Cedar Mae Sarten v. State of Alaska

NOTICE
This is a summary disposition issued under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(a).
Summary dispositions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska
Appellate Rule 214(d).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
CEDAR MAE SARTEN,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF ALASKA,
Appellee.
Court of Appeals No. A-14566
Trial Court No. 4FA-20-01241 CR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
No. 0496 — August 26, 2026
Appeal from the District Court, Fourth Judicial District,
Fairbanks, Maria P. Bahr, Judge.
Appearances: Lindsey Bray, Assistant Public Defender, and
Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Kayla H. Doyle, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Cori M. Mills, Acting
Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Beach,
Judges.
In 2022, Cedar Mae Sarten was convicted, following a jury trial, of one
count of reckless endangerment.1 Two years later, the State moved to amend Sarten’s
judgment to designate the reckless endangerment conviction as a domestic violence
offense. The district court granted the State’s motion and amended the judgment.
1 AS 11.41.250.

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On appeal, Sarten challenges the court’s designation of her conviction as
a crime involving domestic violence, arguing that she was entitled to a jury trial on the
issue and that the court’s late designation violated Alaska Criminal Rule 32(e) and her
right to due process.
The parties have now filed a joint motion for a limited summary
disposition under Alaska Appellate Rule 214. In the joint motion, the State concedes
that the court’s order granting the motion to designate the conviction as a domestic
violence offense did not comply with Criminal Rule 32(e), which requires the
sentencing court to make “factual and legal determination[s]” supporting the
designation. We have reviewed the record, and we conclude that the State’s concession
is well-founded.2
Criminal Rule 32(e) states:
In a case in which the defendant is convicted of an offense
listed in AS 18.66.990(3)[3] and the prosecution claims at
sentencing that the offense is a crime involving domestic
violence, the written judgment must set forth whether the
offense is a crime involving domestic violence as defined in
AS 18.66.990(3) and (5). A factual and legal determination
supporting this finding must be made on the record.
But in Sarten’s case, the court granted the State’s motion without any
factual or legal findings. We agree that this was error and requires vacating the
judgment designating Sarten’s conviction for reckless endangerment as a crime
involving domestic violence.
2 See Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66, 67-68 (Alaska 1972) (holding that an appellate
court must independently assess whether the State’s concession of error in a criminal case
is well-founded).
3 Sarten’s offense, reckless endangerment, is an offense listed in AS 18.66.990(3).
See AS 18.66.990(3)(A); AS 11.41.250.

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The State has separately agreed not to seek designation of Sarten’s
reckless endangerment conviction as a domestic violence offense. Based on this
agreement, Sarten’s issues on appeal are moot and need not be addressed by this Court.
We therefore express no opinion on Sarten’s remaining claims.
Accordingly, we VACATE the designation of Sarten’s conviction as a
crime involving domestic violence, and we REMAND this case to the district court to
retract the amendment to the judgment, consistent with this decision.