R.D. v. G.A.W. II (Appeal from Jackson Juvenile Court: JU-23-364.01).

Rel: November 1, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
_________________________

CL-2024-0344
_________________________

R.D.

v.

G.A.W. II

Appeal from Jackson Juvenile Court
(JU-23-363.01)
_________________________

CL-2024-0345
_________________________

R.D.

v.

G.A.W. II

Appeal from Jackson Juvenile Court
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

(JU-23-364.01)

PER CURIAM.

R.D. ("the mother") appeals from separate judgments entered by

the Jackson Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") that terminated her

parental rights to C.W., whose date of birth is January 12, 2012, and

G.A.W. III, whose date of birth is September 14, 2014, (collectively "the

children"). We reverse the juvenile court's judgments.

Procedural History

Before the commencement of the termination-of-parental-rights

actions that are presently on appeal, the children were involved in

divorce proceedings in the Jackson Circuit Court ("the circuit court")

between the mother and G.A.W. II ("the father"), wherein issues of

visitation and custody were decided. On September 24, 2019, the circuit

court awarded the father sole physical custody of the children. On

August 22, 2023, the father filed in the juvenile court separate but nearly

identical petitions to terminate the parental rights of the mother on the

basis that, since September 24, 2019, she had been incarcerated, had

been living in a rehab facility or living in halfway houses, and had not

consistently visited or supported the children. The juvenile court held a

2
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

trial on the father's termination-of-parental-rights petitions on April 9,

2024.

On April 25, 2024, the juvenile court entered judgments

terminating the parental rights of the mother as to both children. Those

judgments set forth the following specific findings of fact:

"Upon consideration of the testimony and evidence presented
at the hearing and a review of the court file, the Court finds
that the Mother … has not and is unwilling to fulfill the
responsibilities or perform the duties necessary to be a parent
to th[e] child[ren].

"The Court finds that there is no viable parent-child bond
between the parent and child[ren]. The Mother flat lied to
this court during her direct examination about where she
lived of all things. The court now has an extremely hard time
believing the mother[']s claims of sobriety and clean living.

"The mother clearly does not do well with authority and
following court orders, rather she does things her way. This
in great part has led to her visitation being suspended by the
Circuit Court. The Mother has made very little effort or
progress toward reunify[ing her]self with the child[ren]. The
Mother has made little to no effort to visit with the child[ren]
or establish any relationship with the child[ren]. The
Mother[']s lack of visitation is … a direct result of the
Mother[']s conduct and her visitation with the children having
been suspended by the Circuit Court in the parent[']s divorce
action. The Mother has provide[d] no support and only a few
gifts to the child[ren]. The Court finds that this condition has
existed for an extended period of time and is unlikely to
change in the foreseeable future.

3
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

"Therefore, this Court will GRANT the Petition for
Termination of Parental Rights for said child[ren] on the
Mother and it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and
DECREED as follows:

"1. The child[ren are] under the age of eighteen (18) years and
under the jurisdiction of this Court.

"2. The Mother has failed to provide for the material needs of
the child[ren] in that she has: failed to adapt her lifestyle or
adjust her circumstances to take care of the child[ren]; failed
to maintain consistent in person visitation; failed to provide
consistent support for the child[ren]; failed to establish a
relationship or form a bond with the child[ren].

"3. There is clear and convincing evidence, competent,
material and relevant in nature, by which it has been
established that th[e] child[ren are] dependent … as to the
Mother and that the Mother is unable or unwilling to
discharge her responsibilities to and for the child[ren].

"Furthermore, there is clear and convincing evidence,
competent, material and relevant in nature that the conduct
or condition of the Mother is such as to render her unable to
properly care for the child[ren] and that such conduct or
condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Th[e]
child[ren are] dependent as to the Mother.

"4. There are no viable alternatives to the termination of
parental rights and reunification with the Mother is not
possible. It is in the best interests of th[e] child[ren] that the
parental rights be terminated.

"5. The Parental Rights of the Mother … with regard to these
children … are hereby permanently terminated.

"6. The Father … is awarded the legal and physical care,
custody and control of the minor children … and is authorized

4
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

to do all things necessary to protect and preserve the health,
safety and welfare of the child[ren]."

(Capitalization in original.) The mother filed notices of appeal on May 8,

2024, and this court consolidated her appeals ex mero motu on May 14,

2024.

