Ex parte State of Alabama (In re: State of Alabama v. Tramaine Bonner) (Mobile Circuit Court: CC-16-6155 and CC-16-6156)

Rel: June 28, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024
_________________________

CR-2023-0660
_________________________

Ex parte State of Alabama

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: State of Alabama v. Tramaine Bonner)

Mobile Circuit Court
(CC-16-6155 and CC-16-6156)

PER CURIAM.

The State of Alabama ("the State") has petitioned this Court for a

writ of mandamus directing Judge Michael Youngpeter to comply with

an order of this Court that instructed him to set aside a judgment of

acquittal he issued in the State's prosecution of Tramaine Bonner.
CR-2023-0660

Facts and Procedural History

In December 2019, a jury convicted Bonner of two counts of first-

degree robbery. See § 13A-8-41, Ala. Code 1975. On May 3, 2022, before

the sentencing hearing occurred, Bonner filed a motion for a judgment of

acquittal notwithstanding the verdict, see Rule 20.3, Ala. R. Crim. P., in

which he argued that the State's evidence was not sufficient to sustain

his first-degree-robbery convictions.1 Bonner conceded, though, that the

State's evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for two counts of

third-degree robbery. See § 13A-8-43, Ala. Code 1975.

Judge Youngpeter held the sentencing hearing on March 1, 2023,

and, before pronouncing the sentences, orally granted Bonner's motion

for a judgment of acquittal on the two first-degree-robbery charges and

adjudicated him guilty of two counts of third-degree robbery. In support

of that ruling, Judge Youngpeter found that the State's evidence was not

sufficient to sustain Bonner's convictions for first-degree robbery and

1It is not clear from the materials provided to this Court why the

sentencing hearing had not yet occurred in May 2022, more than two
years after Bonner was convicted. However, the State contends that the
delay was "largely because of the COVID-19 pandemic and due to Bonner
not being transported to Mobile County from the custody of the
Department of Corrections." (Petition, p. 2.)
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that there was a material variance between the State's evidence and the

indictments. Judge Youngpeter also noted that, given Bonner's prior

felony convictions, the mandatory sentences for his first-degree-robbery

convictions would be life imprisonment without the possibility of parole

and that those sentences would "not fit the crime committed here."

(Petition, Exhibit 12, p. 2.) Based on Bonner's prior felony convictions,

Judge Youngpeter sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life

imprisonment for his third-degree-robbery convictions.

On March 7, 2023, the State petitioned this Court for a writ of

mandamus, asking this Court to order Judge Youngpeter to set aside the

judgment of acquittal and to reinstate Bonner's first-degree-robbery

convictions. After reviewing the materials provided by the State, this

Court concluded that the State's evidence was sufficient to sustain

Bonner's convictions for first-degree robbery and that there was no

material variance between the State's evidence and the indictments.

Thus, on March 30, 2023, this Court granted the State's petition and

issued an order directing Judge Youngpeter to set aside the judgment of

acquittal "no later than 5:00 p.m. on Friday, March 31, 2023, and to

pronounce sentence upon Bonner for his convictions of first-degree

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robbery." (Petition, Exhibit 13, p. 6.) However, Judge Youngpeter did

not comply with this Court's order, despite the fact that he "learned of

[the order]" "[a]t some point on Friday, March 31, 2023." 2 (Petition,

Exhibit 20, p. 2.) Approximately four hours after the 5:00 p.m. deadline,

Bonner filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Alabama Supreme

Court, in which he sought review of this Court's order. That Court denied

Bonner's petition on July 10, 2023.

