Ex parte C.G. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: C.G. v. F.H.) (Lee Juvenile Court: CS-11-306.04).

Rel: January 12, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter
Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024
_________________________

CL-2023-0757
_________________________

Ex parte C.G.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: C.G.

v.

F.H.)

(Lee Juvenile Court, CS-11-306.03)

_____________________

CL-2023-0758
_____________________

Ex parte C.G.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

(In re: C.G.

v.

F.H.)

(Lee Juvenile Court, CS-11-306.04)

THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.

C.G. ("the father") petitions this court for a writ of mandamus

directing the Lee Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") to vacate its

October 16, 2023, order, entered in case number CS-11-306.03 ("the .03

action"), ordering the father to serve a portion of his criminal-contempt

sanction. The father also petitions this court for a writ of mandamus

directing the juvenile court to vacate its October 16, 2023, order, entered

in case number CS-11-306.04 ("the .04 action"), denying his motion to

dismiss and transferring that action to the Coffee Juvenile Court. We

deny the petitions.

The materials submitted to this court indicate that, pursuant to a

March 2, 2020, judgment, the father was awarded custody of the children

(G.B.G., born in 2006, and Ga.B.G., born in 2007) born of his relationship

with S.B., ("the mother"). F.H. ("the maternal grandmother") was

2
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

awarded grandparent visitation under § 30-3-4.2, Ala. Code 1975.1 On

November 15, 2021, the juvenile court entered a judgment that

incorporated an agreement between the father and the maternal

grandmother that modified the maternal grandmother's visitation

awarded in the March 2, 2020, judgment. On February 18, 2022, the

maternal grandmother filed a petition for an order finding the father in

contempt, which initiated the .03 action. In her petition, she alleged that

the father had not allowed her to visit with the children in compliance

with the November 15, 2021, judgment. On April 11, 2022, the father

filed an answer, denying the maternal grandmother's allegations, and a

counterclaim, alleging that since the entry of the November 15, 2021,

judgment a material change in circumstances had occurred that

supported termination of the maternal grandmother's visitation.

1The materials indicate that initially the mother had been awarded

custody of the children and that she and the children had resided in Lee
County. After the mother died in February 2020, a custody dispute arose
between the maternal grandmother and the father. The March 2, 2020,
judgment provided that the children would reside with the maternal
grandmother until the end of the 2019-2020 school year and that they
would then move to the father's residence in Coffee County and the
maternal grandmother would exercise visitation.
3
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

After conducting a hearing and, subsequently, providing the father

and the maternal grandmother with an opportunity to reach an

agreement, the juvenile court entered its July 17, 2023, judgment,

modifying the maternal grandmother's visitation2 and finding the father

in civil and criminal contempt for violating the November 15, 2021,

judgment by denying the maternal grandmother visitation with the

children on more than 10 occasions. As punishment for his acts of

criminal contempt, the juvenile court sentenced the father to 50 days of

incarceration; for his acts of civil contempt, the juvenile court ordered

the father to pay the maternal grandmother's attorney and filing fees.

The juvenile court suspended the father's sentence of incarceration on

the condition that the father did not further violate the court's orders.

Specifically, the July 17, 2023, judgment provided: "If [the father] does

further violate the orders, he shall be subject to serving those days [of

incarceration] as well as any additional days he may receive for future

violations. The court reserves jurisdiction to determine if this

suspension of incarceration should be lifted for cause." The July 17,

2The juvenile court awarded the maternal grandmother visitation

beginning on Friday, July 23, 2023.
4
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

2023, judgment entered in the .03 action concluded: "This is a final order

except for the items reserved above."

The materials indicate that on July 21, 2023, before the maternal

grandmother could exercise the first period of visitation awarded to her

in the July 17, 2023, judgment, the father's wife ("the stepmother") filed

petitions to adopt the children in the Coffee Probate Court ("the probate

court"). On July 21, 2023, the probate court entered interlocutory orders

of adoption by the stepmother that provided in pertinent part:

"The right of any natural grandparent to maintain
visitation rights pursuant to § 30-3-4.2[, Ala. Code 1975,] is
hereby stayed pending further orders of the court and
terminates upon the adoption of [the children] except as
provided by § 26-10A-30[, Ala. Code 1975]. Post-adoption
visitation rights for any natural grandparents of the
[children] may be granted when the [children are] adopted by
a stepparent … Any such visitation rights may be
maintained or granted at the discretion of this court at any
time prior to or after the final order of adoption is entered
upon petition by any natural grandparents, if it is in the best
interest of the child[ren]."

