father had not been married to the biological mother, had

not provided support, and had not taken steps to establish paternity. An attorney ad litem

was appointed for RG on March 5. The Nobles filed RG’s relinquishment of parental rights

and consent to guardianship and adoption on March 7. Abba Adoption Services was

appointed temporary guardian of the child on March 8. On March 12, counsel entered an

appearance on behalf of MM and filed a response to the petition for adoption alleging, in

part, that he is the putative father, that he had registered with the putative father registry,

2
and that he had worked to establish a relationship with the child both during the pregnancy

and since the child’s birth. On March 12, counsel for MM filed a petition to consolidate the

adoption case (case No. 72-PR-19-179) with his case to establish paternity filed March 8

(case No. 72-PR-19-406).1

On August 27, Jeremy Mayes, MM’s father, filed motions to intervene as next friend

of MM and to be substituted as next friend of MM, which were granted on September 5.

A hearing on the adoption petition took place on October 22 at which MM, RG, and

Jeremy testified. Although RG’s and MM’s testimony regarding their relationship prior to

learning of the pregnancy was basically the same, their testimony of the relationship between

learning of the pregnancy in June 2018 and Christmas was in dispute.

MM was the first witness called by the Nobles. At the time of the hearing, MM was

seventeen years old and a senior in high school; he worked at his father’s sawmill. He

testified that he initially brought up abortion, which RG rejected. He testified that he and

RG began to talk about adoption, which he thought was brought up by RG’s parents. MM

said RG had always “stuck” to adoption as the plan. He acknowledged that he considered

adoption when it was first brought up but said he was “very scared” at that point. He testified

that he, RG, and her mother met with a representative of an adoption agency at RG’s home

on October 16. During the hour-and-a-half meeting, they discussed whether adoption

would be a good option. The representative also showed them photos and profiles of

1
According to a motion to intervene, an order establishing paternity was entered on
August 23, 2019, in case No. 72-PR-19-406. The record does not contain an order granting
or denying the motion to consolidate.

3
prospective parents, including the Nobles, and they talked about which ones they liked best.

MM stated that he never expressed which family he preferred because he leaned towards

keeping the baby.

In regard to their relationship, MM said that they communicated by Instagram,

Snapchat, and phone calls and saw each other two to three times a week. RG did not return

to school at the end of the summer. He said their relationship remained romantic. He

indicated there was friction between them over the plans for the baby, and several times

during the pregnancy they did not communicate because RG “blocked” him. MM said he

and RG continued to date until Christmas at which time they broke up because of her

adoption plan. He was not aware of whether RG had medical insurance or of the care she

received. MM admitted that neither he nor his family paid RG’s medical bills but said that

he and his father told RG they would pay her expenses if she backed out of the adoption

plan. He never made a plan to pay RG’s expenses or reimburse her for them, although he

stated he began saving money to pay for them since the birth of the child.

MM said that his family met with an attorney who told them that he had no rights

because he was not married to the mother, but he registered with the putative father registry.

He admitted that in his deposition, he stated that he was told to register with the putative

father registry in order to stop the adoption.

On cross-examination, MM explained that he did not tell his parents about the

pregnancy for four months because RG and her family “begged” him not to tell his parents

or anyone else. MM explained that they broke up a month and a half after learning of the

pregnancy because they fought “all the time” about what to do but got back together until

4
Christmas. He said they saw each other three to five times a week, elaborating that he would

take her out, buy her things when she would let him, and try to surprise her. They discussed

what the baby would look like, including eye and hair color, and who she would look like.

He indicated RG would sometimes talk about staying together and raising the baby, but

they never talked about marrying. He said they came up with two names but chose Logan

because it would work for a boy or a girl. He learned the baby was a girl the day RG had

an ultrasound and showed him the photo. MM said that he spoke to RG’s stomach, kissed

her stomach, and tried to feel her stomach each time the baby kicked.

In regard to the adoption-agency meeting, he said he was not asked his opinion about

adoption, whether he had any problems with adoption, or whether he would sign a consent

to adoption. Although he was at the meeting, he did not feel like he was involved in the

discussion. By mid-October, he knew that RG was firm on her adoption decision, and RG

knew he was firm on not agreeing to adoption; he felt he was given no choice. MM told

his parents a week after the meeting. MM testified that he did not reach out to the adoption

agency because he thought the “putative father thing would stop all of it.”