On July 17, 2023, the State filed a motion asking Judge Youngpeter

to schedule a hearing "so that [he] may set aside [his] order granting

judgment of acquittal … and … pronounce sentence upon [Bonner] for his

convictions of first-degree robbery." (Petition, Exhibit 16, p. 2.) Judge

Youngpeter granted that motion and scheduled a hearing, but, when the

parties appeared for the hearing, Bonner argued that Judge Youngpeter

no longer had jurisdiction to set aside the judgment of acquittal because

more than 30 days had passed since the date of the final judgment. Thus,

2It is not clear exactly when Judge Youngpeter became aware of this

Court's order. The clerk of this Court telephoned Judge Youngpeter
several times before the 5:00 p.m. deadline and left voicemails, but those
voicemails were not returned. The clerk also e-mailed Judge Youngpeter
and explained that he needed to comply with this Court's order, but
Judge Youngpeter did not respond to that e-mail.
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Judge Youngpeter suspended the hearing for one week to allow the

parties to file briefs regarding the jurisdictional issue, and, on August 30,

2023, he heard oral arguments from the parties.

On September 5, 2023, Judge Youngpeter issued an order in which

he concluded that he no longer had jurisdiction to set aside the judgment

of acquittal. Judge Youngpeter also explained that the reason he had not

complied with this Court's order was because he believed that Bonner's

mandamus petition in the Alabama Supreme Court "obviated [this

Court's] mandate." (Petition, Exhibit 20, p. 2.) The State has once again

petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus, arguing that this Court's

March 30, 2023, order is a valid order that Judge Youngpeter is required

to follow.

Standard of Review

The standard of review this Court uses when reviewing a petition

for a writ of mandamus is well settled:

"A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and it
will be 'issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal right in the
petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3)
the lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court.' Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc.,
628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993)."

5
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Harris v. Owens, 105 So. 3d 430, 433 (Ala. 2012) (citations omitted).

Discussion

In concluding that he did not have jurisdiction to comply with this

Court's March 30, 2023, order, Judge Youngpeter relied on the Alabama

Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Denson, 57 So. 3d 195 (Ala. 2010).

In Denson, Judge John V. Denson II granted Mary Maxine Neel's

postjudgment motion for a judgment of acquittal after a jury found her

guilty of murder. The State petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus,

asking the Court to order Judge Denson to vacate the judgment of

acquittal. Almost one year later, this Court granted the State's petition.

Judge Denson then petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of

mandamus, arguing that the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to

vacate the judgment of acquittal and that this Court had not had

jurisdiction to order him to do so. The Alabama Supreme Court agreed

and stated the following in support of its decision:

"This Court addressed a similar situation in State v.
Webber, 892 So. 2d 869 (Ala. 2004), in which we held that a
claim was moot because no court had jurisdiction to act.
Webber, who had been indicted for property crimes, agreed to
participate in the trial court's drug-court program and
pleaded guilty to the offenses. The trial court deferred
adjudications and sentencing until after Webber completed
the drug-court program and complied with other conditions.

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When Webber successfully completed the program and had
satisfied the other conditions, the trial court, over the
objections of the district attorney, dismissed the cases against
Webber with prejudice. The district attorney then petitioned
the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of
mandamus, asking that court to direct the trial court to vacate
its order dismissing the cases against Webber, to adjudicate
him guilty, and to sentence him. The Court of Criminal
Appeals dismissed the petition, with an unpublished
memorandum. State v. Webber (No. CR–02–1386), 886 So. 2d
187 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (table). The State then petitioned
this Court for the same relief. We, too, dismissed the petition,
stating:

" 'Because the trial court now lacks
jurisdiction to vacate the judgment of dismissal,
and the appellate courts of the state now lack
jurisdiction to order the judgment vacated, we
cannot reach the merits of the claim of the State,
as the claim is moot, and accordingly we must
dismiss the petition for a writ of mandamus
directing that the dismissal of the case be vacated,
the charges adjudicated, and the defendant
sentenced. Parkerson v. Seventeenth Judicial
Circuit Court, Sumter County, 277 Ala. 345, 170
So. 2d 491 (1965). See State ex rel. City of
Prichard v. Jansen, 271 Ala. 104, 122 So. 2d 736
(1960). We will explain.

" 'The April 24, 2003 dismissal of the case
constituted a final judgment, as distinguished
from an interlocutory judgment or order. Ex parte
Sullivan, 779 So. 2d 1157, 1160 (Ala. 2000). See
also Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 82 S.
Ct. 671, 7 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1962). The trial court lost
subject-matter jurisdiction of the cases at the
expiration of thirty days following entry of the
final judgments. Ex parte Hitt, 778 So. 2d 159

7
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(Ala. 2000); Massey v. State, 587 So. 2d 448 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1991); and Shepard v. State, 347 So. 2d
1017 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977). See Rule 24, Ala. R.
Crim. P.

