CBS Holdings, LLC v. Hexagon US Federal, Inc.

Rel: July 11, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2025

_________________________

SC-2024-0308
_________________________

CBS Holdings, LLC

v.

Hexagon US Federal, Inc.

Appeal from Madison Circuit Court
(CV-21-900504)

COOK, Justice.

This is an appeal over the award of attorney fees arising out of a
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dispute involving a commercial lease. This is the second time these

parties have appeared before us regarding this dispute. See CBS

Holdings, LLC v. Hexagon US Federal, Inc., [Ms. SC-2024-0077, Oct. 18,

2024] ____ So. 3d ____ (Ala. 2024).

In the earlier appeal, Hexagon US Federal, Inc. ("HexFed"), had

leased a portion of a building, which was later sold to CBS Holdings, LLC.

A dispute arose between the parties about the length of the lease and

whether HexFed had validly renewed the lease for an additional term.

HexFed eventually filed suit against CBS Holdings, alleging that

CBS Holdings had breached the lease by threatening to eject HexFed

from the building. In response, CBS Holdings alleged various

counterclaims against HexFed.

Following a bench trial, the Madison Circuit Court entered a

judgment in favor of HexFed on all claims and awarded HexFed costs and

attorney fees in an amount to be determined in the future. CBS Holdings

appealed, and our Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of

HexFed, including its award of costs and attorney fees.

After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order

awarding HexFed $174,987.45 in costs and attorney fees. CBS Holdings

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appeals that order, arguing that HexFed failed to adequately support its

application for attorney fees because it redacted the description of the

legal work performed by its attorneys for nearly every entry on the

invoices it submitted. CBS Holdings also argues that the trial court's

order awarding those costs and attorney fees to HexFed was not

sufficiently detailed and thus cannot "allow for meaningful appellate

review" because it does not "articulat[e] the decisions made, the reasons

supporting those decisions, and how it calculated the attorney fee."

Pharmacia Corp. v. McGowan, 915 So. 2d 549, 553 (Ala. 2004). We agree

and thus reverse the trial court's order and remand the matter for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Facts and Procedural History

I. The Underlying Commercial-Lease Dispute

The origins of this commercial-lease dispute date back to 2015,

when Intergraph Unimproved Properties, LLC ("Intergraph

Unimproved"), entered into a lease agreement for two "bay areas" with

HexFed, formerly known as Intergraph Government Solutions

Corporation. At the time, HexFed and Intergraph Unimproved were

related entities. The 2015 lease was amended once by mutual agreement

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of the parties in 2016 ("the 2016 lease").

After the lease was amended, the building was sold by Intergraph

Unimproved to CBS Holdings in November 2016. HexFed continued to

occupy the leased bays and paid rent to CBS Holdings. The parties

amended the 2016 lease by mutual agreement in September 2020.

In December 2020, HexFed emailed CBS Holdings a notice of

HexFed's intent to renew the 2016 lease. That same day, CBS Holdings

responded to HexFed, rejecting the renewal notice. In January 2021,

HexFed's new legal counsel Matthew Moore, with Moore Compliance

Law, P.C., sent a letter to CBS Holdings explaining that HexFed

intended to continue occupying the leased bays according to the renewal

provisions in the 2016 lease. In its response, CBS Holdings argued that

HexFed's attempted renewal notice "was tantamount to an offer for a new

lease on cheaper terms" and offered HexFed a new lease for a greater

price.

On April 21, 2021, HexFed filed suit against CBS Holdings, seeking

a judgment declaring that HexFed had validly exercised its option to

renew the 2016 lease. HexFed also claimed that CBS Holdings had

breached the 2016 lease by breaching its covenant of quiet enjoyment and

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sought costs and attorney fees pursuant to the 2016 lease.

CBS Holdings answered and filed counterclaims against HexFed,

asserting breach-of-contract, ejectment, and unjust-enrichment claims

and seeking the imposition of a landlord's lien.

