Z.J.H. v. State of Alabama

Rel: June 27, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
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Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
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CR-2023-0302
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Z.J.H.

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division
(CC-19-1306 and CC-19-1220)

On Return to Second Remand

MINOR, Judge.

Z.J.H. appeals his convictions for first-degree sodomy, see § 13A-6-

63(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, and sexual abuse of a child under the age 12

years old, see § 13A-6-69.1, Ala. Code 1975. 1 On appeal, Z.J.H. argues (1)

1On original submission, this Court noticed (1) that there was a

discrepancy between the sentence pronounced at the sentencing hearing
CR-2023-0302

that the Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division, erred by excluding

evidence of H.H.'s alleged prior sexual abuse, (2) that the circuit court

erred by limiting certain expert testimony, (3) that the circuit court erred

by allowing a certified facility dog in the courtroom, (4) that the circuit

court erred by allowing the State to impeach K.H., and (5) that "the jury's

verdicts were not supported by the great weight of the evidence." For the

reasons set forth below, we affirm Z.J.H.'s convictions. But we remand

the case for the circuit court to sentence Z.J.H. to not less than 10 years'

postrelease supervision under § 13A-5-6(c), Ala. Code 1975, for his

for Z.J.H.'s conviction for first-degree sodomy and the sentencing order
for that conviction and (2) that the record did not include a written
sentencing order for the sexual-abuse conviction. Thus, in September
2024 this Court remanded this cause to the circuit court, by order, with
instructions for that court to supplement the record with (1) a corrected
sentencing order for the sodomy conviction and (2) a sentencing order for
the sexual-abuse conviction. See Rule 10(g), Ala. R. App. P.

On return to remand, although the circuit court submitted a
corrected sentencing order for the sodomy conviction, the circuit court did
not supplement the record with a sentencing order for the sexual-abuse
conviction. This Court, on October 16, 2024, thus remanded this cause to
the circuit court, by order, for a second time for that court to supplement
the record with a sentencing order for the sexual-abuse conviction. On
remand, the circuit court complied with our instructions. (Record on
Return to Second Remand, C. 5-6.) The circuit court sentenced Z.J.H. to
20 years' imprisonment on the sodomy conviction and to 10 years'
imprisonment on the sexual-abuse conviction.
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conviction for first-degree sodomy.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In November 2018, H.H., who was 10 years old and a fifth grader

at McAdory Elementary, disclosed to her school counselor that her

adoptive brother, 17-year-old Z.J.H., had sexually abused her since she

was in the second grade until about one month before her disclosure.

H.H., who was 14 years old at the time of the trial, testified that on

many occasions Z.J.H. had sexually abused H.H. at their home on Powder

Plant Road in McCalla. H.H. initially told her friends, who, in turn,

alerted the school counselor about the allegations that Z.J.H., along with

"French kiss[ing]" H.H., would "suck [H.H.'s] feet," "make [H.H.] rub

[Z.J.H.'s] private area," and "put it in [H.H.'s] mouth." (R. 884.) H.H. also

had stated that "[Z.J.H.] would make [H.H.] watch [porn videos]." 2 (R.

2When Nashira Palmer, who is employed with the Jefferson County

Department of Human Resources, interviewed H.H. at the school
following her disclosures to the school counselor, H.H. stated that
"[Z.J.H.] would do things to [H.H.] after they watched […] porn on
[Z.J.H.'s] phone." (R. 627.) That same day, Palmer interviewed Z.J.H.,
who denied the allegations but admitted that "[H.H.] may have walked
in on him a time before while he was […] masturbating." (R. 634.) Z.J.H.
also admitted to Palmer that he had received counseling for "an issue
with porn." (R. 634-35.)

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885.)

H.H. later told Ammy Swaby, the forensic interviewer at the Clay

House, that "[Z.J.H.] would make [H.H.] rub [Z.J.H.'s] private area until

it leaked and [Z.J.H.] would kiss [H.H.] and suck on [her] feet and [Z.J.H.]

would make [H.H.] sit on [Z.J.H.'s] face." (R. 890-91.) H.H. stated that,

when Z.J.H. made H.H. sit on Z.J.H.'s face, H.H.'s clothes would be off

and that "[Z.J.H.] would lick [H.H.'s] private area." (R. 891.) H.H. stated

that she used the word "leak" because "when [Z.J.H.] would tell [her] to

[rub his thing], [Z.J.H.] would say that." (R. 892.)