" 'No party filed an appeal. Because no party
filed a timely appeal, no appellate court ever
acquired any appellate jurisdiction over the cases.
Spina v. Causey, 403 So. 2d 199 (Ala. 1981); Lewis
v. State, 463 So. 2d 154 (Ala. 1985); Woods v. State,
371 So. 2d 944, 945 (Ala. 1979); and Turner v.
State, 365 So. 2d 335, 336 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978).

" 'Within seven days after the trial court
entered the final judgments, during the thirty
days when the trial court did retain subject-matter
jurisdiction, the State petitioned the Court of
Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus
directing the trial judge to vacate the dismissal, to
adjudicate the charges, and to sentence the
defendant. The State did not, however, obtain,
from either the trial court or any appellate court,
any stay of the final judgment.

" 'The filing of a petition for a writ of
mandamus against a trial judge does not divest
the trial court of jurisdiction, stay the case, or toll
the running of any period for obeying an order or
perfecting a filing in the case. See Ex parte St.
John, 805 So. 2d 684 (Ala. 2001); State ex rel. S.N.
v. W.Y., 622 So. 2d 378, 381 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993);
and Continental Oil Co. v. Williams, 370 So. 2d
953, 954 (Ala. 1979). The petition for a writ of
mandamus, if meritorious, merely prompts the
appellate court to exercise its supervisory power to
tell the trial judge, as an official, as distinguished
from the trial court itself, to do his or her duty
when that duty is so clear that there are no two

8
CR-2023-0660

ways about it. Ex parte Little, 837 So. 2d 822, 824
(Ala. 2002). Further, a petition for a writ of
mandamus is not a substitute for an appeal. State
v. Van Reed, 673 So. 2d 857, 858 (Ala. Crim. App.
1996); and Ex parte City of Tuscaloosa, 636 So. 2d
692, 694 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).

" 'Therefore, in the case now before us, the
filing of the petition for a writ of mandamus
neither transferred the retained subject-matter
jurisdiction of the trial court to the appellate court,
nor tolled the expiration of the thirty days of
retained jurisdiction of the trial court, nor
conferred appellate jurisdiction (as distinguished
from supervisory jurisdiction over the trial judge)
on the Court of Criminal Appeals. Thus, after the
thirty days of retained jurisdiction in the trial
court expired, and after any applicable period for
appeal, if any, expired, the trial court lost all
jurisdiction and all possibility of reacquiring
jurisdiction to vacate the judgment of dismissal,
and the appellate courts lost all possibility of
acquiring appellate jurisdiction to remand the case
for the judgment to be vacated.'

"892 So. 2d at 870-71 (footnotes omitted).

"In this case, the trial court's entry on April 3, 2009, of
a judgment of an acquittal for Neel constituted a final
judgment. The trial court had jurisdiction to enter the
judgment. Therefore, the entry of the judgment of acquittal
for Neel was lawful and within the jurisdiction of the trial
court. When the State filed its petition for a writ of
mandamus, it did not ask the trial court or the Court of
Criminal Appeals to stay the proceedings. Nothing before us
indicates that the case was stayed in the trial court. Because
the case was not stayed, the trial court at the expiration of the
30 days from the entry of the judgment of acquittal for Neel

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lost subject-matter jurisdiction of Neel's case, and the Court
of Criminal Appeals lost all possibility of acquiring appellate
jurisdiction to remand the case for the trial court's judgment
to be vacated.

" ' " '….'

" '….'

"….

"Because the Court of Criminal Appeals did not have
subject-matter jurisdiction to order Judge Denson to vacate
his April 3, 2009, order entering a judgment of acquittal for
Neel, Judge Denson has established a clear legal right for the
relief he requests. Therefore, we grant Judge Denson's
petition and direct the Court of Criminal Appeals to vacate its
order directing Judge Denson to set aside his order vacating
the jury's verdict finding Neel guilty of murder."