(Emphasis added.)

On September 5, 2023, the maternal grandmother filed in .03

action a motion entitled "renewed motion for emergency relief." In her

motion, the maternal grandmother alleged that rather than abiding by

the July 17, 2023, judgment directing the father not to interfere with the

5
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

maternal grandmother's visitation with the children or to violate the

juvenile court's orders, the father had attempted to circumvent the

juvenile court's visitation award by having the stepmother file adoption

petitions and by obtaining interlocutory orders of adoption from the

probate court prohibiting the maternal grandmother from visiting with

the children. The maternal grandmother asked the juvenile court to lift

its suspension of the father's sentence of incarceration and to order the

father to serve the 50-day sentence. She also asked the juvenile court to

impose new sanctions in light of the father's continued failure to abide

by its orders and to modify custody of the children.3

On September 7, 2023, the father filed a motion to dismiss the

maternal grandmother's motion. In his motion, the father argued that

dismissal of the maternal grandmother's motion was proper because, he

said, after the stepmother filed her petitions for adoption and the

probate court entered its interlocutory orders of adoption, subject-matter

jurisdiction over the maternal grandmother's visitation rested in the

probate court, not the juvenile court. He further argued that the motion

3The juvenile court did not address these requests in its October

16, 2023, order, discussed infra, entered in the .03 action.
6
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

should be dismissed because, by asking for additional sanctions and

modification of custody, the maternal grandmother had filed a new

action but had not paid a filing fee or properly served the necessary

parties to invoke the juvenile court's jurisdiction.

On September 15, 2023, the maternal grandmother filed in the

juvenile court a petition that created the .04 action. The maternal

grandmother alleged that since the entry of the July 17, 2023, judgment,

she had not been allowed to exercise her awarded visitation with the

children because the stepmother had obtained interlocutory orders of

adoption that had prohibited her visitation. The maternal grandmother

asked the juvenile court, among other things, to find the father in

contempt for preventing her from visiting with the children after the

entry of the July 17, 2023, judgment, and to award her temporary

custody of the children and child support.

On October 3, 2023, the father filed in the .04 action a motion to

dismiss or in the alternative to transfer the .04 action to the Coffee

Juvenile Court for further proceedings. In his motion, the father

maintained that after the stepmother filed the adoption petitions and

the probate court entered its interlocutory orders of adoption, the

7
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

probate court and not the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction

over the grandmother's visitation. In the alternative, the father argued

that if subject-matter jurisdiction continued to rest in the juvenile court,

he no longer "voluntarily submitted" to the continued jurisdiction of the

juvenile court and asked that the juvenile court enter an order

transferring the case to the Coffee Juvenile Court. According to the

father, he and the children had lived continuously in Coffee County for

more than three consecutive years preceding the filing of the maternal

grandmother's petition. He asserted that venue was proper in Coffee

County, pursuant to § 30-3-5(2), Ala. Code 1975, 4 and asked the juvenile

court to transfer the case to the Coffee Juvenile Court.

On October 4, 2023, the juvenile court entered an order in the .04

action setting an "emergency contempt hearing." The order provided:

"The court has received the petition for contempt, rule
nisi, and emergency relief filed by [the maternal
grandmother] and the motion to dismiss filed by [the father].

4Section 30-3-5(2), Ala. Code 1975, provides that venue for a
petition requesting child-custody modification is proper either in the
circuit court that granted custody to the current custodial parent or in
the circuit court of the county where the current custodial parent and
the children have resided for three consecutive years immediately
preceding the filing of the petition.

8
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

This matter is set for emergency hearing on these and all
pending motions.

"[The father] is ordered to appear before this court on
October 12, 2023, at 1:00 p.m. … for a hearing allowing [the
father] to show cause as to why [he] should not be held in
contempt of court for failing to:

"COMPLY WITH THIS COURT'S ORDER OF
JULY 17, 2023, REGARDING VISITATION
AND FOR VIOLATION OF THE CONDITIONS
TO AVOID INCARCERATION DUE TO A
FINDING OF CONTEMPT OF COURT, as
previously ordered by this court."

(Capitalization in original.)