The trial court held a bench trial on December 18, 2023. Following

the bench trial, on January 12, 2024, the trial court entered a judgment

in favor of HexFed on all claims and concluded that HexFed was entitled

to costs and attorney fees in an amount to be determined in the future.

As part of its judgment, the trial court ordered HexFed to provide the

court with any supplemental evidentiary submissions within three

weeks.

On February 5, 2024, CBS Holdings appealed the trial court's

judgment in favor of HexFed, including its decision to award HexFed

costs and attorney fees.

II. HexFed's Application for Costs and Attorney Fees

Before CBS Holdings filed its appeal, HexFed had already filed its

application for costs and attorney fees in the trial court, in which it asked

for an award of $174,987.45. In support of its application, HexFed

included the affidavit of Rebecca D. Harris, the chief financial officer of

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HexFed, who provided a general accounting of HexFed's attorney fees

and litigation expenses. HexFed also included the affidavit of Walter A.

"Tod" Dodgen, the managing partner of the Huntsville office of Maynard

Nexsen, P.C. Dodgen stated he had reviewed the redacted invoices from

Loftin Holt LLP and Moore Compliance Law, P.C. -- the two firms that

had worked with HexFed during the course of its dispute with CBS

Holdings -- and found HexFed's requested attorney fees reasonable in

light of the complexity of the case.

In response, CBS Holdings filed a motion to stay the determination

of attorney fees HexFed was entitled to, pending the resolution of CBS

Holdings' first appeal before this Court. CBS Holdings argued that if it

was successful in its appeal, HexFed's application for attorney fees would

be mooted. Additionally, CBS Holdings argued that HexFed had not

sufficiently supported its application for attorney fees. The trial court

denied CBS Holdings' motion to stay and set the application for a hearing

on March 21, 2024.

On February 28, 2024, HexFed filed a motion for leave to serve

expedited postjudgment discovery requests on CBS Holdings. HexFed

stated that it understood that CBS Holdings was going to dispute the

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reasonableness of the costs and attorney fees HexFed was requesting

and, therefore, sought discovery on the amount of costs and attorney fees

CBS Holdings itself had incurred in this matter.

CBS Holdings filed a response opposing HexFed's motion in which

it argued that it did not have to respond to HexFed's postjudgment

discovery requests and reprised its argument that HexFed had not

properly supported its application for costs and attorney fees. CBS

Holdings also emphasized that HexFed's application did not include

invoices, invoice summaries, or any other documentation that showed the

time spent by HexFed's attorneys on this matter or a description of how

such time was spent. The trial court denied HexFed's motion for leave to

serve expedited postjudgment discovery requests on March 1, 2024.

On March 8, 2024, CBS Holdings filed an unopposed motion to

continue the hearing on HexFed's application for costs and attorney fees

from March 21 to March 25, because counsel for CBS Holdings was

scheduled to participate in a jury trial beginning on March 18. The trial

court granted CBS Holdings' motion.

On the morning of March 25, 2024, CBS Holdings filed its response

in opposition to HexFed's application for costs and attorney fees. In its

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response, CBS Holdings reprised its argument that HexFed had not

properly supported its application for costs and attorney fees. CBS

Holdings argued that "exactly what [HexFed] is seeking to recoup cannot

be determined from the Application." As an example, CBS Holdings

argued that the application shows that HexFed is seeking to recover

$11,866.30 paid to Moore Compliance Law, P.C., even though no one from

that law firm was ever counsel of record for HexFed in this matter.

CBS Holdings also disputed the $5,160.50 paid to "Page One, LLC,"

for "e-discovery licenses," arguing there was nothing in the application

"from which to ascertain the purpose or scope of these 'e-discovery

licenses' or how [they] related to this case." Lastly, CBS Holdings

emphasized that HexFed had not attached invoices, invoice summaries,

or other documents that showed the time incurred by attorneys working

on this case or a description of how that time was spent.