Denson, 57 So. 3d at 196-98 (footnotes omitted).

In this case, on March 1, 2023, Judge Youngpeter orally granted

Bonner a judgment of acquittal on his two first-degree-robbery charges,

adjudicated him guilty of two counts of third-degree robbery, and

sentenced him for those convictions. In other words, the trial court issued

a final judgment on that date, and, because the State never requested a

stay of the trial-court proceedings, the court's jurisdiction over Bonner's

case expired 30 days later on March 31, 2023. Thus, Judge Youngpeter

correctly concluded that, by the time the parties appeared for the July

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2023 hearing, he no longer had jurisdiction to set aside the judgment of

acquittal. In that respect, Denson is indistinguishable from this case.

However, Denson is distinguishable in another respect. In that

case, this Court had no jurisdiction to order Judge Denson to set aside

the judgment of acquittal he had issued because, at the time this Court

issued its order, the trial court's jurisdiction over Neel's case had expired.

Thus, this Court had "lost all possibility of acquiring appellate

jurisdiction to remand the case for the trial court's judgment to be

vacated." Denson, 57 So. 3d at 198. See also State v. Cantrell, 295 So.

3d 140, 143 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019) (holding that, "[b]ecause the circuit

court no longer has jurisdiction over Cantrell's case, this Court has 'lost

all possibility of acquiring appellate jurisdiction to remand the case for

the trial court's judgment to be vacated' " (quoting Ex parte Denson, 57

So. 3d at 198) (emphasis added)).

In this case, though, this Court issued an order on March 30, 2023,

directing Judge Youngpeter to set aside the judgment of acquittal, which

means that this Court's order was issued while the trial court still had

jurisdiction over Bonner's case. Thus, unlike Denson, this Court's March

30, 2023, order was a valid order that Judge Youngpeter was required to

11
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follow. That fact also distinguishes State v Webber, 892 So. 2d 869 (Ala.

2004), on which the dissent relies, because there was no order from an

appellate court in that case, much less one issued while the trial court

retained its jurisdiction. The dispositive question in this petition, then,

is whether this Court has the power to enforce its prior valid order,

despite the fact that the trial court's jurisdiction over Bonner's case has

expired. As to that issue, Denson and Webber have nothing to say.

Section 12-3-11, Ala. Code 1975, provides this Court with "authority

to grant injunctions and issue writs of habeas corpus and such other

remedial and original writs as are necessary to give it a general

superintendence and control of jurisdiction inferior to it." That statute

gives this Court the authority to issue a writ of mandamus directed to a

lower court when that court has refused or failed to comply with this

Court's valid mandate. Moreover, even apart from that statutory

authority, "[a]n appellate court has the inherent authority to enforce its

own mandate," MetroPCS Comm., Inc. v. Porter, 225 So. 3d 843, 845 (Fla.

Dist. Ct. App. 2016), and, "[i]f the trial court fails or refuses to comply

with the appellate court's mandate, the latter may … take any steps or

issue any appropriate writ necessary to give effect to its judgment."

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Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 328 So. 2d

825, 827 (Fla. 1975). See also Interest of A.H.S., 676 S.W.3d 355, 359

(Tex. Ct. App. 2023) (noting "the inherent authority of trial courts and

appellate courts to enforce their judgments"); and State v. Downey, 29

Kan. App. 2d 467, 470, 27 P.3d 939, 942 (2001) (noting an appellate

court's "inherent authority to assert continuing jurisdiction to enforce its

mandate").

Thus, this Court has both statutory and inherent authority to

enforce its March 30, 2023, order, which, as we have explained, was a

valid order issued in response to the State's first mandamus petition.