The materials submitted to this court indicate that on October 10,

2023, the probate court entered final judgments of adoption. 5 On

October 10, 2023, the probate court entered an order awarding the

5That same day, the father filed a petition for a writ of mandamus

in this court that our clerk designated as case number CL-2023-0738. In
his mandamus petition, the father sought an order compelling the
juvenile court to grant his motion to dismiss in the .04 action or to
transfer the case to the Coffee Juvenile Court. Because the juvenile
court had not conducted a hearing or entered an adverse order regarding
the father's motion to dismiss, this court denied the father's petition as
having been prematurely filed. Ex parte C.G., (Ms. CL-2023-0738, Oct.
11, 2023).

9
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

maternal grandmother visitation with the children pursuant to § 26-

10A-30, Ala. Code 1975. 6

On October 13, 2023, the juvenile court conducted a hearing. The

materials submitted to this court do not include a transcript of the

hearing or any official court document indicating the evidence, if any,

admitted at that hearing. On October 16, 2023, at 10:29 a.m., the

juvenile court entered an order in the .03 action, that provided in

pertinent part:

"In this case, the court entered a contempt and
modification judgment on July 17, 2023, which found the
father in criminal and civil contempt of court for his ongoing
refusal to comply with his agreed upon, and court-ordered,
visitation. He was sentenced to 50 days in jail for his
criminal contempt. The court also ordered that his sentence
was 'suspended so long as he [did] not further violate the
court orders in this case. If he [did] further violate the orders,
he [would] be subject to serving those days as well as any
additional days he may receive for future violations.' That
judgment was a final order, but the court did reserve
jurisdiction 'to determine if this suspension of incarceration
should be lifted for cause.' …

"The same judgment decreed that [the maternal]
grandmother would have visitation from July 23, 2023, until
the end of the summer and at other times thereafter. On July
21[, 2023], the father's current spouse, with his aid and
cooperation, filed for a step-parent adoption with [the probate

6The maternal grandmother filed a petition for grandparent
visitation in the probate court on October 6, 2023.
10
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

court] and somehow obtained an interlocutory [order] from
that court on the same date which went to the extraordinary
step of stating that the 'right of any natural grandparent to
maintain visitation rights pursuant to § 30-3-4.2[, Ala. Code
1975,] is hereby stayed…' The father did not bring the
children to the July 23rd visitation or any of the court-
ordered visitation since then.

"Two days before the hearing in this case, on October
10, 2023, [the probate court] apparently issued an order
granting [the maternal] grandmother visitation … The order
does not expressly mention if there was an intent to affect the
visitation previously agreed to and ordered by this court. It
does not appear that the contemplated adoption had been
completed yet. The order provided to this court does state 'all
other motions … are denied' but it does not specifically
reference the adoption of [the children].

"At issue at this time in this case is whether the
previous suspension of incarceration should be lifted and [the
father] should be required to serve his sentence. The
evidence is clear that [the father] willfully violated the court
order in THIS case again. His has been a long train of abuses
and this court has no doubt that the adoption action was
solely an attempt to use the court system as means to ignore
his own promises and this court's orders. [The father]
acknowledges that the purpose of the adoption proceedings
was not for the enrichment of the children but to try to
prevent the grandmother from getting custody of the children
while he was in jail. This also indicates the father's intent to
ignore this court's visitation orders, because that would be
the reason he might go to jail. (This court had made it clear
that his jail sentence would be suspended as long as there
were no further violations of this court's orders.)

"The father's counsel argues that this court lost
jurisdiction when [the father's] wife filed for adoption
pursuant to § 30-3-4.2(j)[, Ala. Code 1975]. Firstly, the

11
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

children do not appear to have been adopted, so it is not clear
that is even in play in regard to anything.

"More importantly, courts are allowed to exercise their
inherent duty of administering justice. This court suspended
[the father's] jail sentence as a courtesy to him. That
courtesy was met with more contempt than gratitude, just as
[the maternal grandmother's] courtesy was previously. This
court warned [the father] to abide by this court's orders in
this case if he wanted his incarceration to remain suspended.
It is undisputed that he did not.

"That [the father] is in contempt of court and subject to
50 days in jail is already decided and adjudicated. Those
issues were made final by the July judgment. The only issue
before this court at this time is whether the suspension of
[the father's] jail sentence should be lifted. For good cause
shown, this court finds that the suspension of [the father's]
jail sentence should be lifted -- at least in regards to 24 of
those days.