H.H. stated that the last time she went into Z.J.H.'s room and

planned to ask Z.J.H. something, Z.J.H. had notes on his stomach that

read "[t]he only way—one way to wake me up is to remove the blanket

and suck me" and another one that read "that's the only way and

underlined only." (R. 892-93.) H.H. stated that she "slid" the notes under

her other adoptive brother K.H.'s door but that K.H. said that he threw

the notes away. (R. 892-94.) H.H. testified that it was not the first time

she had told K.H. about what Z.J.H. had done to H.H. H.H. testified that

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"[K.H.] told [H.H.] not to tell mom." 3 (R. 898-99.)

In his defense, Z.J.H. denied any inappropriate contact with H.H.

But Z.J.H. admitted that H.H. had walked in on him while he was

masturbating while watching pornography.

A jury convicted Z.J.H. of one count of first-degree sodomy and one

count of sexual abuse of a child less than 12 years old. Z.J.H. now appeals.

I. EVIDENCE OF H.H.'S ALLEGED PRIOR SEXUAL ABUSE

Z.J.H. argues that "[t]he circuit court denied [him] his

constitutional right to present a defense by excluding evidence that H.H.

ha[d] been previously sexually abused." (Z.J.H.'s brief, p. 15.) See Rule

412(b)(3), Ala. R. Evid. Z.J.H. argues that the evidence was relevant

because, he says, it "explained how [H.H.] could have possibly known

about the type of sexual acts alleged apart from the State's position that

Z.J.H. abused H.H." (Z.J.H.'s brief, p. 23.)

Rule 412, Ala. R. Evid., provides:

"(a) Evidence Generally Inadmissible. The following
evidence is not admissible in any prosecution for criminal
sexual conduct except as provided in sections (b) and (c):

"(1) evidence offered to prove that any

3K.H. denied that H.H. had told him about the sexual abuse or the

incident during which H.H. said she had slid notes under his door.
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complaining witness[4] engaged in other sexual
behavior.

"….

"(b) Exceptions. The following evidence is admissible, if
otherwise admissible under these rules:

"….

"(3) evidence the exclusion of which would
violate the constitutional rights of the defendant."

The State before trial moved in limine to exclude "any specific

instances of [H.H.'s] sexual behavior and/or sexual predisposition" under

Rule 412 (2d Supp. R. 132). Z.J.H. argued at a pretrial-motion hearing

that "there may have been prior abuse of the child, which would explain

the words that she knew at the time that these allegations were made,"

and that "the history of potential abuse is relevant." (1st Supp. R. 41.)

After noting that H.H.'s adoptive mother S.H. had called H.H.

"promiscuous,"5 the State argued that no such evidence existed:

"Actually, [Z.J.H.'s] mother [S.H.] did specifically on
several occasions refer to [H.H.] as being promiscuous and

4A "complaining witness" is defined as "[a]ny person alleged to be

the victim of the crime charged, the prosecution of which is subject to the
provisions of this rule." Rule 412(d)(1), Ala. R. Evid.

5Z.J.H.'s
counsel also stipulated "that [H.H.] is not sexually
promiscuous …. I will stipulate [H.H.] never had sex." (1st Supp. R. 41.)
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that it wasn't her son that had a problem, but that it was
[H.H.] who was promiscuous. So in reading that and then this
alleged prior sexual abuse.

"There is absolutely no record of that whatsoever. The
only person who's ever alleged that, again, is [Z.J.H.'s] mother
[S.H.], who is also the same one who called [H.H.]
promiscuous. And she is the only person that has ever alleged
that [H.H.] was potentially, you know, sexually abused or
otherwise prior to their family getting her in foster care and
then adopting.

"There were no reports of abuse. [The Department of
Human Resources] did a thorough investigation into this case
about family history and all of that, and there was no evidence
or no alleged abuse prior to her coming into the H[.] family."

(1st Supp. R. 42.)

The circuit court granted the State's motion, holding: "[W]e're not

going to backdoor sexual behavior around rape shield just because it's a

novel argument unless you can show me some law that there is—here's

the rape shield, but here's an exception to that rule. And I hadn't heard

that." (1st Supp. R. 53-53.)