III. The Hearing on HexFed's Application for Costs and Attorney
Fees

Later that day, the trial court held a hearing on HexFed's

application for costs and attorney fees. HexFed brought three exhibits

and two witnesses to the hearing. At the beginning of the hearing, the

attorney for CBS Holdings noted that he had not seen the redacted
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invoices that HexFed had brought to the hearing, because the redacted

invoices had not been included with HexFed's original application. As a

result, CBS Holdings asked for a continuance so that it could review the

invoices. The trial court ultimately declined to continue the hearing but

stated that CBS Holdings could move at the end of the hearing for extra

time to respond in writing.

HexFed's first exhibit was a report prepared by HexFed's

accounting department that summarized the litigation costs incurred by

HexFed in relation to this matter. The accounting department's report

listed each invoice received by HexFed, who the invoice came from, the

date of the invoice, the amount due, and the "charge type" (either postage,

filing fees, "e-discovery licenses," costs related to depositions, or "Legal

Services").

HexFed's last two exhibits were redacted invoices from Loftin Holt

LLP and Moore Compliance Law, P.C. Those invoices showed that

HexFed was seeking attorney fees for the time consumed on this matter.

Each charge for legal services was calculated by multiplying the amount

of time billed by the rate charged for that time. However, the descriptions

provided by the law firms explaining each charge were heavily redacted,

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purportedly due to attorney-client privilege.

Of the 411 charges from Loftin Holt LLP, the explanatory notes for

403 charges were fully redacted. The 8 unredacted notes described

charges for filing fees, deposition expenses, print services, and an expert-

witness fee.

Additionally, of the 47 charges from Moore Compliance Law, P.C.,

the explanatory notes for 46 charges were fully redacted. The only

unredacted note was for a FedEx charge. In other words, the time records

included virtually no explanations for any of the time entries. Below is a

representative example of what the invoices showed:

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In addition to its exhibits, HexFed also called two witnesses to

testify on its behalf. Glenda Smart, the corporate counsel for HexFed,

testified first. Smart testified that HexFed's in-house counsel retired

during the COVID-19 pandemic, so HexFed turned to Matthew Moore of

Moore Compliance Law, P.C., for its legal needs, because Smart did not

join HexFed until August 2022. Moore did the initial work with respect

to the lease dispute, but, once it was clear that the dispute would require

litigation, HexFed hired Loftin Holt LLP. Smart testified that attorneys

with Loftin Holt LLP were the "representative attorneys for this

litigation" and were initially hired to file the complaint, though they also

handled depositions, written discovery, other demands, and were

HexFed's representatives at trial. Smart also testified that the fees for e-

discovery licenses from Page One, LLC, were for the purpose of this

litigation.

On cross-examination, Smart testified that Moore had also

performed work for HexFed not related to the commercial-lease dispute.

At the time of the hearing, Moore was the corporate secretary for HexFed,

a position he assumed before Smart's date of employment. In addition,

Moore handled "intercompany agreement work with the parent

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company" and "other legal things." Smart testified that HexFed would

receive multiple bills from Moore Compliance Law, P.C., specific to each

of Moore's roles. Smart would then review the explanatory note for each

charge to make sure the charge corresponded with the correct bill.

Next, Walter A. "Tod" Dodgen, the managing partner of the

Huntsville office of Maynard Nexsen, P.C., testified as an expert witness

for HexFed on attorney fees. Dodgen testified that he was familiar with

the litigation, was familiar with the attorneys at Loftin Holt LLP, and

had reviewed the redacted invoices from Loftin Holt LLP and Moore

Compliance Law, P.C., and found the rates charged by those law firms to

be reasonable. Dodgen also testified that it was efficient to use e-

discovery in this case and that the e-discovery costs in this case were very

low. Finally, Dodgen concluded that the amount of time and the actual

cost billed to HexFed was "very reasonable given the scope of the case

and the work that was done" and noted that he had considered the factors

set forth in this Court's decision in Peebles v. Miley, 439 So. 2d 137 (Ala.

