Ex parte The Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama for its Division, University Hospital PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: Donisha Howard v. The Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama) (Jefferson Circuit Court: CV-24-903212).

Rel: December 12, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026

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SC-2025-0240
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Ex parte The Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama for
its Division, University Hospital

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: Donisha Howard

v.

The Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama et al.)

(Jefferson Circuit Court: CV-24-903212)

COOK, Justice.
SC-2025-0240

This mandamus petition presents the question of whether a

plaintiff may pursue claims against a state university's governing board

after voluntarily abandoning an interpleader claim that would permit

judicial review of a hospital lien. In August 2024, Donisha Howard filed

suit in the Jefferson Circuit Court challenging a hospital lien asserted by

the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama ("the Board") in

connection with medical services provided by the University of Alabama

at Birmingham Hospital ("UAB Hospital"). Howard's original complaint

included an interpleader claim seeking to deposit disputed settlement

funds with the court so that the competing claims to those funds could be

adjudicated. But after the Board moved to dismiss the action against it

on the ground that it is entitled to State immunity under Article I, § 14,

of the Alabama Constitution, Howard amended her complaint to remove

the interpleader claim, to add additional claims, and to proceed only on

various tort, contract, and state constitutional claims. The trial court

subsequently entered an order denying the Board's motion to dismiss.

The Board now petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus

directing the trial court to vacate its order and to enter an order

dismissing the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the

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operative complaint no longer contains an interpleader claim and seeks

relief solely against an arm of the State, the Board contends that the trial

court has a "clear and imperative duty" to dismiss the action under § 14

of the Alabama Constitution. For the reasons explained below, we grant

the petition and issue the writ.

Facts and Procedural History

On May 16, 2023, Howard was involved in a motor-vehicle accident

in Jefferson County. After the accident, she sought medical treatment at

UAB Hospital, which is operated by the Board. The Board alleges that

Howard incurred $9,231 in medical expenses for the medical care and

treatment she received at UAB Hospital.

Almost two months later, on July 19, 2023, UAB Hospital filed a

hospital lien in the Jefferson County Probate Court in the amount of

$9,231. The lien secured payment for Howard's treatment and care from

any settlement or recovery she might receive on account of her injuries.

Howard retained counsel to pursue claims against the other person

involved in the accident. As a result of that litigation, she recovered

$25,000 from his liability-insurance provider. She then tried to negotiate

with UAB Hospital to reduce the amount she owed under the lien.

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After negotiations failed to yield a favorable result, Howard filed

suit on August 16, 2024, against the Board; its employee, Thomas Elmes,

in both his official and individual capacities; 1 and numerous fictitiously

named defendants in the Jefferson Circuit Court. The complaint

contained a litany of tort, contract, and state constitutional claims

against the Board. In addition, Howard included an interpleader claim

alleging that the lien amount was unreasonable and sought declaratory

and injunctive relief against the Board. After filing her complaint, she

also moved to deposit the settlement funds with the trial court.

On October 14, 2024, the Board moved to dismiss Howard's

complaint. 2 In its motion, the Board argued that it was entitled to State

immunity under Section 14 of the Alabama Constitution because it was

an agency of the State of Alabama. The Board also claimed that the trial

court could not exercise in rem jurisdiction because Howard did not

1Elmes was named as a defendant because he had filed the lien on

behalf of UAB Hospital as part of his employment with the hospital.

2We note that the Board and Elmes jointly filed the motion to
dismiss. After that motion was denied, Elmes petitioned this Court for a
writ of mandamus in which he, like the Board, asked us to direct the trial
court to dismiss all of Howard's claims against him based on State
immunity. Our Court issued an order denying Elmes's petition. Ex parte
Elmes (No. SC-2024-0852, Feb. 12, 2025) (Ala. 2025).
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interplead the settlement funds with the court. 3

Howard opposed that motion, arguing principally that State

immunity does not apply because the court may exercise in rem

jurisdiction over her settlement funds. She maintained that, under Rule

22, Ala. R. Civ. P., parties seeking interpleader are permitted -- but not

required -- to deposit the disputed funds. Moreover, she contended that

if State immunity does apply and the court could not exercise in rem

jurisdiction, she would be denied due process under the Alabama

Constitution, because her property would be taken without an

opportunity to defend her rights. Instead, she argued, she should be

allowed to raise defensive claims against UAB Hospital's lien. Finally,

she asserted that, if her only error was naming the Board as a defendant,

that mistake was harmless.

On the same day the trial court held a hearing on the Board's

motion, Howard filed a motion to withdraw her motion to deposit the

settlement funds. About a week later, Howard amended her complaint.

The new complaint, among other things, removed her interpleader claim.

3At the time the motion to dismiss was filed, Howard's motion to

deposit the settlement funds was still pending in the trial court.
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On March 4, 2025, the trial court denied the Board's motion to

dismiss. The Board thereafter petitioned this Court for a writ of

mandamus, and we ordered answers and briefs.