The State at trial objected to testimony from H.H.'s adoptive

mother S.H. about H.H.'s prior behavior—"[o]ne was bed-wetting …, and

the other one was masturbation." (1st Supp. R. 487-88.) Z.J.H. argued:

"We're not saying [H.H.] was sexually active or was promiscuous," but

"[w]hat knowledge—what words was [H.H.] exposed [to] before coming to

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this home." (1st Supp. R. 493.) The circuit court sustained the State's

objection, finding that these facts had not presented an exception to Rule

412. (1st Supp. R. 494-95.)

In Johnson v. State, 394 So. 3d 613, 617 (Ala. Crim. App. 2023), we

held that an alleged error in the granting of a motion in limine excluding

evidence must be preserved by an adequate offer of proof at trial. In

Johnson, this Court recognized that "[t]he circuit court, under Rule 412,

Ala. R. Evid., was tasked with balancing the privacy interests of S.T. with

Johnson's right to present a defense," but that Johnson's offer of proof

was lacking:

"Johnson asserted below, as he does on appeal, that the
evidence was essential to explain S.T.'s knowledge of sexual
acts and her age-inappropriate language. All that was before
the circuit court when it ruled on the State's motion, however,
was that S.T. 'was molested by an 11-year-old in Talladega
County' the year before Johnson's abuse. (R. 18.)

"….

"The allegations against Johnson were that S.T.
performed oral sex on him and that he touched S.T.'s
'pocketbook' and her 'boobies.' Given the dearth of information
before the circuit court, it would have been impossible for it to
assess whether the prior instance of sexual abuse would have
been relevant to explaining S.T.'s knowledge of sexual acts or
her purportedly age-inappropriate language. The absence of
an offer of proof similarly prevents this Court from assessing
whether the circuit court abused its discretion in granting the

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State's motion to prohibit the evidence."

394 So. 3d at 617-18 (footnote omitted).

Z.J.H.'s proffer consisted of nothing more than unsupported,

nonspecific assertions. That inadequate proffer "prevents this Court from

assessing whether the circuit court abused its discretion in" disallowing

the evidence, and thus the issue is not preserved for appellate review.

Johnson, supra.

Even if the issue were preserved, the circuit court did not deny

Z.J.H. his constitutional right to present a defense by excluding the

alleged evidence indicating that H.H. had been sexually abused before

coming to Z.J.H.'s home. Cf. Ex parte Dennis, 730 So. 2d 138, 141 (Ala.

1999) ("[T]he constitutionality of [Rule 412's] application is to be

determined on a case-by-case basis."). The circuit court correctly

concluded that the purported evidence of H.H.'s prior sexual abuse—

which was entirely unsubstantiated—fell outside an exception to the

general inadmissibility of such evidence under Rule 412. Thus, Z.J.H. is

due no relief on this issue.

II. EXPERT TESTIMONY

Z.J.H. argues that the circuit court erred by limiting the testimony

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of forensic psychologist Dr. Kimberly Ackerson. Z.J.H. argues that Dr.

Ackerson, who evaluated Z.J.H., would have testified about Z.J.H.'s

personality traits and their relationship to sexual deviance. (Z.J.H.'s

brief, pp. 23-30.)

"[A] trial court has broad discretion over the admissibility of expert

testimony at trial, and a court's exercise of that discretion will not be

reversed unless it has palpably abused that discretion." R.D. v. State, 706

So. 2d 770, 775 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997).

The circuit court ruled that it would allow Dr. Ackerson to testify

about pornography addiction, a matter that was brought into trial

through, among other evidence, testimony that Z.J.H. had admitted to

his mother that he had a pornography addiction (R. 572):

"THE COURT: As it relates to the defendant's response
regarding the differences as it relates to them opening the
door regarding a certain character trait. I will note that the
only character—well, the only issue that they have brought is
the issue of a porn addiction and what [e]ffect the porn
addiction would have on his behavior during that time.

"So, therefore, I am going to allow Dr. Ackerson to
testify. However, it will be solely on what she's testified to at
the end of this hearing which is related to the porn—the
alleged porn addiction and what [e]ffect, if any—if he had one
and, you know, what [e]ffect it had on—you know, basically
everything she testified as it relates to the porn addiction."

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(R. 1066.) Z.J.H. declined to call Dr. Ackerson to testify "[c]onsidering the

limiting guidance from the Court." (R. 1070-71.)

To the extent that Z.J.H. argues that the circuit court erred by

prohibiting Dr. Ackerson's testimony about her psychological evaluation

of Z.J.H. and its relationship to general sexually deviant behavior, this

argument lacks merit.