1983) ("the Peebles factors"), in reaching this conclusion. Dodgen further

testified that he was surprised the fees were as low as they were given

the nature of the work, the number of expert witnesses, the fact that five

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depositions had been taken, and the fact that the trial had lasted two

days.

On cross-examination, however, Dodgen testified that he had

reviewed only the redacted version of the invoices from HexFed and

explained that, as a litigator, he would not give an expert witness

unredacted versions of his own bills, because it would violate attorney-

client privilege. Dodgen also recalled that, in at least one case he had

been involved with, the invoices produced from opposing counsel seeking

to recover attorney fees contained explanatory notes redacted in their

entirety.

CBS Holdings called no witnesses of its own and instead requested

that the hearing be continued for a few weeks so that it could review the

redacted invoices and provide either an additional written response or

request a conclusion session of the hearing. The trial court granted CBS

Holdings' motion and gave it 14 days to file a response.

On April 8, 2024, CBS Holdings filed its supplemental response in

which it argued that the trial court should not consider the redacted

invoices that HexFed had brought to the hearing, because, it asserted,

they had been filed too late. Additionally, CBS Holdings argued that the

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redacted invoices did not sufficiently support HexFed's application for

attorney fees, because, it said, the heavily redacted invoices made it

impossible to determine whether the amounts charged were reasonable

and necessary.

IV. The Trial Court's Order

On April 16, 2024, the trial court entered an order awarding

HexFed $174,987.45 in costs and attorney fees. In its entirety, the trial

court's order provided:

"This matter came before the Court on Plaintiff Hexagon
US Federal Inc.'s ('HexFed') Application for Fees and
Expenses. … The Court FINDS that the attorneys' fees and
expenses incurred by HexFed to enforce its rights under the
lease agreement with Defendant CBS Holdings, LLC were
reasonable under the factors set forth in Peebles v. Miley, 439
So. 2d 137 (Ala. 1983); and ENTERS final judgment against
Defendant CBS Holdings, in favor of Plaintiff HexFed, in the
amount of $174,987.45. Any further relief requested by either
party is DENIED. This matter is closed."

(Capitalization in original.)

V. CBS Holdings' Present Appeal

CBS Holdings appealed the trial court's order awarding costs and

attorney fees to this Court on May 15, 2024. On July 24, 2024, this Court

stayed the current appeal, pending the resolution of CBS Holdings' first

appeal. See CBS Holdings, ____ So. 3d at ____ n.4. As stated previously,
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in that appeal, our Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of

HexFed on all of CBS Holdings' claims as well as the trial court's

determination that HexFed was entitled to costs and attorney fees. After

this Court issued our decision in that appeal, we lifted the stay in the

present appeal and are now being asked to determine whether the

amount of the costs and attorney fees awarded to HexFed should be

upheld.

Standard of Review

" ' The determination of whether an attorney fee is
reasonable is within the sound discretion of the trial court and
its determination on such an issue will not be disturbed on
appeal unless in awarding the fee the trial court exceeded that
discretion. State Bd. of Educ. v. Waldrop, 840 So. 2d 893, 896
(Ala. 2002); City of Birmingham v. Horn, 810 So. 2d 667, 681-
82 (Ala. 2001); Ex parte Edwards, 601 So. 2d 82, 85 (Ala.
1992), citing Varner v. Century Fin. Co., 738 F.2d 1143 (11th
Cir. 1984).

" ' ….

" ' We defer to the trial court in an attorney-fee case
because we recognize that the trial court, which has presided
over the entire litigation, has a superior understanding of the
factual questions that must be resolved in an attorney-fee
determination. Horn, 810 So. 2d at 681-82, citing Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40
(1983). Nevertheless, a trial court's order regarding an
attorney fee must allow for meaningful appellate review by
articulating the decisions made, the reasons supporting those
decisions, and how it calculated the attorney fee. Horn, 810
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So. 2d at 682, citing American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia
v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir. 1999); see also
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S. Ct. 1933.' "

Kiker v. Probate Ct. of Mobile Cnty., 67 So. 3d 865, 867-68 (Ala. 2010)

(quoting Pharmacia, 915 So. 2d at 552-53).