And we can enforce that order by issuing a second writ of mandamus

directing Judge Youngpeter to comply with the order. § 12-3-11. The fact

that the trial court no longer has jurisdiction over Bonner's case is of no

significance because that court's compliance with this Court's valid

mandate is a purely ministerial act. See MetroPCS Comm., 225 So. 3d

at 845 ("When an appellate court issues its mandate, compliance by the

lower tribunal is a purely ministerial act, and the lower tribunal is

without authority to modify or evade that mandate."); and R.J. Reynolds

Tobacco Co. v. Townsend, 118 So. 3d 844, 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

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(noting that the trial court's duty to follow the instructions of the

appellate court was "a purely ministerial act" (citations omitted)). Cf. Ex

parte Caremark Rx, LLC, 229 So. 3d 751, 757 (Ala. 2017) (noting that,

even after a trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction expires, the court

"continues to hold 'residual jurisdiction' … such that it can still take any

steps that are necessary to enforce its judgment").

Because Judge Youngpeter did not comply with this Court's March

30, 2023, order, the State has demonstrated that it has a clear legal right

to relief, i.e., the enforcement of that order. Thus, we grant the State's

petition and direct Judge Youngpeter to comply with this Court's March

30, 2023, order by setting aside the judgment of acquittal he issued in

Bonner's favor, reinstating Bonner's two first-degree-robbery convictions,

and sentencing Bonner for those convictions.

Although we grant the State's petition in the present case, we find

it necessary to emphasize one final point in order to hopefully provide

guidance in future cases such as this. As noted, the State did not ask

either Judge Youngpeter or this Court to stay the trial-court proceedings

while it sought relief in its first mandamus petition, and the filing of that

petition did not stay those proceedings. See Rule 21(f), Ala. R. App. P.

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(providing that the filing of a petition for a writ of mandamus "shall not

stay proceedings in the trial court unless the trial judge or an appellate

court shall so order"). Thus, because the State did not seek a stay of the

trial-court proceedings, the trial court's jurisdiction over Bonner's case

expired on March 31, 2023. Denson, supra. Because this Court issued

its order on March 30, 2023, the State was not harmed by its failure to

seek a stay of the trial-court proceedings. However, had we not issued

that order before the trial court's jurisdiction expired, Denson makes it

clear that, once that court's jurisdiction expired, this Court would have

been powerless to grant the relief the State sought in its first mandamus

petition.

Thus, as Justice Stuart of the Alabama Supreme Court once aptly

explained, the better practice in a case such as this would have been for

the State to seek a stay of the trial-court proceedings from either Judge

Youngpeter or an appellate court while it sought relief in its first

mandamus petition:

"In accordance with [State v.] Webber, [892 So. 2d 869
(Ala. 2004),] the proper procedure for the State to follow is to
timely request a motion to stay the proceedings in the trial
court and to timely file a petition for a writ of mandamus in
the Court of Criminal Appeals. If the trial court denies the
motion to stay the proceeding, then the State must file a

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motion to stay with its petition for the writ of mandamus in
the Court of Criminal Appeals. If the Court of Criminal
Appeals denies the stay, the State must file a petition for a
writ of mandamus with this Court requesting that this Court
order the Court of Criminal Appeals to order the trial court to
stay the proceedings until resolution of the petition for the
writ of mandamus."

State v. Calhoun, 915 So. 2d 569, 570 (Ala. 2005) (Stuart, J., concurring

specially in the denial of the State's mandamus petition). See also

Denson, 57 So. 3d at 198 n.3 ("It is the responsibility of the parties, not

the courts, to seek a stay of the case."). Although the State's failure to

seek a stay of the trial-court proceedings was not fatal in this particular

case, this case will hopefully serve as a cautionary tale regarding the

importance of ensuring that trial-court proceedings are stayed when

filing a mandamus petition if jurisdictional issues might come into play.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

Kellum, McCool, Cole, and Minor, JJ., concur. Windom, P.J.,

dissents, with opinion.

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WINDOM, Presiding Judge, dissenting.

The majority grants the State's petition for a writ of mandamus and

directs Judge Michael Youngpeter to comply with this Court's March 30,

2023, order by setting aside the judgment of acquittal he issued in

Tramaine Bonner's favor, reinstating Bonner's two first-degree-robbery

convictions, and sentencing Bonner for those convictions. Because I

believe Judge Youngpeter no longer has jurisdiction over Bonner's case,

I respectfully dissent.