In Vrocher v. State, 813 So. 2d 799 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001), this

Court affirmed a circuit court's ruling that an expert witness's testimony

was not relevant and was thus inadmissible because the witness "could

not state with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty or a reasonable

degree of medical certainty that there was a nexus between the

[defendant's] personality profile and his behavior on … the date of the

incident of sexual abuse." 813 So. 2d at 805. "Thus, Vrocher provides

implicit support for the conclusion that it is proper for an expert witness

to state an opinion in such terms." Keaton v. State, 375 So. 3d 44, 102

(Ala. Crim. App. 2021).

In R.D., supra, this Court affirmed a circuit court's refusal to allow

expert testimony about sexual-functioning-inventory- and personality-

inventory-test results that R.D. claimed were critical to his defense

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because, he said, they showed that he did not manifest the symptoms of

a sexual abuser of children. 706 So. 2d at 774. This Court agreed with the

circuit court's ruling that the evidence was both improper character

evidence and was "clearly irrelevant." 706 So. 2d at 775-76. The expert

"could not say, on the basis of the test results, whether R.D. was guilty

or innocent" and acknowledged that the sexual-functioning inventory

"[could] not tell [her] whether someone has ever actually experienced a

sexual episode with a person of this age category" and that the

personality inventory was not used for measuring sexual deviance. 706

So. 2d at 775.

"[E]ven though R.D.'s witnesses gave opinions about the
reliability and validity of the tests, R.D. failed to establish
that the evidence was relevant to the case and, in fact,
demonstrated that it was not relevant. Evidence that,
according to R.D.'s own witnesses, was unrelated to whether
he committed the crimes with which he was charged was
clearly irrelevant and properly excluded."

706 So. 2d at 776.

Like the accused in R.D., Z.J.H. failed to show that Dr. Ackerson's

testimony would have tended to prove or disprove a material fact as

required for relevancy under Rule 401, Ala. R. Evid., or that, even if

relevant, the evidence would not be substantially outweighed by the

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danger of confusing or misleading the jury under Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid.

Dr. Ackerson admitted that her testing could not determine whether

someone committed a specific sexual offense, and, while she opined that

she could testify about whether Z.J.H. met certain criteria consistent

with sexual deviancy, she appeared unable to testify with a reasonable

degree of scientific certainty or a reasonable degree of medical certainty

that there was a nexus between Z.J.H.'s personality profile and his

behavior on the dates that he allegedly sexually abused H.H. (R. 1043-

65.)

When the circuit court asked Dr. Ackerson whether she could

testify as required by Vrocher and its progeny, she replied:

"THE COURT: Okay. And so we have this personality
profile of [Z.J.H.] And I guess the question per case law is are
you able to testify that there is a nexus between the
personality profile that you have of [Z.J.H.] and the alleged, I
guess, behavior between—his alleged behavior in November
of 2017 and November 2018 is the question.

"[Dr. Ackerson]: Well, again, I'm—I'm a little
uncomfortable that people are focusing just on that test. I
never used a test or a singular test.

"….

"In other words, the testing allows us to get information
about his overall values, his thoughts and thinking. And that
would be similar to how he was at the time of the offense,

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especially if you look at all the other information provided."

(R. 1047-48.)

Under these circumstances, the circuit court did not err by refusing

to permit Dr. Ackerson's testimony about Z.J.H.'s personality traits

related to general sexually deviant behavior. Thus, Z.J.H. is due no relief

on this issue.

III. CERTIFIED FACILITY DOG

Z.J.H. argues that "[t]he circuit court erred by allowing a certified

facility dog" in the courtroom because, he says, the State "failed to show

the need for the use of a certified facility dog and [that] its use of the dog

throughout the trial caused significant prejudice to [him]." Z.J.H. also

argues that "the State's violation of the [circuit] court's order to keep its

certified facility dog out of view of the jury requires a new trial." (Z.J.H.'s

brief, pp. 31-38.)

Section 12-21-148(b), Ala. Code 1975, provides: "In a legal

proceeding, to reduce the stress of a witness and to enhance the ability of

the court to obtain full and accurate testimony, the court may allow a

certified facility dog to accompany a victim or witness while testifying."

Section 12-21-148(c) provides that the trial court exercises "sole

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discretion" over allowing a certified facility dog.