Evidence

The evidence from the April 9, 2024, trial on the father's

termination-of-parental-rights petitions indicates the following. After

seven years of marriage, the mother and the father divorced in 2018. At

that time, they were awarded joint custody of the children. In May 2018,

the mother pleaded guilty to three criminal charges: unlawful possession

of drug paraphernalia, driving under the influence of a controlled

substance, and illegal possession of prescription drugs. As a result of

those convictions, the mother was placed on probation, and she completed

18 months of color-code drug testing through the court-referral program

of Jackson County ("the court-referral program").

On June 26, 2019, the mother was arrested and charged with illegal

possession of prescription drugs. Based on that arrest, the district

attorney's office filed a motion to revoke her probation. On September

17, 2019, the Jackson Circuit Court placed the mother under house arrest

5
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

and ordered her to participate in the court-referral program and to

complete an assessment for drug rehabilitation.

Based on the mother's 2019 arrest, the father also filed in the

divorce action an ex parte petition for modification of the circuit court's

previous custody arrangement. His petition was granted, and the

mother's visitation was suspended. According to the father's petitions to

terminate the mother's parental rights, the circuit court awarded him

sole physical custody of the children on September 24, 2019.

On October 21, 2019, the mother tested positive for oxycodone and

failed to provide a prescription for that drug. At some point, she also left

her residence without permission. As a result, in November 2019, the

district attorney's office filed two motions to revoke the mother's house

arrest and probation. The mother testified that, as a result of the

disposition of those motions, she was required to go to jail.

The mother stated that she was released from jail and began

substance-abuse treatment in 2020. According to the mother, in

compliance with the court-referral program, she completed a 21-day

drug-rehabilitation program, after which she moved into a halfway house

in Nashville, Tennessee, where she lived for 90 days. She then acquired

6
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

an apartment in Nashville, although she still had a home in Section,

Alabama, so she "would go back and forth between them, with the kids."

On March 29, 2021, the circuit court granted the mother

unsupervised visitation with the children. The mother testified that, in

2021, she left Nashville and moved into an apartment in Scottsboro for a

year. According to the mother, she was arrested twice for driving under

the influence after leaving Nashville. She was also arrested again for

drug-related offenses. While living in Scottsboro, the mother was

arrested for selling fentanyl; however, she testified that she ended up

pleading guilty to the possession of a controlled substance, i.e., Xanax,

after that arrest. The mother testified that she had a legal prescription

for Xanax at the time and was arrested merely for having her pills outside

of the bottle.

The father testified that, around the time of the mother's arrest for

selling fentanyl, the children told him that the mother took them to a

"drug house," told them that they could not come in, and left them in the

car. In 2022, after the mother's lease for the apartment in Scottsboro

ended, she moved in with her sister in Stevenson.

7
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

On October 17, 2022, the circuit court entered an order pursuant to

a visitation agreement between the parties. At some point, the

unsupervised visitation the mother had been awarded on March 29, 2021,

was suspended. In the October 17, 2022, order, the circuit court restored

the mother's unsupervised visitation.

The mother testified that, from October 17, 2022, until January

2023, she had visitation with the children every other week for seven

days at a time. The mother testified that, during that time, she provided

for the children's material needs and paid for their sports activities.

The mother testified that her visitation with the children

terminated in January 2023 because of "[a] disagreement between [her]

and [the father] and his wife." First, the mother stated that the

disagreement was caused, in part, by her drug use; however, later, she

admitted explicitly that her visitation with the children ended in January

2023 because of her drug use. The mother admitted that she had

continued to abuse her prescription medication even after her visitation

was restored in October 2022.

The mother testified that, in January and February 2023, she

provided the children with new clothing and shoes. The father testified

8
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

that that clothing was the only thing that the mother had given the

children in 2023.

In March 2023, the mother filed a motion in the circuit court to

again modify visitation. However, on April 3, 2023, the mother was

arrested for driving under the influence and for possession of a controlled

substance. Based on that arrest, the father filed a motion in the circuit

court to suspend the mother's visitation with the children. On April 6,

2023, after a hearing, the circuit court granted that motion, but it allowed

the mother to continue having telephonic visitation with the children.

The circuit court also ordered the mother to submit to drug testing

through the court-referral program, submit to an evaluation for

substance abuse by the court-referral program, and submit to a mental-

health evaluation at Mountain Lakes Behavioral Healthcare ("Mountain

Lakes"). The mother was directed to complete the care recommended by

the administrators at Mountain Lakes.