MM testified that he asked to go to doctor’s appointments but was never allowed to

go. He discussed being present at the birth to help RG, to hold her hand, and to be there

for the baby when she was born. He was not told when the baby was going to be born but

found out at school on the day of her birth and then rushed to the hospital. He was allowed

to go into the delivery room after the baby was born and to hold her. At some point, he

discussed with RG that they were the only two that could raise the baby and love her. He

told her that if she did not want the baby to let him have the baby, which she refused.

5
MM testified that the relationship ended at Christmas. They had no communication

after RG blocked him, and he was not able to go to her house anymore. He stated that

during the pregnancy when he and RG were together, he frequently bought her food as

well as two stuffed animals. He said they went shopping for baby clothes and items at

Walmart and Target on several occasions.

On redirect, MM admitted that RG lived in the same house the entire time and had

not moved. He also said that RG expressed that she wanted the baby to have a better life—

not two “kids” raising a child together. MM said that RG would sometimes say she was

scared or that she wanted to keep the baby but indicated that her parents wanted her to give

the baby up for adoption.

RG testified that she and MM remained together during the pregnancy but said there

were times she blocked him because she “couldn’t take the things he said” to her. She

indicated that she “cut off” communication with MM but always left one way “open” in

case they needed to get in touch with each other. RG said that MM suggested abortion,

which she rejected, and then suggested adoption. She questioned adoption at first because

she was confused but then thought it was the best option for the baby.

RG stated that she first met with the adoption agency on August 2, after which she

was committed to adoption. She said that MM was aware of the meeting, and she kept him

informed until she stopped seeing him about two months into the pregnancy. RG said that

at one point, MM agreed with the adoption plan but later informed her he did not agree.

Although they discussed raising the child before the October meeting with the adoption

agency, RG told MM it would be better for the Nobles to raise her rather than sixteen- and

6
seventeen-year-old kids. RG said MM agreed with that logic. RG testified that during the

October meeting with the adoption agency, they looked at profiles and completed social-

and medical-background paperwork.

RG testified that she did not receive financial support from the agency but that the

agency had her medical bills. She did not recall that MM offered to pay her bills if she

backed out of her adoption plan. RG said that neither MM nor his family provided any

financial support.

On cross-examination, RG said that MM told her he wanted to keep the baby the

day before he told his parents, and thereafter, he communicated his desire “aggressively.”

She acknowledged that she told him to “back off” in November 2018 but denied ever

telling him never to talk to her again. She indicated that they did not continue to go to

basketball or football games in the fall of 2018. She said she and MM stopped having sexual

relations after finding out she was pregnant. RG admitted that MM asked if he could go to

doctor’s appointments and that she told him no. She also admitted that MM told her he

wanted to be there for the birth, and she told him she did not want him in the room but

that he could be there afterwards to see and hold the baby. She did not tell MM she had

gone into labor but acknowledged he was there and held the baby after she was born.

RG stated that MM asked how she was feeling during the pregnancy, and they

discussed her having morning sickness. She also acknowledged that when MM would ask

how her day was, if she needed anything, or to hang out, that it was MM trying to be there

for her, but she denied that he was involved in, or wanted to help her during, the pregnancy.

RG also denied looking at baby items at Walmart. RG testified that she never saw MM in

7
the three months before the baby was born but admitted she blocked him from

communications. Although she did not invite him over, she said MM was allowed to come

to her parents’ house. RG said she always kept one line of communication open. On

redirect, RG explained that she did not call MM to tell him she was in labor because she

had lost her phone.

Following RG’s testimony, appellee moved to dismiss on the basis that the Nobles

failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that MM did not establish the relationship.

Appellee further argued that the testimony was uncontroverted that MM participated in the

baby’s life. In denying the motion, the circuit court stated that the testimony was

controverted regarding their relationship after learning of the pregnancy.

Jeremy Mayes testified in opposition to the adoption petition and on behalf of his

son, MM. He was heavily involved with helping MM since he learned of the pregnancy in

October 2018 when RG was five months’ pregnant. He stated that from October until

December, MM and RG were still in a relationship, and he saw them together at the park

or at MM’s mother’s house. He believed that MM and RG’s relationship changed in

December, explaining that they went from seeing each other every day, including sneaking

around to do so, to things calming down. Jeremy said that RG made it clear to MM that

“you’re either on my side or – or I just don’t want nothing to do with you.” Jeremy said

that RG’s assertion that the relationship ended three months into the pregnancy is

“absolutely not true” because RG had been with his family several times in the fall. He said

that RG was at his house regularly until Thanksgiving. Jeremy testified that he and RG’s

father found out about the pregnancy within a few days of each other.