The State before trial moved to allow a certified facility dog under

§ 12-21-148 asserting that the dog's presence would help reduce H.H.'s

stress and anxiety after she had "expressed anxiety about testifying in

court." (1st Supp. R. 104-06.) Z.J.H. objected, arguing that the State's

"pet" would prejudice him, and requested similar accommodation at trial

because of his having "suffered humiliation and ostracization." (1st Supp.

R. 111.) The circuit court granted the State's motion and denied Z.J.H.'s

request for similar accommodation. (R. 21.)

Before H.H.'s testimony, Z.J.H. again objected, arguing that "this

dog was paraded through the hallway full of jurors" and that it was seen

through a glass panel "sitting and hugging and loving on [H.H.]" (R. 857-

58.) The State admitted that "[H.H.] [wa]s having a little bit of a

breakdown" and needed the comfort of the dog and that it had allowed

the dog to go to H.H. in the conference room and comfort her before she

took the stand. (R. 859-60.) The circuit court overruled Z.J.H.'s objection

and allowed the dog to sit with H.H., instructing the jury that the dog

was present in the courtroom and that it should not concern them or

create any prejudice as to any party. (R. 868.) Later during H.H.'s

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testimony, the dog made a noise, which Z.J.H.'s counsel described as

"whimpering" and a "distraction," requiring the dog's handler to signal

that it needed a break. (R. 906-07.) Z.J.H. again moved to exclude the dog

from the courtroom, which motion the circuit court denied. (R. 907-08.)

The State showed that the certified facility dog would assist in

H.H.'s ability to testify about the sexual abuse. Thus, the circuit court did

not abuse its considerable discretion in allowing the certified facility dog

to sit at H.H.'s feet during her testimony.

And Z.J.H.'s claim of unfair prejudice is not persuasive. Other than

his own statements, Z.J.H. offered nothing to show that the use of the

certified facility dog distracted the jury. Finally, the circuit court properly

instructed the jury that the certified facility dog should not concern them

or create any prejudice as to any party. "[W]e presume the jury followed

the [circuit] court's instructions." Harrison v. State, 398 So. 3d 955, 974

(Ala. Crim. App. 2023). Thus, Z.J.H. is due no relief on this issue.

IV. IMPEACHMENT OF K.H.

Z.J.H. argues that the circuit court erred by allowing the State, over

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his objections, to impeach K.H.'s testimony.6 Z.J.H. points to testimony

from Jefferson County Department of Human Resources employee

Nashira Palmer and statements made in H.H.'s forensic interview

pertaining to K.H., as well as several occasions during his own testimony.

Z.J.H. argues that, during those instances, the State impeached him

without specifically confronting him with the circumstances of his prior

statements as required by Rule 613(b), Ala. R. Evid. Z.J.H.'s issue is not

properly preserved for appellate review. See Ex parte Coulliette, 857 So.

2d 793, 794 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Newsome v. State, 570 So. 2d 703, 717

(Ala. Crim. App. 1989)) (" 'Review on appeal is restricted to questions and

issues properly and timely raised at trial.' "). "The statement of specific

grounds of objection waives all grounds not specified, and the trial court

will not be put in error on grounds not assigned at trial." Ex parte Frith,

526 So. 2d 880, 882 (Ala. 1987). Thus, Z.J.H. is due no relief on this issue.

6K.H., Z.J.H.'s brother and who was 12 or 13 years old at the time

of the allegations and 19 years old at the time of trial, denied that one
week before his father had passed away, H.H. had disclosed to him that
"[Z.J.H.] would make [H.H.] rub him until it leaked" or that "[K.H.] told
[H.H.] not to tell [their] mom" or that "[H.H.] gave [K.H.] letters that
[Z.J.H.] had [given] her." (R. 714-15.) Jefferson County Department of
Human Resources employee Nashira Palmer testified and recalled that
K.H. had admitted all those statements to her.
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V. WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

Z.J.H. contends that "the jury's verdicts were not supported by the

great weight of the evidence." (Z.J.H.'s brief, p. 48.) Z.J.H. asserts that

the State's case was "based entirely on H.H.'s disclosure and testimony,"

that "no physical or other corroborating evidence exist[ed]," and that "due

to H.H.'s history of dishonesty, the State's evidence [wa]s so lacking here

[as] to render the verdicts wrong and unjust." (Z.J.H.'s brief, pp. 48-51;

Z.J.H.'s motion for a new trial, R. 223.)