The mother admitted that she never completed a mental health

evaluation at Mountain Lakes and that she had chosen to go to a different

facility instead. The mother testified that she began an eight-day

detoxification from drugs at a hospital on April 11, 2023. According to

9
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

the mother, although it followed an arrest, her decision to begin the

detoxification was voluntary and was not court ordered. She stated that

her detoxification facility sent paperwork to the court-referral program

explaining that she had entered treatment on her own. She admitted

that she had never submitted to drug testing or enrolled in a color-code

testing program through the court-referral program as ordered by the

circuit court.

On April 19, 2023, the mother entered The Father's House, a sober-

living facility. She testified that The Father’s House was recommended

by the detoxification facility that she had chosen, but she acknowledged

that neither of those programs had been recommended by the court-

referral program. The mother testified that, in May 2023, she did not

provide the children with any material support because she had been in

treatment and had not been allowed to work; however, in June 2023, she

purchased the children new clothes.

The mother testified that, after entering The Father's House, she

filed in the circuit court a motion for visitation on the basis that she had

enrolled herself in a substance-abuse treatment program. On June 1,

2023, the circuit court held a hearing on the mother's request. However,

10
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

before an order could be entered, the mother was "unsuccessfully

discharged from The Father's House on 06/19/2023 … for inappropriate

relationships with other clients," according to a letter addressed to the

circuit court and signed by the director of The Father's House.

According to the mother, she was sober when she left The Father's

House and was not dismissed for failure to pass a drug test. She testified

that she was dismissed from The Father's House "for a letter from

another woman." She stated that she had "never even received the

letter."

The mother testified that, for the two months she was at The

Father's House, from April to June 2023, she did not comply with the

circuit court's order that she participate in programs through the court-

referral program because the facility handled all such matters for the

residents. According to the mother, The Father's House did not have her

appointments through the court-referral program scheduled. The mother

admitted that, even after she left The Father's House, she never attended

programs through the court-referral program. The mother testified that,

two weeks before the trial in this case in April 2024, she telephoned the

office of the court-referral program to make an appointment. She stated,

11
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

however, that she had been told to call back and had not yet done so;

therefore, she said, she had not been evaluated or drug tested as of the

date of the trial. The mother testified that she had paperwork showing

that she "was somewhere taking drug tests," although she admitted that

it was not through the court-referral program.

According to the mother, as soon as she was dismissed from The

Father's House, she went to the Jackson County courthouse and "put it

in writing to [the circuit court]" that she was moving to a different

facility. On June 27, 2023, after the hearing on her visitation request,

the circuit court entered an order awarding the mother three types of

visitation: in-person visitation every third Sunday during church,

visitation by phone for a maximum of 15 minutes per day, and in-person

visitation at the Gathering Place in Fort Payne when she could obtain a

pass to leave her sober-living facility. The visitation was awarded on the

conditions that the mother submit to color-code drug testing, be

evaluated for participation in Family Wellness Court, and comply with

the terms of her probation.

However, just hours later, the circuit court entered an order stating,

"[t]he court is now informed that the mother left her prior placement at

12
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

The Father's House … and [has] gone to a facility in Chattanooga,

Tennessee." Because, the court stated, it was unfamiliar with the

mother's new facility, it vacated its prior order, except for the allowance

of phone calls, visitation at the Gathering Place, and its mandate that

the mother participate in drug testing. The mother testified that her in-

person visitation was terminated entirely in June 2023. According to her,

The Gathering Place could not facilitate visitation between her and the

children due to a lack of funding for after-school visits. The father

testified that the lack of visits was a result of the mother's own failure to

contact The Gathering Place to schedule them.

The father testified that the last scheduled visitation before the

trial in April 2024 was some time in 2023 and that he had planned to

take the children to the church on that Sunday to meet the mother;

however, that visitation never took place because he was notified that the

mother had been dismissed from The Father's House.

The mother testified that she entered a sober-living facility called

Oxford House in Chattanooga, Tennessee, on June 28, 2023. The mother

admitted that she had never complied with the circuit court's June 27,

2023, order to participate in Family Wellness Court and stated that it

13
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

was because her facility did not help her comply. The mother admitted

that she had still not participated in Family Wellness Court as of the date

of the trial in April 2024.

The mother also admitted that, in July 2023, she provided no

financial support to the father to assist him in meeting the needs of the

children. At the time of the trial, the mother worked full time as a

manager at a shoe department in a mall in Chattanooga. She testified

that she began working there at the end of July 2023. The father filed

petitions to terminate the mother's parental rights to the children on

August 22, 2023.