Standard of Review

Although interlocutory orders denying a motion to dismiss are

generally not reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus, such a

petition "is an appropriate means for seeking review of an order denying

a claim of immunity." Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 176 (Ala. 2000).

Indeed, it is well established that mandamus will issue to compel

dismissal of a claim barred by State immunity. Ex parte Blankenship,

893 So. 2d 303, 305 (Ala. 2004) (citing Ex parte McWhorter, 880 So. 2d

1116, 1117 (Ala. 2003)).

Mandamus will issue when there is: "1) a clear legal right in the

petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the respondent

to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) the lack of another

adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court." Ex

parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993).

Discussion

In its petition for a writ of mandamus, the Board argues that the

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trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss. Because the Board is

protected by State immunity under § 14 of the Alabama Constitution, it

says, the trial court had a "clear and imperative duty" to grant the

motion.

Article I, § 14, Ala. Const. 2022, provides that "the State of Alabama

shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." That

provision establishes what this Court has described as a "nearly

impregnable" wall of immunity that shields the State from suit.

Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d 137, 142 (Ala. 2002).

Immunity extends beyond the State itself to its agencies and

instrumentalities. For instance, as relevant here, "the State's institutions

of higher learning are also entitled to the immunity of § 14," Ex parte

Board of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama, 411 So. 3d 1228, 1232 (Ala. 2024)

(citing Sarradett v. University of S. Alabama Med. Ctr., 484 So. 2d 426,

426 (Ala. 1986)), because such institutions are "agenc[ies] of the State,"

Hutchinson v. Board of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama, 47 Ala. App. 460, 463,

256 So. 2d 279, 281 (Civ. App. 1971). Indeed, this Court has repeatedly

emphasized that "'[t]he Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama

was created by the State of Alabama,'" and "[o]ur cases have made it

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abundantly clear that the Board is entitled to § 14 immunity." Ex parte

Board of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama, 264 So. 3d 850, 854 (Ala. 2018)

(citation omitted).

When State immunity attaches, it operates as a "jurisdictional bar"

to a trial court's ability to exercise jurisdiction over the action. See Ex

parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., 985 So. 2d 892, 894 (Ala. 2007); see also

Larkins v. Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 806 So.

2d 358, 364 (Ala. 2001). The jurisdictional nature of § 14 immunity means

that, when it attaches, a trial court must dismiss the action. As this Court

explained in Vandenberg v. Aramark Educational Services, Inc., 81 So.

3d 326, 333 (Ala. 2011), "boards of trustees are corporate bodies

governing the universities, and there is no exception to the immunity

afforded the State by § 14 that would permit the trial court to entertain

an action against them, regardless of whether monetary, injunctive, or

declaratory relief is being sought."

Thus, as a general matter, Howard's claims against the Board

cannot be entertained because the Board is immune from suit of any type.

This means that Howard's action against the Board was due to be

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

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Despite this result -- and the clear legal principles that support it

-- Howard insists that the Alabama Constitution itself requires an

exception here. According to Howard, applying State immunity in the

present case would effectively deny her all opportunity to obtain due

process of law, as guaranteed by Article I, § 6, of the Alabama

Constitution. In her view, § 14, if enforced without qualification, would

obliterate the protections of § 6.

Although Howard cites § 6 of the Alabama Constitution, her

argument in substance rests on Article I, § 13, of the Alabama

Constitution. Section 6 concerns due process in criminal prosecutions. It

provides that, "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused … shall not be

compelled to give evidence against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,

or property, except by due process of law." Ala. Const. 2022, Art. I, § 6.

Section 13, by contrast, "guarantee[s] every person a remedy by due

process of law for 'any injury done … in his lands, goods, person, or

reputation.'" Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 398 (Ala. 2000)

(plurality opinion) (quoting Ala. Const. 1901, Art. I, § 13).

This Court "has interpreted the due process guaranteed under the

Alabama Constitution to be coextensive with the due process guaranteed

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under the United States Constitution." Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d

726, 730 (Ala. 2002)). Specifically, we have explained that "procedural

due process, protected by the Constitutions of the United States and this

State, requires notice and an opportunity to be heard when one's life,

liberty, or property interests are about to be affected by governmental

action." Brown's Ferry Waste Disposal Ctr., Inc. v. Trent, 611 So. 2d 226,

228 (Ala. 1992) (emphasis added).