I believe this case is controlled by State v. Webber, 892 So. 2d 869

(Ala. 2004). In that case, Clennan Hill Webber pleaded guilty to various

offenses, but the trial court deferred adjudication and sentencing while

Webber participated in a "drug-court" program. Webber, 892 So. 2d at

870. After Webber completed that program, the trial court "dismissed"

the charges against him on April 24, 2003. Id. at 870. The State then

filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Alabama Supreme Court

(after unsuccessfully seeking mandamus relief in this Court), arguing

that the trial court had no authority to dismiss the charges against

Webber. The Alabama Supreme Court denied the State's petition on the

following basis:

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"Because the trial court now lacks jurisdiction to vacate
the judgment of dismissal, and the appellate courts of the
state now lack jurisdiction to order the judgment vacated, we
cannot reach the merits of the claim of the State, as the claim
is moot, and accordingly we must dismiss the petition for a
writ of mandamus directing that the dismissal of the case be
vacated, the charges adjudicated, and the defendant
sentenced. Parkerson v. Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court,
Sumter County, 277 Ala. 345, 170 So. 2d 491 (1965). See State
ex rel. City of Prichard v. Jansen, 271 Ala. 104, 122 So. 2d 736
(1960). We will explain.

"The April 24, 2003[,] dismissal of the case constituted a
final judgment, as distinguished from an interlocutory
judgment or order. Ex parte Sullivan, 779 So. 2d 1157, 1160
(Ala. 2000). See also Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141,
82 S. Ct. 671, 7 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1962). The trial court lost
subject-matter jurisdiction of the cases at the expiration of
thirty days following entry of the final judgments. Ex parte
Hitt, 778 So. 2d 159 (Ala. 2000); Massey v. State, 587 So. 2d
448 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); and Shepard v. State, 347 So. 2d
1017 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977). See Rule 24, Ala. R. Crim. P.

"No party filed an appeal. Because no party filed a
timely appeal, no appellate court ever acquired any appellate
jurisdiction over the cases. Spina v. Causey, 403 So. 2d 199
(Ala. 1981); Lewis v. State, 463 So. 2d 154 (Ala. 1985); Woods
v. State, 371 So. 2d 944, 945 (Ala. 1979); and Turner v. State,
365 So. 2d 335, 336 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978).

"Within seven days after the trial court entered the final
judgments, during the thirty days when the trial court did
retain subject-matter jurisdiction, the State petitioned the
Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus directing
the trial judge to vacate the dismissal, to adjudicate the
charges, and to sentence the defendant. The State did not,
however, obtain, from either the trial court or any appellate
court, any stay of the final judgment.

18
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"The filing of a petition for a writ of mandamus against
a trial judge does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction, stay
the case, or toll the running of any period for obeying an order
or perfecting a filing in the case. See Ex parte St. John, 805
So. 2d 684 (Ala. 2001); State ex rel. S.N. v. W.Y., 622 So. 2d
378, 381 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993); and Continental Oil Co. v.
Williams, 370 So. 2d 953, 954 (Ala. 1979). The petition for a
writ of mandamus, if meritorious, merely prompts the
appellate court to exercise its supervisory power to tell the
trial judge, as an official, as distinguished from the trial court
itself, to do his or her duty when that duty is so clear that
there are no two ways about it. Ex parte Little, 837 So. 2d
822, 824 (Ala. 2002). Further, a petition for a writ of
mandamus is not a substitute for an appeal. State v. Van
Reed, 673 So. 2d 857, 858 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996); and Ex parte
City of Tuscaloosa, 636 So. 2d 692, 694 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).

"Therefore, in the case now before us, the filing of the
petition for a writ of mandamus neither transferred the
retained subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court to the
appellate court, nor tolled the expiration of the thirty days of
retained jurisdiction of the trial court, nor conferred appellate
jurisdiction (as distinguished from supervisory jurisdiction
over the trial judge) on the Court of Criminal Appeals. Thus,
after the thirty days of retained jurisdiction in the trial court
expired, and after any applicable period for appeal, if any,
expired, the trial court lost all jurisdiction and all possibility
of reacquiring jurisdiction to vacate the judgment of
dismissal, and the appellate courts lost all possibility of
acquiring appellate jurisdiction to remand the case for the
judgment to be vacated."