" ' "Once a prima facie case has been submitted to
the jury, this Court will not upset the jury's verdict
except in extreme situations in which it is clear
from the record that the evidence against the
accused was so lacking as to make the verdict
wrong and unjust. Deutcsh v. State, 610 So. 2d
1212, 1234-35 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). This Court
will not substitute itself for the jury in
determining the weight and probative force of the
evidence. Benton v. State, 536 So. 2d 162, 165 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1988)."

" 'May v. State, 710 So. 2d 1362, 1372 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997).

" ' "Furthermore, on appeal, there is a presumption
in favor of the correctness of the jury verdict.
Saffold v. State, 494 So. 2d 164 (Ala. Crim. App.
1986). Although that presumption of correctness is
strong, it may be overcome in a limited category of
cases where the verdict is found to be palpably
wrong or contrary to the great weight of the
evidence. Bell v. State, 461 So. 2d 855, 865 (Ala.

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Crim. App. 1984)."

" 'Henderson v. State, 584 So. 2d 841, 851 (Ala. Crim. App.
1988).' "

S.A.J. v. State, 195 So. 3d 327, 345 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015) (quoting

Thompson v. State, 97 So. 3d 800, 810 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011)).

H.H.'s testimony alone sufficiently established a prima facie case of

first-degree sodomy, see § 13A-6-63, and sexual abuse of a child less than

12 years old, see § 13A-6-69.1. " '[T]he victim's testimony alone is

sufficient to establish a prima facie case of either rape or sexual abuse.' "

Williams v. State, 10 So. 3d 1083, 1087 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting

Jones v. State, 719 So. 2d 249, 255 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996)). Considering

that, this Court holds that the evidence here is not so lacking as to

warrant reversal of the jury's verdicts. " ' " '[T]he credibility of witnesses

and the weight or probative force of testimony is for the jury to judge and

determine.' " ' " Williams, 10 So. 3d at 1087 (quoting Johnson v. State, 555

So. 2d 818, 820 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (additional citations omitted)).

Thus, Z.J.H. is due no relief on this issue.

VI. POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION

Although the issue has not been raised on appeal, this Court

recognizes that the circuit court did not impose a period of postrelease

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supervision on Z.J.H.'s conviction for first-degree sodomy. Because

"[m]atters concerning unauthorized sentences are jurisdictional," Hunt

v. State, 659 So. 2d 998, 999 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994), this Court may take

notice of an illegal sentence at any time. See, e.g., McCall v. State, 794

So. 2d 1243 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000). Z.J.H.'s conviction for first-degree

sodomy was for a Class A felony sex offense involving a child, and thus

the circuit court should have imposed on the conviction "an additional

penalty of not less than 10 years of post-release supervision to be served

upon the defendant's release from incarceration." § 13A-5-6(c), Ala. Code

1975. That statute provides:

"In addition to any penalties heretofore or hereafter provided
by law, in all cases where an offender is designated as a
sexually violent predator pursuant to Section 15-20A-19, [Ala.
Code 1975,] or where an offender is convicted of a Class A
felony sex offense involving a child as defined in Section 15-
20A-4, [Ala. Code 1975, 7] and is sentenced to a county jail or
the Alabama Department of Corrections, the sentencing judge
shall impose an additional penalty of not less than 10 years of
post-release supervision to be served upon the defendant's
release from incarceration."

See also Bishop v. State, 344 So. 3d 906, 915 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021).

7"Sex Offense Involving a Child" is defined as "[a] conviction for any

sex offense in which the victim was a child or any offense involving child
pornography." § 15-20A-4(27), Ala. Code 1975.
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We thus remand this cause for the circuit court to impose not less

than 10 years of postrelease supervision on Z.J.H.'s conviction for first-

degree sodomy to be served upon Z.J.H.'s release from incarceration.

CONCLUSION

We affirm Z.J.H.'s conviction for first-degree sodomy and his

conviction and sentence for sexual abuse of a child under the age of 12.

We remand this cause to the circuit court with instructions for it to

conduct a new sentencing hearing at which Z.J.H., represented by

counsel, must be given a sentence that includes not less than 10 years of

postrelease supervision for his conviction for first-degree sodomy. Due

return must be filed with this Court no later than 56 days from the date

of this opinion. The return to remand must include a transcript of the

proceedings conducted on remand and a new sentencing order for the

first-degree-sodomy conviction.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Windom, P.J., and Cole and Anderson, JJ., concur. Kellum, J.,

concurs in the result.

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