Discussion

On appeal to this Court, CBS Holdings makes two arguments: (1)

that HexFed failed to properly support its application for costs and

attorney fees and (2) that the trial court failed to explain with sufficient

particularity why it awarded HexFed $174,987.45 in costs and attorney

fees. In support of its arguments, CBS Holdings emphasizes that

HexFed's heavily redacted invoices did not allow the trial court to review

whether HexFed was entitled to recover all the invoiced charges it alleged

it had incurred during the course of the underlying commercial-lease

dispute.

In Alabama, it is well settled that the criteria to be considered by a

trial court in determining a reasonable attorney fee are the 12 factors set

forth in Peebles. The Peebles factors have been summarized as follows:

"(1) the nature and value of the subject matter of the
employment; (2) the learning, skill, and labor requisite to its
proper discharge; (3) the time consumed; (4) the professional
experience and reputation of the attorney; (5) the weight of
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his responsibilities; (6) the measure of success achieved; (7)
the reasonable expenses incurred; (8) whether a fee is fixed or
contingent; (9) the nature and length of a professional
relationship; (10) the fee customarily charged in the locality
for similar legal services; (11) the likelihood that a particular
employment may preclude other employment; and (12) the
time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances."

Van Schaack v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 530 So. 2d 740, 749 (Ala. 1988).

Although there may be multiple ways for a trial court to calculate a

reasonable attorney-fee award, the trial court must always consider the

Peebles factors in reaching its final award. See, e.g., Beal Bank, SSB v.

Schilleci, 896 So. 2d 395, 397-98, 403 (Ala. 2004) (holding that Peebles

factors apply when attorney fees sought for time consumed on the case);

Pharmacia, supra (applying the Peebles factors to a flat-fee award); and

Madison Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res. v. T.S., 53 So. 3d 38, 44-45 (Ala. 2009)

(applying the Peebles factors to a contingency-fee award). It should also

consider the Peebles factors even if some, but not all, of the factors are

implicated in a particular case. See Beal Bank, 896 So. 2d at 403 ("We

stress that these criteria are evaluative and not an exhaustive list of

specific criteria that all must be met when reviewing the reasonableness

of an attorney fee.").

In addressing CBS Holdings' arguments in the present case, we find
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our prior decision in Pharmacia, supra, to be especially helpful because

it is routinely applied by our Court in cases similar to the one now before

us.1 In that case, Candis McGowan served as the guardian ad litem for a

group of minor plaintiffs and as the administrator ad litem for a group of

deceased plaintiffs in a toxic-tort action against Pharmacia Corporation,

formerly known as Monsanto Company. After a settlement agreement

had been reached, McGowan was appointed to review and execute the

agreement on behalf of the minors and the deceased plaintiffs' estates.

McGowan later petitioned the trial court for an attorney-fee award

in the amount of $284,000, arguing that a reasonable fee would be $500

per plaintiff. Pharmacia objected, noting that McGowan had not

provided records of the time she spent on the case and suggested that she

be paid instead based on her actual hours worked on the case at a rate of

$250 per hour. The trial court awarded McGowan $284,000 in attorney

fees, and Pharmacia appealed.

1See, e.g., Eli Global, LLC v. Cieutat, 400 So. 3d 534, 560-61 (Ala.