8
Regarding the conversation Jeremy had with RG’s family, he stated that he went to

their house and talked with them for two hours. Jeremy testified that he offered to take

complete financial responsibility for the birth of the child and anything RG needed during

the pregnancy; he said he “begged” and “pleaded” with them to allow him to do that but

they absolutely would not let him. Jeremy had conversations with MM about keeping the

child, and MM was sure it was what he wanted to do. As a result, Jeremy testified that he

had noticed MM change from a teenage boy to a young man. MM helped Jeremy every

night until 10:00 p.m. to remodel their house in order for MM to provide a better home

for him and his daughter. He told MM that he would fully support him in raising the baby.

MM testified again for the defense. He maintained his earlier testimony that they

remained in a consistent romantic relationship until December indicating they were together

all the time. He stated that they went to football and basketball games together in the fall of

2018. MM acknowledged hiding their relationship at a point because they were supposedly

broken up, and he said they were not allowed to see each other after Christmas. In regard

to looking at baby items, MM stated that RG was not being truthful in denying having

done so. He elaborated about a trip to Target where they stopped to look at baby clothes

and a special trip to Walmart in Fayetteville specifically to look at baby items because he

wanted to do something nice for RG. When asked about RG’s testimony that she blocked

him from communication early on, MM explained that they would get in a fight and she

would block him for a day or two. On cross-examination, MM stated that he and his dad

have been working on their house since the birth of the child in anticipation of needing the

house for the child.

9
After an extensive oral ruling that relied heavily on credibility findings in favor of

MM and his father, the fact that the birth parents were minors, and that the petition for

adoption was filed a day before the birth of the child, the court denied appellants’ petition.

The written order on November 6 found in part:

2. The Court further finds that the Petitioners herein filed their Petition
without the consent of the putative father and Respondent, [MM], and contend that
said consent is not required pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-9-206(a)(2)(f),
more specifically, that the Respondent and putative father failed to establish a
significant custodial, personal or financial relationship with the minor child prior to
the Petition for Adoption being filed; that the Respondent, [MM], claims in his
Response that his consent is required; that this Court finds that Arkansas law is clear
that the Petitioners wishing to adopt the child, must prove that consent is unnecessary
by clear and convincing evidence; the Court finds after carefully listening to
testimony and observing the witnesses, that the Petitioners have failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the putative father and Respondent’s consent is
not required.

3. The Court further finds that the putative father and Respondent, [MM],
has proven that he established a significant custodial, personal or financial relationship
with the child before the Petition for Adoption was filed, more specifically, the Court
finds that the Respondent was in a relationship with the biological mother, [RG],
from February 2018 until the end of December, 2018, which included six (6) months
of the pregnancy at issue; during said time, the Respondent and putative father took
steps to form a significant custodial, personal or financial relationship with the minor
child and that the natural mother, [RG], further thwarted his efforts to continue to
establish such relationship to an extent of [sic] sufficient to require the Respondent’s
consent to the adoption pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-9-206(a)(2)(f).

A timely notice of appeal followed.

We review issues of statutory construction de novo, as it is for this court to decide

what a statute means. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Smelser, 375 Ark. 216, 289 S.W.3d 466 (2008).

We are not bound by the circuit court’s decision; however, in the absence of a showing

that the circuit court erred, its interpretation will be accepted as correct on appeal. Id.

However, when it is the circuit court’s application of a statute to the facts before it, our

10
standard of review is clearly erroneous. Racine v. Nelson, 2011 Ark. 50, 378 S.W.3d 93. A

finding is clearly erroneous when, despite evidence to support it, we are left on the evidence

with the firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Morningstar v. Bush, 2011 Ark.

350, 383 S.W.3d 840.