Howard maintains that, unless the courts can adjudicate her

claims, she will be deprived of her property without due process. While it

is true that a property interest exists in a valid final money judgment,

and thus a litigant is entitled to due process before the State may deprive

her of that judgment, see Huckabee v. Stephens, 29 Ala. App. 259, 261-

62, 195 So. 295, 297 (1940), we note that, consistent with § 14 immunity

principles, Alabama courts have repeatedly entertained suits that

resolve hospital liens asserted by UAB Hospital through the procedural

mechanism for interpleader found in Rule 22, Ala. R. Civ. P. 4

4The Board expressly concedes this point in its petition:

"Indeed, had the funds been interplead[ed] into the trial
court, the trial court would have acquired in rem jurisdiction
over the interplead[ed] funds. Upon acquiring in rem
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Through interpleader claims, Alabama courts have long

adjudicated disputes over liens filed by state-run hospitals without

treating immunity as a jurisdictional bar. For example, in Ex parte

University of South Alabama, 761 So. 2d 240, 242 (Ala. 1999), this Court

reviewed the merits of an interpleader case involving a hospital "operated

by the University of South Alabama." Likewise, in Roberts v. University

of Alabama Hospital, 27 So. 3d 512, 514 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008), the

plaintiffs interpleaded two drafts that had been issued by a liability

insurer, and the trial court added a hospital asserting a lien as a

defendant and adjudicated the lien's validity and amount. Other

decisions reflect the same practice. See, e.g., Progressive Specialty Ins.

Co. v. University of Alabama Hosp., 953 So. 2d 413 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006)

(entertaining a declaratory-judgment action regarding a hospital lien);

Board of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama v. Richards, 405 So. 3d 267, 271 (Ala.

Civ. App. 2024) (relying on Roberts to note that interpleader provides a

jurisdiction, the trial court could have completely and totally
adjudicated Ms. Howard's claim on the reasonableness of the
charges secured by The Board's statutory Hospital Lien
asserted under the Hospital Lien Statute."

The Board's petition at 7-8.

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proper avenue for resolving hospital-lien disputes).

These precedents show that Alabama courts understand

interpleader as a proper procedural vehicle for litigating the validity and

amount of hospital liens, even when state-owned universities are the

defendants. And even if the defendant in some of those cases did not

expressly raise an affirmative immunity defense, this Court's failure to

raise subject-matter jurisdiction ex mero motu reinforces the point. See,

e.g., Puckett v. Board of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama, 408 So. 3d 730, 733-34

(Ala. 2024) (Cook, J., dissenting) ("Although the applicability of State

immunity was not expressly decided in the above-mentioned cases, we

have held that State immunity is an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction

and that appellate courts are '"duty bound to notice ex mero motu the

absence of subject-matter jurisdiction."'" (quoting Baldwin Cnty. v. Bay

Minette, 854 So. 2d 42, 45 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn Stamps v.

Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 642 So. 2d 941, 945 n.2 (Ala. 1994))). 5

5Of course, the failure to address the issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction in prior cases does not actually bind our Court. See
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 119 (1984)
(" ' [ W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior
decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when
a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us.' "
(quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533 n. 5 (1974))).
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The availability of interpleader is pivotal in the present case.

Howard herself first recognized it as the proper path for obtaining the

relief she desired when she included an interpleader claim in her original

complaint and then maintained that claim all the way through the

hearing on the Board's motion to dismiss. At that stage, she possessed a

clear procedural vehicle by which the trial court could have exercised

jurisdiction to resolve the validity and amount of the lien.

However, for reasons unknown to this Court, Howard chose to set

that mechanism aside when she withdrew her motion to deposit the

settlement funds and then amended her complaint to remove her

interpleader claim. By doing so, she relinquished a well-established

avenue that would have allowed the trial court to adjudicate her claim in

a manner that would not have run afoul of § 14.

What remained after Howard amended her complaint were various

tort, contract, and state constitutional claims asserted directly against

the Board that fall squarely within the constitutional bar in § 14. The

constitutional guarantee of due process is not defeated by § 14; it works

in concert with it when parties make use of the procedural tools the law

provides. Interpleader is one such tool, and Howard's voluntary decision

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to abandon it is what forecloses her opportunity to pursue her action

against the Board here. Having declined a valid means of securing the

relief she is seeking against the Board, she cannot now fault the

Constitution for lack of a remedy. Because Howard abandoned her

interpleader claim, immunity squarely applies, and the trial court was

required to dismiss the action.6

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Board has demonstrated a clear legal

right to the relief it is seeking. In particular, the Board has adequately

demonstrated that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain

Howard's suit against it because of its entitlement to § 14 immunity.

" ' Without jurisdiction, a court has no power to act and must dismiss the

action.' " Ex parte Board of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama, 264 So. 3d at 854

(quoting Alabama State Docks Terminal Ry. v. Lyles, 797 So. 2d 432, 435

(Ala. 2001)). Accordingly, we grant the petition for a writ of mandamus

and direct the trial court to vacate its order denying the Board's motion

6After contending that State immunity does not apply to the Board,

Howard further argues that UAB Hospital is not a "corporation" under
§ 35-11-370, Ala. Code 1975, and therefore cannot hold a valid lien.
Because we resolve the petition on State-immunity grounds, we need not
address that argument.
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to dismiss and to, instead, enter an order granting that motion.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

Stewart, C.J., and Bryan, McCool, and Parker, JJ., concur.

Shaw, Wise, Sellers, and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.

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