"It is hereby ordered and decreed that:

"1. The suspension of [the father's] jail time is
hereby lifted for 24 of the 50 previously ordered
days in jail. The remaining 26 days remain
suspended at this time.

"2. [The father] shall serve such jail sentence on
weekends once a month for twelve months on the
first weekend of each month for 12 months
beginning in November 2023.

"….

"… Specifically, without waiving any other powers, the
court reserves jurisdiction to lift the suspension of the
remaining jail sentence and/or require that [the father] serve

12
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

his days in a different manner, including consecutively, in
the future."

(Emphasis added.)

After entering its order in the .03 action lifting in part the

suspension of the sentence of incarceration for criminal contempt

ordered in its July 17, 2023, judgment, the juvenile court at 10:30 a.m.

entered an order in the .04 action transferring that action to the Coffee

Juvenile Court. The order provides in pertinent part:

"[The father] argues that all jurisdiction in this case has
now been absorbed by [the probate court] because [the
stepmother] filed an adoption in that court. He also argues,
in the alternative, that this .04 case is an action to enforce
visitation and because [the father,] who is the primary
custodian, and the children, lived in Coffee County for three
years prior to the filing of [the petition that initiated the .04
action, the father] has the option of choosing his home county
as venue for this action pursuant to § 30-3-5 of the Code of
Alabama, 1975.

"The [maternal] grandmother's counsel argues that
because this action is another contempt action as to [the
father], and not [the stepmother], this court maintains
jurisdiction. …

"In regard to jurisdiction, this court does not find the
juvenile courts have lost jurisdiction over the grandparent's
visitation issues. There has apparently been no final order
of adoption entered in regard to these children yet.

"In regards to venue, while § 30-3-5 may read as if it
was intended to apply to circuit court actions such as

13
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

divorces, and not juvenile or district court actions, it also
reads that it applies to all actions for modification or
enforcement of custody and visitation issues. Our appellate
courts have apparently taken the position that this statute
applies to all custody actions relating to prior
custody/visitation/support actions, not just circuit court
actions.

"[The father's] counsel, based on the drafting of the
petition, raises the question whether this is a dependency
action or not. While dependency findings can overcome an
adoption, this court takes no position on that at this time,
because if it were a new dependency case, venue would not
be in this court."

(Emphasis added.)

On October 26, 2023, the father filed two petitions for a writ of

mandamus with this court. Regarding the order entered in the .03

action, the father petitions this court to order the juvenile court to vacate

that order and to enter an order dismissing the action. Our clerk has

designated this petition as CL-2023-0757. Regarding the order entered

in the .04 action, the father asks this court to order the juvenile court to

vacate its order transferring the case to the Coffee Juvenile Court and

to enter an order dismissing the case. Our clerk has designated that

petition as CL-2023-0758. On October 25, 2023, this court issued an

order that consolidated the two petitions for purposes of appellate review

14
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

and an order that directed answers from the respondents. On November

6, 2023, the maternal grandmother filed an answer and brief.

" ' "The standard for determining whether a
writ of mandamus will issue is as follows:

" ' " 'A writ of mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy, and it will be
"issued only when there is (1) a clear
legal right in the petitioner to the
order sought; (2) an imperative duty
upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3)
the lack of another adequate remedy;
and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of
the court." Ex parte United Serv.
Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala.
1993). A writ of mandamus will issue
only in situations where other relief is
unavailable or is inadequate, and it
cannot be used as a substitute for
appeal. Ex parte Drill Parts & Serv.
Co., 590 So. 2d 252 (Ala. 1991).'

" ' "Ex parte Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 720
So. 2d 893, 894 (Ala. 1998)." '

"Ex parte Silver Chiropractic Group, Inc., 975 So. 2d 922, 925
(Ala. 2007)(quoting Ex parte Sawyer, 892 So. 2d 898, 901
(Ala. 2004))."

Ex parte Wall, 983 So. 2d 380, 381 (Ala. 2007). " 'The petitioner bears

the burden of proving all four of these elements before a writ of

mandamus will issue.' " Tatum v. Freeman, 893 So. 2d 1213, 1218 (Ala.