Adoption proceedings are reviewed de novo. In re A.R., 103 Ark. App. 1, 3, 285

S.W.3d 716, 717 (2008). Adoption statutes are strictly construed, and a person who wishes

to adopt a child without the consent of the parent must prove that consent is unnecessary

by clear and convincing evidence. In re Adoption of Lybrand, 329 Ark. 163, 169–70, 946

S.W.2d 946, 949–50 (1997) (citing In re Adoption of K.F.H. and K.F.H., 311 Ark. 416, 844

S.W.2d 343 (1993); Harper v. Caskin, 265 Ark. 558, 561, 580 S.W.2d 176, 179 (1979)

(stating adoption petitioner’s burden is “heavy”)). A finding regarding consent will not be

reversed unless clearly erroneous. Id.; see also Racine, supra. We defer to the circuit court in

making credibility determinations because the circuit court is in a better position to judge

the credibility of witnesses. In re A.R., 103 Ark. App. at 4, 285 S.W.3d at 718.

In In re Adoption of Glover, 288 Ark. 59, 62–63, 702 S.W.2d 12, 13–14 (1986), our

supreme court stated:

The court gives careful protection to a natural parent’s rights. As announced
in Woodson v. Lee, 221 Ark. 517, 254 S.W.2d 326 (1953), quoting In re Cordy, 169
Cal. 150, 157, 146 P.2d 532 (1914),

. . . the power of the court in adoption proceedings to deprive a parent of her
child, being in derogation of her natural right to it, and being a special power
conferred by the statute, such statute should be strictly construed; that ‘the
law is solicitous toward maintaining the integrity of the natural relation of
parent and child; and in adversary proceedings in adoption, where the absolute
severance of that relation is sought, without the consent and against the protest
of the parent, the inclination of the courts, as the law contemplates it should
be, is in favor of maintaining the natural relation. . . . Every intendment should

11
have been in favor of the claim of the mother under the evidence, and if the
statute was open to construction and interpretation it should be construed in
support of the right of the natural parent.’

For their first point on appeal, the Nobles argue that the circuit court erred in finding

that MM’s consent to adoption was required. They state that the circuit court’s decision was

based on a misinterpretation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-9-206(a)(2)(F).

Specifically, they argue that the circuit court erred by not requiring strict compliance by

MM with the statute that governs the consent of the putative father.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-9-206(a)(2) provides that unless consent is not

required under section 9-9-207, a petition to adopt a minor may be granted only if written

consent to a particular adoption has been executed by:

(2) The father of the minor if:

(A) The father was married to the mother at the time the minor was conceived
or at any time thereafter;

(B) The minor is his child by adoption;

(C) He has physical custody of the minor at the time the petition is filed;

(D) He has a written order granting him legal custody of the minor at the time
the petition for adoption is filed;

(E) A court has adjudicated him to be the legal father prior to the time the
petition for adoption is filed;

(F) He proves a significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship existed
with the minor before the petition for adoption is filed; or

(G) He has acknowledged paternity under § 9-10-120(a)[.]

The circuit court’s decision was made under subsection (a)(2)(F)—that he proved a

significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship existed with the minor. This language

12
was added in the 2005 amendment to the statute. The language “custodial, personal or

financial relationship” came from the decision in Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),

which involved the issue of “whether New York has sufficiently protected an unmarried

father’s inchoate relationship with a child whom he has never supported and rarely seen in

the two years since her birth.” Lehr, 463 U.S. at 249–50. In discussing the biological link of

the natural father, the Court explained:

The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father
an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his
offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for
the child’s future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and
make uniquely valuable contributions to the child’s development. If he fails to do so,
the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a state to listen to his opinion
of where the child’s best interests lie.

Id. at 262 (footnote omitted). The Court wrote that the appellant “never had any significant

custodial, personal, or financial relationship with [the child], and he did not seek to establish

a legal tie until after she was two years old.” Id. at 262–63. The Court was “concerned only

with whether New York has adequately protected his opportunity to form such a

relationship.” Id. The Court stated that appellant’s right to receive notice of the adoption

proceedings was completely within his control as he could have mailed a postcard to the

putative father registry. Id. at 264. Ultimately, the Court concluded that appellant’s

constitutional rights were not violated because the New York statutes adequately protected

his inchoate interest in establishing a relationship with his child. Id. at 265.

The Nobles contend that MM never had custody of the child, never paid any

expenses for the mother or the child, and never paid any of the child’s medical bills. They

acknowledge that MM made one offer to pay for the hospital bills if the adoption did not

13
continue, which was rejected. The Nobles suggest that these uncontested facts were clear

and convincing evidence that the putative father’s consent was not required.