2023) (relying on Pharmacia to remand case back to trial court so that it
could provide sufficient explanation as to how it determined the attorney
fees it had awarded); and Ex parte Shinaberry, 326 So. 3d 1037 (Ala.
2020) (relying on Pharmacia to find that the trial court had exceeded its
discretion in awarding attorney fee of $7,750 to guardian ad litem).
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On original submission, the Pharmacia Court explained that "a

trial court's order regarding an attorney fee must allow for meaningful

appellate review by articulating the decisions made, the reasons

supporting those decisions, and how it calculated the attorney fee." 915

So. 2d at 553. Because the trial court's order had provided "no indication

as to whether the trial court considered any of the [Peebles factors as]

outlined by this Court in Van Schaack," the Pharmacia Court remanded

the case with instructions for the trial court to enter an order explaining

its decision. See id. at 553, 554.

On remand, the trial court entered a "memorandum opinion and

order" in which it explained that it had arrived at an attorney-fee award

of $284,000 by multiplying McGowan's recommended $500 flat fee by the

568 wards McGowan represented. Id. at 554 (opinion on return to

remand). In support of its conclusion, the trial court noted that, although

attorneys may be paid on an hourly basis, other fee structures like

contingency fees and flat fees are common within the Bar. Id. at 555.

Citing Peebles, the trial court reasoned that " '[a]lthough time spent in a

case has often been the first yardstick used by the trial judge in setting a

fee, it is not the only measure of a fee, and indeed need not even be

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considered by the judge at all.' " Id.

On return to remand, the Pharmacia Court disagreed, stating:

"We do not agree with the trial court's assessment that
Peebles v. Miley, 439 So. 2d 137 (Ala. 1983), stands for the
proposition that a trial court, in determining an attorney-fee
award, need not consider 'at all' the time spent on the matter.
To the contrary, Peebles states that 'all of the [12 criteria]
must be taken into consideration by the trier of the facts.' "

Id. (quoting Peebles, 439 So. 2d at 141) (emphasis added). In reversing

the trial court's award of $284,000 in attorney fees to McGowan, the

Pharmacia Court concluded that an attorney-fee award should not -- and

could not -- be assessed without considering all the Peebles factors,

including the factor concerning the time spent on a matter.

Stated simply, Pharmacia stands for the proposition that a trial

court's order awarding attorney fees should show that it considered all

12 Peebles factors, even if it summarily concludes that not all the factors

are implicated.2 The trial court's order must also be sufficiently detailed

2We note that, even if a trial court does not show that it considered

all the Peebles factors, we may still affirm the trial court's award of
attorney fees if the omission was harmless. See Moultrie v. Wall, 143 So.
3d 128, 137 (Ala. 2013). However, a party who seeks to challenge a trial
court's award of attorney fees because the court did not consider all the
Peebles factors must show how the party was prejudiced by the trial
court's omission.

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to allow for "meaningful appellate review by articulating the decisions

made, the reasons supporting those decisions, and how it calculated the

attorney fee." Pharmacia, 915 So. 2d at 553.

In order for a trial court to satisfy its obligation under Pharmacia

and Peebles, a party requesting attorney fees must first provide sufficient

evidence to support its request. Generally, this means that a

comprehensive application for attorney fees should include an analysis of

all 12 Peebles factors; however, we recognize that there may be cases in

which not all of those factors may be implicated and, thus, need not be

discussed in detail. See Beal Bank, 896 So. 2d at 403 (" 'Indeed, there

would hardly ever be a case where the application of attorney's fees

brought into play every criterion.' " (quoting Graddick v. First Farmers &

Merchants Nat'l Bank of Troy, 453 So. 2d 1305, 1311 (Ala. 1984))). 3

3We recognize that, in practice, some kinds of evidence may be less

relevant depending on the petitioner's theory of how the attorney fees
should be calculated. For example, if the petitioner does not allege that
its attorneys were especially experienced, and the opposing party does
not allege that the petitioner's attorneys were especially inexperienced,
the trial court might assume that the fourth Peebles factor ("the
professional experience and reputation of the attorney") may not result
in either an upward or downward adjustment to the attorney fees.
Compare Madison Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res. v. T.S., 53 So. 3d 38, 56 (Ala.
2009) (determining that attorney's experience was not relevant to the

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Because "it is generally recognized that the first yardstick that is

used by the trial judges [in evaluating a request for attorney fees] is the

time consumed," Peebles, 439 So. 2d at 141, a petitioner must include

some accounting of the time consumed on the matter with an application

for attorney fees.4

However, when the basis for the attorney fees is premised on the

time consumed, the petitioner must do more. Applications based upon

time consumed should sufficiently describe the billed time such that the

trial court can independently calculate what would be an appropriate fee.