The mother initially testified that, at the time of the trial in April

2024, she still lived at the Oxford House in Chattanooga, Tennessee,

where she had resided since June 2023. On cross-examination, however,

the mother admitted that she no longer lived at the Oxford House. She

admitted that she had moved out of the Oxford House with another

resident in November 2023 and had moved into an apartment with her.

The mother stated that she and her roommate had maintained

"connections" and "networking" with the Oxford House after moving out.

14
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

However, she admitted that she had misled the juvenile court about

where she lived.

The mother also admitted that she had not told the truth to the

circuit court presiding over her divorce. The mother testified that she

had wanted to tell the circuit-court judge in person because he had "been

over [her] case for all these years." Thus, she said that, on November 16,

2023, before she left the Oxford House, she "requested court dates,"

during which she planned to notify the circuit court that she had left the

Oxford House. In her filings, which were admitted into evidence in this

case, the mother told the circuit court that she had had her probation

transferred to Tennessee, that she "still currently reside[d] at a recovery

house for women in Chattanooga," and that she had not seen the children

at the Gathering Place, although she had called and spoken with its

director "numerous, numerous times." As the mother admitted at trial,

those motions did not state that she had left or was planning to leave the

Oxford House. The mother testified that the circuit court scheduled a

hearing; however, because that hearing was continued twice, she

admitted that, as of the date of the trial of this case, she had not yet

notified the circuit court that she had left the Oxford House.

15
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

On February 1, 2024, the mother filed in the circuit court a motion

for visitation based on an alleged change in her circumstances, namely,

the fact that she had resolved her legal issues, had been clean for a longer

amount of time, and could not effectively visit with the children by

telephone because of interference by the children's stepmother. In that

motion, which was admitted into evidence in this case, the mother stated

as follows: "The mother has resided at the sober living Oxford House in

Chattanooga, Tennessee since June 28, 2023." The mother acknowledged

that that statement was not true at the time but said that the statement

"was based on [her] last motion."

The mother testified that, at the time of the trial, she still lived in

her private apartment. The father testified that he learned for the first

time at the trial of this case that the mother was no longer living at the

Oxford House. He stated, and the mother admitted, that she had still

been telling the children that she lived at the Oxford House.

Because she had moved, the mother admitted that, at the time of

the trial, she had not been randomly drug tested since November 2023.

She stated, though, that she was willing to take a drug test that day. The

mother testified that, on the day before the trial, she had submitted to a

16
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

drug test as part of the process to apply for a job. According to the

mother, she has been clean from drugs since the beginning of her hospital

detoxification on April 11, 2023. The mother stated at the trial that, in

two days, she would attain one year of sobriety.

The mother testified that, for the entire year of 2023, she was not

allowed to visit with the children in person; however, she also stated that

the last time she visited the children in person was in the spring of 2023.

The mother stated that, at the time of the trial, she had only telephonic

visitation, but, she said, she had been blocked on C.W.'s cellular

telephone "for months," which prevented her from telephoning C.W. She

testified that she had had to message C.W. and have C.W. initiate their

calls.

The father testified that the mother had never been blocked on

either his, his wife's, or C.W.'s cellular telephone. He stated that the

mother "had problems getting through on [C.W.'s] phone" but added that

the mother never tried to telephone him or his wife to resolve those

problems. The father stated that the mother had not consistently taken

advantage of her telephonic visitation. According to the father, the

mother called one to four times per week in 2024. He stated that, in 2023,

17
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

months passed without the mother calling, although that was rare.

Overall, he testified that after he filed the termination-of-parental-rights

petitions, the mother's level of effort "changed a lot" with respect to

telephonic visitation.

According to the father, in the last two years, the mother attended

only one sports game in which one of the children was playing. The

mother testified that she had provided the children with Christmas and

birthday gifts through her mother and sister. The father testified that

he was not aware of the mother providing any birthday gifts to the

children. He stated that, so far in 2024, the children had received some

movie posters and $50 each from the mother; G.A.W. III had received a

pair of shoes; and C.W. had received "a used bag of makeup." The father

stated that the only time he or the children had received any money from

the mother was the aforementioned instance in which the mother gave

the children $50 each. The father testified that the mother gave each of

those gifts after the trial of this matter was scheduled.