15
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

Civ. App. 2004). "[T]he issue of subject-matter jurisdiction is reviewable

by way of a petition for a writ of mandamus. Ex parte U.S. Bank Nat'l

Ass'n, 148 So. 3d 1060, 1065 (Ala. 2014); Ex parte Rhodes, 144 So. 3d

316, 318 (Ala. 2013)." Ex parte Moultrie, [Ms. CL-2022-0864, Oct. 21,

2022] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2022).

The father contends that the juvenile court had an imperative duty

to dismiss the maternal grandmother's "renewed motion for emergency

relief" filed in the .03 action and the petition initiating the .04 action and

refused to do so. According to the father, the probate court's entry of the

interlocutory orders of adoption on July 21, 2021, the final judgments of

adoption on October 10, 2023, and the order awarding the maternal

grandmother grandparent visitation on October 11, 2023, divested the

juvenile court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the issue of the

maternal grandmother's visitation. He insists that the probate court has

jurisdiction, and, consequently, the juvenile court only had authority to

dismiss these actions. See Ex parte Thompson Tractor Co., 227 So. 3d

1234, 1238 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017)("A court that lacks jurisdiction has the

power only to dismiss the action.")

16
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

The father, however, does not demonstrate that the juvenile court

erred in denying his motions to dismiss. In its October 16, 2023, order

in the .04 action, the juvenile court observed that the father had

questioned whether the maternal grandmother had initiated a new

dependency action and, consequently, implied that jurisdiction may be

proper in the juvenile court. As previously noted, § 30-3-5, Ala. Code

1975, provides that venue for a petition requesting child-custody

modification is proper either in the circuit court that granted custody to

the current custodial parent or in the circuit court of the county where

the current custodial parent and the children have resided for three

consecutive years immediately preceding the filing of the petition.

Because the materials submitted to this court indicate that the March

2, 2020, judgment awarding the father custody of the children was

entered by the juvenile court, venue for the .04 action was proper in Lee

County. It also appears undisputed that the father and the children

have lived in Coffee County for three consecutive years immediately

preceding the filing of the maternal grandmother's motion. The father

is correct that in Ex parte Johnson, 692 So. 2d 843 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997),

this court held that a trial court must transfer venue in matters seeking

17
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

to modify custody on motion of the custodial parent. Here, the juvenile

court, recognizing that the father had established that venue was no

longer proper in Lee County and that it was proper in Coffee County,

transferred the case, as requested by the father, to the Coffee Juvenile

Court. Thus, the juvenile court granted the father's motion to transfer

and did not enter an adverse ruling as to jurisdiction. Consequently, the

father has not demonstrated a clear, legal right to mandamus relief in

the .04 action based on the probate court's proceedings and judgments.

See Ex parte Drury Hotels Co., LLC, 303 So. 3d 1188, 1194 (Ala.

2020)(refusing to address petitioner's argument because an adverse

ruling had not been entered); and Ex parte Veteto, 230 So. 3d 401, 403

(Ala. Civ. App. 2017)("[T]he trial court has not yet entered written orders

on the motions .... Therefore, there are no adverse rulings for this court

to consider at this time. Moreover, it is the duty of this court to review

the propriety of orders and judgments made in the trial court; this court

cannot issue rulings on the motions pending before the trial court.").

Likewise, we conclude that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to

lift the father's suspended sentence of incarceration ordered in the July

17, 2023, judgment and that any actions taken by the probate court

18
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

subsequent to the entry of the July 17, 2023, judgment did not impact

the juvenile court's jurisdiction to lift the suspended sentence ordered in

its July 17, 2023, judgment and to order the father to serve in part the

sentence.

It is well established that

"[a] trial court retains jurisdiction to interpret and enforce its
owns judgments.

" 'A trial court has inherent authority to
interpret, clarify, and enforce its own final
judgments. See Helms v. Helms' Kennels, Inc.,
646 So. 2d 1343, 1347 (Ala. 1994)("a trial court
does have residual jurisdiction or authority to take
certain actions necessary to enforce or interpret a
final judgment"); Gild v. Holmes, 680 So. 2d 326,
329 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)("A trial court possesses
an inherent power over its own judgments that
authorizes it to interpret, clarify, implement, or
enforce those judgments."). Thus, even after this
Court, on the direct appeal, affirm[s] the trial
court's ... judgment, [the trial] court retain[s]
jurisdiction to interpret and clarify that
judgment."

"State Pers. Bd. v. Akers, 797 So. 2d 422, 424 (Ala. 2000)."