The Nobles also suggest that under the current state of the law, it is unclear how

much of a custodial, personal, or financial relationship is required by the statute, questioning

the meaning of what constitutes a “significant custodial, personal, or financial” relationship.

They argue that the circuit court’s decision set the bar so low that the “feeble actions such

as those by MM may require the consent of a putative father.” They suggest that MM’s only

connection to the child is RG and that MM did little more than file with the putative father

registry and offer conditional financial assistance; thus, MM failed to establish any of the

required relationships with the minor prior to the petition for adoption, and therefore his

consent was not required. The Nobles state that our caselaw does not address the issue

before us and direct us to other states’ interpretations of the rights and duties of putative

fathers as persuasive authority. However, we are not persuaded by these authorities because

their consent requirements differ from the Arkansas statute.

The circuit court orally stated that its findings of fact and conclusions of law relied

“in no small measure” on its ability to personally observe the witnesses as they testified;

ultimately, the circuit court found MM’s and Jeremy’s testimony credible as to the time

MM and RG spent together from February 2018 through December. There was evidence

that MM made repeated statements to RG that he did not want to give the child up for

adoption; MM asked RG to let him raise the baby; MM asked to be present at the birth to

hold RG’s hand though the process and be there to hold the baby immediately after she was

born; MM wanted to attend RG’s doctor’s appointments; MM told RG he wanted to be

14
there for her, recognized she was scared, and assured her that they could get through it

together; MM referred to the child by the name which they had given her, including talking

to RG’s stomach and telling RG to tell her goodnight while in utero on a regular basis; RG

showed MM an ultrasound photo; MM felt the baby kick and would rub and kiss RG’s

stomach; and they looked at baby clothes together on at least two occasions. The circuit

court found Jeremy’s testimony credible that he offered to pay for the birthing expenses and

begged to take care of the child and accept all financial expenses relating to the child, which

was declined by RG’s family. In addition to buying meals for RG, the court noted that,

while minimal, MM bought two stuffed animals. The circuit court recognized that MM

and Jeremy had been adding on to their house, working seven days a week until ten o’clock

at night to remodel their home to make room for the baby and that MM had been saving

for the baby.

Ultimately, the circuit court found that MM had established the requisite relationship

and that the Nobles had failed to prove that MM’s consent was not required. In its oral

ruling, the court stated that in considering all the facts and circumstances, especially the facts

that both birth parents were minors and that the petition for adoption was filed prior to the

AMN’s birth, the steps taken by MM created a significant personal relationship. The court

stated it could “think of nothing else as it relates to the personal relationship that the putative

father could have done to establish this significant personal relationship.” Because the

appellate court gives great deference to a circuit court’s findings of fact, see In re Baby Boy

B., 2012 Ark. 92, at 8, 394 S.W.3d 837, 841, we cannot say that the circuit court’s findings

are clearly erroneous.

15
For their second point on appeal, the Nobles contend that the circuit court’s finding

that MM’s efforts to establish a significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship were

thwarted by RG after December is clearly erroneous.

Our supreme court in In re Adoption of Baby Boy B. addressed the issue of what degree

of compliance is necessary by the father such that his consent to an adoption of his minor

child is required. 2012 Ark. 92, at 8, 394 S.W.3d at 841. The supreme court held that the

biological father’s efforts to establish a significant custodial, personal, or financial

relationship, in light of the biological mother’s thwarting of his efforts, were sufficient such

that his consent to the adoption was required pursuant to section 9-9-206(a)(2). Id. at 13,

394 S.W.3d at 844.

The Nobles suggest that MM’s efforts are “woefully insufficient” when compared to

the efforts of the birth father in In re Adoption of Baby Boy B. In that case, the birth parents

were college students and were in a relationship for the first five months of the pregnancy

until the mother left and would not reveal where she went. The evidence established that

(1) the putative father told his friends and family about the pregnancy when he found out;

(2) he tried to go to the doctor with the mother, but his schedule did not allow him to go;

(3) he and the mother went to a pregnancy center for information; (4) the parents were

romantically involved until the mother left; (5) the mother stayed at the putative father’s

apartment several nights a week; (6) he indicated the mother did not have morning sickness

but rubbed the mother’s stomach and back to comfort her as she was stressed; (6) he

purchased a Valentine’s gift for the mother, which consisted of a massage and a diaper/school

bag; (7) he expressed concern for the unborn child; (8) he suggested a name for the baby;

16
(9) he told the mother he would always be there for her; (10) he tried to find where the

mother was located after she left and learned she was in Texas from the adoption agency

through which she was working; (11) he filed with the putative father registry in four states

and filed paternity and custody actions in two states; (12) he did not provide financial support

although he was employed during the pregnancy; and (13) his mother loaned him $1100 to

place in an account for the benefit of the child. Id. at 11–12, 394 S.W.3d at 843–44.