With respect to the impact of the mother failing to complete

rehabilitation, the father testified: "Of course, they love their mom. …

They want to see her sometimes. … [I]t has affected them … greatly.

18
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

[C.W.] has became cold and don't really care anymore, she's kind of just

use[d] to it and has became cold towards her and towards other people."

The father clarified that C.W. is used to "being in and out of court" and

used to the lack of consistent visitation with the mother. He testified

that the children need stability.

Later, when discussing the mother's dishonesty regarding where

she lived, the father testified that the children will be negatively

impacted when they are informed that the mother is not living in The

Oxford House and is no longer drug testing. He stated that C.W. has lost

hope that the mother will be able to remain sober consistently. He

testified that G.A.W. III "holds on to hope, like he clings to just a little bit

that's still here, that's still there to hang on to."

The father stated that he believed that it was in the best interests

of the children for the mother's parental rights to be terminated. He

further testified that the mother's issues with drugs have spanned seven

years and that her repeated arrests, going in and out of rehabilitation

programs, and failure to comply with court orders for drug counseling

have caused G.A.W. III to have "behavioral issues, acting out, mental

things."

19
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

The father stated that, "[a]t one point in time, [he] was willing to

work with a sober" version of the mother. However, when asked what it

would take for the mother to prove that she was sober, he stated that

"[a]t this point, her being sober [was] irrelevant to [him]." He testified

that he was burned out. He stated that after each of the mother's arrests,

he had had conversations with her in which she stated that she was going

to take care of her issues.

The father admitted that he had also been arrested. He stated that

he had struggled with opioid addiction in the past and that he and the

mother had used methadone, oxycodone, Xanax, and Suboxone, together.

However, he stated that he overcame his addiction, both by spending

time in a drug-rehabilitation facility, and ultimately on his own. The

father testified that if the mother's parental rights were terminated, he

would continue to provide for the children and give them a stable life.

The father testified that he was married and that his wife was a

stay-at-home mother to their three children, while he was self-employed

as the owner of a business. The father testified that child support "was

mentioned" in the divorce proceedings but that he did not pursue it

because he did not want it and does not need the mother's money. There

20
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

was no testimony given regarding whether the father's wife, or anyone

else, planned to adopt the children.

Standard of Review

"A judgment terminating parental rights must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence, which is
' " '[e]vidence that, when weighed against evidence in
opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm
conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high
probability as to the correctness of the conclusion . ' " ' C.O. v.
Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 206 So. 3d 621, 627 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2016) (quoting L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So. 2d 171, 179
(Ala. Civ. App. 2002), quoting in turn Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-
20(b)(4)).

" ' "[T]he evidence necessary for
appellate affirmance of a judgment
based on a factual finding in the
context of a case in which the ultimate
standard for a factual decision by the
trial court is clear and convincing
evidence is evidence that a fact-finder
reasonably could find to clearly and
convincingly … establish the fact
sought to be proved."

" 'KGS Steel, Inc. [v. McInish], 47 So. 3d [749,] 761
[(Ala. Civ. App. 2006)].

" '… [F]or trial courts ruling … in civil cases
to which a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard
of proof applies, "the judge must view the evidence
presented through a prism of the substantive
evidentiary burden[,]" [Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed.
2d 202 (1986)]; thus, the appellate court must also

21
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

look through a prism to determine whether there
was substantial evidence before the trial court to
support a factual finding, based upon the trial
court's weighing of the evidence, that would
"produce in the mind [of the trial court] a firm
conviction as to each element of the claim and a
high probability as to the correctness of the
conclusion .'

"Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d 767, 778 (Ala. 2008). This court
does not reweigh the evidence but, rather, determines
whether the findings of fact made by the juvenile court are
supported by evidence that the juvenile court could have
found to be clear and convincing. See Ex parte T.V., 971 So.
2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007). When those findings rest on ore tenus
evidence, this court presumes their correctness. Id."

M.W. v. Marshall Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., [Ms. CL-2023-0809, Mar. 15,

2024] ___ So. 3d ____, ____ (Ala. Civ. App. 2024).

Discussion

A juvenile court may terminate parental rights only when the

petitioner presents clear and convincing evidence showing: (1) grounds

for termination, see § 12-15-319(a), Ala. Code 1975, (2) the absence of a

viable alternative to termination, and (3) that the termination will serve

the best interests of the child. See J.A. v. S.L., [Ms. CL-2023-0576, June

28, 2024], ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2024). In her appeal, the mother

challenges the juvenile court's judgment on all three points. However,

22
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

we find the issue of whether there was a viable alternative to termination

dispositive.