Stephens v. Nelson, 141 So. 3d 1073, 1076 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013).

The juvenile court's jurisdiction to enter its July 17, 2023,

judgment is not in dispute, and any subsequent loss of jurisdiction did

not divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction to enforce its judgment

19
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

entered when it possessed jurisdiction. See § 12-1-7, Ala. Code 1975

(providing that "[e]very court shall have power ... [t]o compel obedience

to its judgments, orders and process and to orders of a judge out of court,

in an action or proceeding therein"); and McMorrough v. McMorrough,

930 So. 2d 511, 516 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005)(plurality opinion)(noting that

"Alabama law is well established that a trial court has the power to

enforce its judgment and to enter such orders as may be necessary to

render a judgment effective"). Accordingly, the father has not

demonstrated a clear, legal right to dismissal of the .03 action based on

the proceedings and judgments in the probate court.

The father also maintains that the juvenile court did not have

subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the October 16, 2023, order in the

.03 action because, he says, the maternal grandmother's requested relief

for additional sanctions for contempt and a custody modification in her

motion for emergency relief created a new action. He argues that

because the maternal grandmother did not pay a filing fee when she filed

her motion, she did not invoke the juvenile court's jurisdiction over these

new claims and that, therefore, the juvenile court erred by not

dismissing the action. See § 12-19-70, Ala. Code 1975, De-Gas, Inc. v.

20
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

Midland Res., 470 So. 2d 1218, 1222 (Ala. 1985)(requiring the payment

of filing fees or a court-approved verified statement of financial hardship

at the time of filing the complaint), and Farmer v. Farmer, 842 So. 2d

679, 681 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002)(holding that "the failure to pay the filing

or docketing fee is a jurisdictional defect").

Our review of the materials before us indicates that the payment

of a filing fee was not required. The juvenile court's October 16, 2023,

order in the .03 action reflects that it addressed only one matter, i.e.,

whether the suspension of the father's sentence of incarceration ordered

in the July 17, 2023, judgment should be lifted. Consequently, the

juvenile court acted within its jurisdiction and entered an order lifting

the suspension of the father's sentence of incarceration. Cf. Crowe v.

State ex rel. Patterson, 860 So. 2d 363 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003). To hold that

the juvenile court, upon learning that the father had not complied with

its July 17, 2023, judgment, did not have jurisdiction to act, either sua

sponte or at the request of a party, to lift the suspension of a sentence

ordered as a sanction for an earlier finding of criminal contempt would

inappropriately limit the juvenile court's ability to fashion a sanction

suitable to the facts and circumstances of each case. Therefore, we

21
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

conclude that the payment of a filing fee to invoke the juvenile court's

jurisdiction was not required. See Rowland v. Tucker, 286 So. 3d 713

(Ala. Civ. App. 2019)(implying that a motion to enforce a judgment that

does not include a newly stated cause of action does not require the

payment of a filing fee). Accordingly, the father has not demonstrated a

clear, legal right to mandamus relief based on the foregoing

jurisdictional argument. Vann v. Cook, 989 So. 2d 556, 559 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2008)(recognizing that a judgment entered by a court with subject-

matter jurisdiction is not void).

Lastly, the father argues that if the juvenile court had jurisdiction

to consider whether to reinstate the sanction it had suspended in the

July 17, 2023, judgment, the juvenile court exceeded its discretion by

refusing to transfer the .03 action to the Coffee Juvenile Court. The

materials submitted to this court, however, do not indicate that the

father requested that the juvenile court transfer the .03 action to the

Coffee Juvenile Court. As our supreme court has held:

"In determining, on mandamus review, whether the trial
court exceeded the limits of its discretion, 'the appellate
courts will not reverse the trial court on an issue or
contention not presented to the trial court for its
consideration in making its ruling.' Ex parte Wiginton, 743
So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Ala. 1999)."

22
CL-2023-0757; CL-2023-0758

Ex parte Ebbers, 871 So. 2d 776, 786 (Ala. 2003). Accordingly, because

the materials before us do not indicate that the father presented any

argument in the juvenile court regarding the transfer of venue in the .03

action, the father has not demonstrated that he has a clear, legal right

to the transfer of the .03 action to the Coffee Juvenile Court.

Based on the foregoing, the father's petitions are denied.

CL-2023-0757 -- PETITION DENIED.

CL-2023-0758 -- PETITION DENIED.

Moore, Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.

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