Under this method, the petitioner must demonstrate that the time billed

and the billing rate were reasonable and that the work was necessary,

calculation of fees), with City of Birmingham v. Horn, 810 So. 2d 667, 684
(Ala. 2001) (determining that petitioner's attorneys had little experience
in the relevant area of law and therefore should have a lower hourly
billing rate).

4We note briefly that the time-consumed method is analogous to the

federal "lodestar" method, and cases applying these methods should be
construed consistently. Compare Peebles, 439 So. 2d at 141-42 (noting
that, generally, trial courts first consider the time consumed, then adjust
based on the other Peebles factors, including "the fee customarily charged
in the locality for similar legal services"), with Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 434 (1983) (noting that the federal "lodestar" method involves
multiplying the reasonable hours worked by a reasonable rate, then
considering factors that adjust the fee upward or downward).
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see, e.g., Beal Bank, 896 So. 2d at 408-09, so that the trial court can then

use that information to make its own determination of what an

appropriate attorney-fee award should be. See Pharmacia, 915 So. 2d at

553.

How detailed this description must be will depend on the particular

facts of each case. Ultimately, the descriptions should be detailed enough

so that the trial court can check for itself that the requested attorney fees

include only charges for time consumed for which the petitioner is

entitled to recover. See, e.g., Ex parte Edwards, 601 So. 2d 82, 86 (Ala.

1992) ("The court should deduct for redundant hours and should deduct

for hours spent on 'discrete and unsuccessful claims.' " (quoting Norman

v. Housing Auth. of the City of Montgomery, 836 F. 2d 1292, 1302 (11th

Cir. 1988))); Southeast Env't Infrastructure, L.L.C. v. Rivers, 12 So. 3d

32, 52 (Ala. 2008) (holding that, under an indemnity agreement, the

award of attorney fees did not extend to services rendered to establish

the right to indemnification). This is especially important when a law

firm is working on multiple matters for the same client and when

multiple law firms are working on the same matter for the same client --

both of which are true here. Cf. CBS Holdings' brief at 7 (noting that

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Moore Compliance Law, P.C., worked on multiple matters for HexFed).

In the present case, HexFed's application for costs and attorney fees

indicated that it was seeking attorney fees for the time consumed on this

matter. However, rather than provide documentation detailing the time

billed by its lawyers and showing that the work being billed was

necessary, see Beal Bank, 896 So. 2d at 408-09, HexFed instead provided

copies of its invoices containing 458 charges, 449 of which were fully

redacted. Of the remaining charges, the only information that was left

unredacted related to costs associated with the underlying litigation and

not work performed by HexFed's lawyers.

HexFed contends that it had to redact that information based on

attorney-client privilege. In making this assertion, however, HexFed does

not explain why those invoices had to be fully redacted and why they

could not have included some general information about what services

were billed by their lawyers. Our Court has found that "slightly redacted

copies of a large number of invoices from [the] attorneys that documented

charged fees and expenses" were sufficient to support an application for

attorney fees for the time consumed on a matter. Eli Global, LLC v.

Cieutat, 400 So. 3d 534, 544 (Ala. 2023) (emphasis added). We are not

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aware of any case in which a petitioner sought to recover and was

awarded attorney fees under a time-consumed theory after providing

invoices that completely redacted the descriptions of how the billed time

was actually used based on attorney-client privilege. HexFed certainly

has not provided us with any examples. Thus, under the circumstances

of this case, HexFed failed to provide sufficiently detailed information in

support its application for attorney fees.