It is well settled that a noncustodial parent continues to maintain

a fundamental right to a legal relationship with his or her child. See

McQuinn v. McQuinn, 866 So. 2d 570, 572 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003). A

juvenile court may only interfere with that fundamental right using the

most narrowly tailored means to achieve the State's compelling interests.

See Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976). Only two interests

have been identified as sufficiently compelling to justify a termination of

parental rights: the protection of children from parental abuse or neglect

and the advancement of the children's need for a permanent custodial

arrangement. See Ex parte Bodie, 377 So. 3d 1051, 1065 (Ala. 2022)

(Parker, C.J., concurring specially). If the juvenile court can secure a

child in a permanent custodial arrangement that insulates the child from

the threat of parental harm, the juvenile court may not terminate the

noncustodial parent's parental rights because a viable alternative exists.

See J.A. v. S.L., supra.

Ordinarily, when a trial court has vested sole physical custody of a

child in one parent, while restricting the visitation rights of the

23
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

noncustodial parent, to safeguard the children, the State's interests are

completely fulfilled, and the trial court has provided the child with a

permanent custodial arrangement that secures the child from potential

abuse or neglect by the noncustodial parent. Hence, this court has

consistently held that, if that custodial arrangement can be continued,

the court should maintain the status quo as a viable alternative to

termination of parental rights. See A.J.H.T. v. K.O.H., 983 So. 2d 394,

407 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (Moore, J., concurring specially) (citing Sutton

v. Elrod, 724 So. 2d 551 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998); In re Beasley, 564 So. 2d

959 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); Miller v. Knight, 562 So. 2d 274 (Ala. Civ. App.

1990); Talley v. Oliver, 628 So. 2d 690 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993); S.M.W. v.

J.M.C., 679 So. 2d 256 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996); and Thornton v. Thornton,

519 So. 2d 960 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987)). In a private termination-of-

parental-rights case, when a juvenile court terminates parental rights

despite the viability of maintaining the status quo, this court has

regularly reversed the judgment. See, e.g., J.A. v. S.L., supra; J.G. v.

Lauderdale Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 379 So. 3d 444 (Ala. Civ. App.

2023); J.C.D. v. Lauderdale Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 180 So. 3d 900, 901

(Ala. Civ. App. 2015).

24
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

Here, under the status quo, the children resided safely with the

father according to a permanent sole physical custody arrangement; they

visited telephonically with the mother; and the mother was permitted to

visit with them in person at the Gathering Place, although she had not

yet arranged a meeting there. The father testified that he had given the

children a stable life and had met all of their needs without assistance

from the mother. There was no evidence indicating that continued

telephonic visitation or supervised in-person visitation with the mother

would be harmful to the children.

We recognize that denying the father's petitions would have left

open the possibility that, in the future, the mother could be awarded

unsupervised visitation with the children, which, in light of her

substance abuse problems and criminal history, could harm the children.

We note, however, that the children were protected under the current

supervised visitation arrangement, and the mother could not be awarded

unsupervised visitation except upon a showing that she had adjusted her

circumstances such that unsupervised visitation would not be harmful to

the children. Therefore, maintaining the status quo satisfied the State's

interests and was a viable alternative to the termination. Accordingly,

25
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

the juvenile court should have denied the father's petitions. See A.J.H.T.,

983 So. 2d at 407 (Moore, J., concurring specially) (citing Sutton, 724 So.

2d 551; In re Beasley, 564 So. 2d 959; Miller, 562 So. 2d 274; Talley, 628

So. 2d 690; S.M.W., 679 So. 2d 256; and Thornton, 519 So. 2d 960)).

Having determined that there was a viable alternative to the

termination of the mother's parental rights, we pretermit a discussion of

whether there were grounds for termination of the mother's parental

rights and whether the termination served the best interests of the

children. Even if it did, the juvenile court could not terminate the

mother's parental rights when there was a viable alternative. See Ex

parte T.V., 971 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 2007).

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the juvenile court's judgments

terminating the mother's parental rights and remand the causes for the

entry of judgments denying the father's petitions to terminate the

mother's parental rights.

CL-2024-0344 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.

26
CL-2024-0344; CL-2024-0345

CL-2024-0345 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH

INSTRUCTIONS

Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, Fridy, and Lewis, JJ., concur.

27