Although the circuit court found that the father had done all he could do to protect

his rights under the circumstances, it relied on a case from our court that held that strict

compliance with the statute was required and found that his consent was not required. 2 Our

supreme court reversed, holding that appellant had taken steps to form a significant custodial,

personal, or financial relationship with the child. Id. at 13, 394 S.W.3d at 844. Although

the appellants argued that the father could have done more, the court stated that “the

question is whether appellant’s efforts to establish a significant custodial, personal, or

financial relationship, in light of [the mother’s] thwarting of his efforts, were sufficient such

that his consent to the adoption was required pursuant to section 9-9-206(a)(2). The court

concluded that they were and held that the circuit court’s decision was clearly erroneous,

reversing the circuit court’s decision that the father’s consent was not required. Id. at 13,

394 S.W.3d at 844.

2
See X.T. v. M.M., 2010 Ark. App. 556, 377 S.W.3d 442, overruled by In re Adoption
of Baby Boy B., 2012 Ark. 92, 394 S.W.3d 837.

17
Appellants contend that the facts presented here are more aligned with T.R. v. L.H.,

2015 Ark. App. 483, than Baby Boy B. We disagree. In T.R., the birth parents had a

romantic relationship in March and April 2013, which ended on April 27. Shortly thereafter,

the mother learned she was pregnant and did not notify the father and decided to place the

baby for adoption because she was divorced with two young children. The adoptive parents

met the mother in mid-May and began to support the mother financially and emotionally

until the child’s birth on December 30. The parents had no contact with one another after

the relationship ended. On November 11, 2013, the father learned of the pregnancy from

a friend of the mother and filed with the putative father registry the next day. He filed a

petition to establish paternity and objected to the adoption on November 13. T.R., 2015

Ark. App. 483, at 1. The mother admitted that she did not tell the father she was pregnant

but stated that she did nothing to avoid him and that her address and email had not changed.

Id. at 2. The circuit court held that appellant’s consent was not required and specifically

found that the father was not a credible witness. Id.

On appeal, the father argued that in the short amount of time he was given—the

time between when he learned of the pregnancy and the filing of the adoption petition—

he established the requisite relationship with the child, and thus his consent was required,

which this court rejected. In affirming, this court noted that other than changing her phone

number seven months after they broke up and blocking him from Facebook, there was no

evidence that the mother avoided him as her address she shared with the father and her

email remained the same. Id. at 5. T.R. relied on In re Baby Boy B., which we rejected,

stating that T.R. did not establish a significant, custodial, personal, or financial relationship

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as did the putative father in In re Baby Boy B. Id. at 5. We also stated that the facts did not

support his argument that his efforts were thwarted. Id. Further, our court concluded that

his argument that he did not have enough time to form the requisite relationship lacked

merit because T.R. failed to follow up with the mother and inquire about the possibility of

a pregnancy once their relationship ended, which he had the burden to do under Arkansas

law. Id.

Here, the circuit court noted in its oral ruling that it was clear from MM’s testimony

that after December, RG blocked MM from communication, and he was not welcome at

her home. The circuit court emphasized that these parents are minors, and although MM

knew where RG lived and had the same phone number, it did not give him the right to

show up at her home every day. The court stated that RG’s family made it clear MM was

not welcome there and found that under these circumstances, “there was really nothing

more that [MM] could have done to have a significant personal relationship with the child.”

Considering the facts and circumstances in this case, along with the credibility

determinations by the circuit court, we cannot say the circuit court’s finding that RG

thwarted MM’s efforts to establish a significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship

after December is clearly erroneous.

Affirmed.

GLADWIN and HARRISON, JJ., agree.

H. Keith Morrison, for appellants.

Gramlin/Estes Law Firm, by: Peter (Tripp) G. Estes III, for appellee.

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