Because HexFed failed to sufficiently support its application for

attorney fees, we fail to see how the trial court could have sufficiently

articulated how it calculated the amount of attorney fees it awarded or

fully explained how it considered the Peebles factors in its calculation of

its award. As a result, its order cannot be subject to "meaningful

appellate review." Pharmacia, 915 So. 2d at 553.5

5We note that similar standards exist in federal court. For instance,

the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that the party
seeking attorney fees has the burden of proof and must provide enough
evidence "to enable the District Court … to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law that would allow this Court to conduct meaningful
appellate review." Johnston v. Borders, 36 F.4th 1254, 1286-87 (11th Cir.
2022). This includes the responsibility to " 'maintain billing time records
in a manner that will enable a reviewing court to identify distinct
claims.' " Id. at 1283 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437
(1983)). When "a significant number of entries are severely redacted …,

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Conclusion

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand this

matter to the trial court for HexFed to adequately support its application

for costs and attorney fees. The trial court is free to accept any

information or evidence that it deems necessary to assist it with

confirming that the requested attorney fees include only billed charges

that HexFed is entitled to recover. The trial court should then enter an

order awarding costs and attorney fees to HexFed based on any

additional evidence and information that is presented to it. Per this

Court's decision in Pharmacia, that order should show how the trial court

calculated the amount awarded and explain how it considered the

Peebles factors in its calculation.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Stewart, C.J., and Shaw, Mendheim, McCool, and Lewis, JJ.,

concur.

Sellers, J., concurs in the result, with opinion, which Wise and

Bryan, JJ., join.

it may be an abuse of discretion to award fees based on the redacted
entries." Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1197 (11th
Cir. 2002).
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SELLERS, Justice (concurring in the result).

Generally, when the same trial judge who presided over a trial

subsequently awards costs and attorney fees, we give great deference to

that judge's determination. However, that deference is not so broad that

the determination is accepted without relevant documentary evidence

and an indication that the trial court considered the relevant factors to

support such an award. Thus, I agree with the main opinion that the

judgment of the Madison Circuit Court ("the trial court") awarding

Hexagon US Federal, Inc. ("HexFed"), $174,987.45 in costs and attorney

fees is not detailed enough to allow for meaningful appellate review. In

support of its application for costs and attorney fees, HexFed submitted

invoices containing heavily redacted information, based on alleged

attorney-client privilege. HexFed, however, had the burden of providing

enough information to enable the trial court to make sufficient findings

of facts and conclusions of law regarding the reasonableness of its fee

request. If HexFed claimed that the invoices contained privileged

information, it should have submitted unredacted copies for an in camera

review for the trial court to evaluate and confirm that the invoices truly

contained relevant and privileged information not subject to disclosure.

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Accordingly, while I respect the trial court's award of costs and attorney

fees in this case, we have little to evaluate and nothing to review to

substantiate how the court determined the reasonableness of those costs

and fees. As a result, this Court now reverses the trial court's order and

remands the case for the trial court to give HexFed a second chance to

adequately support its application for costs and attorney fees, to enter an

order showing how the court calculated those costs and fees, and to

explain how it considered the factors set forth in Peebles v. Miley, 439 So.

2d 137 (Ala. 1983), in its calculation. Although I agree that the Peebles

factors are to be considered in fashioning an award of costs and attorney

fees, I deem it imprudent to require a trial court to specifically weigh,

enumerate, and discuss all the factors it considered to determine the

reasonableness of the costs and fees. Rather, I would defer to a trial

court's acknowledgment of the Peebles factors, without requiring a

formulistic approach to an order awarding costs and fees. Thus, as long

as a trial court enters a judgment acknowledging the Peebles factors

relevant to its analysis and provides sufficient information for

meaningful review, that is adequate. For this reason, I concur in the

result.

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SC-2024-0308

Wise and Bryan, JJ., concur.

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