Webber, 892 So. 2d at 870-71 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). See

Ex parte Denson, 57 So. 3d 195 (Ala. 2010).

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In this case, on March 1, 2023, Judge Youngpeter orally granted

Bonner a judgment of acquittal on the two first-degree-robbery charges,

adjudicated him guilty of two counts of third-degree robbery, and

sentenced him for those convictions. Thus, Judge Youngpeter issued a

final judgment on that date, and he retained jurisdiction to modify that

judgment for only 30 days, unless he or an appellate court issued a stay

of the trial-court proceedings. However, nothing in the materials

provided to this Court indicate that the State asked Judge Youngpeter to

stay the proceedings while it sought mandamus relief, and nothing in the

materials before this Court indicate, nor does the State contend, that he

issued a stay. The State also did not ask this Court to stay the trial-court

proceedings when it filed its first petition for a writ of mandamus, and,

as the Webber Court explained, the mere filing of that petition did not

operate to stay the proceedings – a fact the State concedes. See also Rule

21(f), Ala. R. App. P. (providing that the filing of a petition for a writ of

mandamus "shall not stay proceedings in the trial court unless the trial

judge or an appellate court shall so order"). Also, Bonner did not appeal

the final judgment, so this Court never acquired appellate jurisdiction

over his case.

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It is true that this case is in a different procedural posture than

Webber in that, here, this Court has already issued an order, in response

to the State's first petition for a writ of mandamus, in which this Court

directed Judge Youngpeter to reinstate Bonner's first-degree-robbery

convictions. Further, this Court's order was issued on March 30, 2023,

which was within the 30-day period that Judge Youngpeter retained

jurisdiction to amend his final judgment. The majority uses this fact to

untether this case from Alabama Supreme Court precedent, holding that,

despite the expiration of the trial court's retained jurisdiction, this Court

can enforce its previously issued order because it was timely entered.

The majority reasons that § 12-3-11, Ala. Code 1975, provides this Court

with the "authority to grant injunctions and issue writs of habeas corpus

and such other remedial and original writs as are necessary to give it a

general superintendence and control of jurisdiction inferior to it." Yet,

the holding of Webber makes clear that because 30 days have lapsed

since Judge Youngpeter granted Bonner's motion for judgment of

acquittal, there is no longer any inferior jurisdiction in this case over

which this Court can exercise a general superintendence. Further, I do

not believe this Court's inherent authority to enforce its orders allows it

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to order a lower court to act when the lower court lacks the jurisdiction

to do so.

In short, because the trial-court proceedings were not stayed in this

case, the trial court retained jurisdiction to set aside or modify the

judgment of acquittal for only 30 days, which Judge Youngpeter did not

do. After the expiration of that 30 days, the trial court "lost all

jurisdiction and all possibility of reacquiring jurisdiction to vacate the

judgment of [acquittal], and the appellate courts [have now] lost all

possibility of acquiring appellate jurisdiction to remand the case for the

judgment to be vacated." Webber, 892 So. 2d at 871.

This Court issued a timely and valid order that was not followed.

Nonetheless, I feel constrained to believe the State's petition for a writ of

mandamus must be dismissed as moot, as it was in Webber for the same

reason. See also State v. Cantrell, 295 So. 3d 140, 143 (Ala. Crim. App.

2019) ("[I]n the absence of a stay, a trial court loses jurisdiction to modify

or vacate its order after 30 days, and the issue before the appellate court

becomes moot."); and Ex parte Denson, 57 So. 3d 195, 198 (Ala. 2010)

("Because the case was not stayed, the trial court at the expiration of the

30 days from the entry of the judgment of acquittal for Neel lost subject-

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matter jurisdiction of Neel's case, and the Court of Criminal Appeals lost

all possibility of acquiring appellate jurisdiction to remand the case for

the trial court's judgment to be vacated."). Therefore, I respectfully

dissent.

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