Darrell Sam II v. State of Alaska

NOTICE
This is a summary disposition issued under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(a).
Summary dispositions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska
Appellate Rule 214(d).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
DARRELL LEROY SAM II,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF ALASKA,
Appellee.
Court of Appeals No. A-14603
Trial Court No. 4GA-18-00034 CR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
No. 0497 — September 9, 2026
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District,
Fairbanks, Thomas I. Temple, Judge.
Appearances: Elizabeth D. Friedman, Attorney at Law,
Prineville, Oregon, under contract with the Office of Public
Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Ann B. Black,
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals,
Anchorage, and Stephen J. Cox, Acting Attorney General,
Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Haines,
Judges.
Darrell Leroy Sam II pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to
second-degree sexual abuse of a minor and first-degree burglary.1 Pursuant to the plea
agreement, Sam received an agreed-upon composite sentence of 17.5 years with 5 years
suspended (12.5 years to serve) and a 10-year term of probation. The parties agreed to
1 AS 11.41.436(a)(2) and AS 11.46.300(a)(1), respectively.

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most of the probation conditions but left other probation conditions open to the
discretion of the superior court.
At sentencing, Sam requested that certain information be added to the
presentence report, and he objected to Special Probation Condition No. 14, which
requires him to submit to warrantless searches of his electronic devices, email, and
social media accounts for unapproved contact with minors under the age of sixteen. The
superior court denied Sam’s request to make certain additions to the presentence report
and imposed Special Probation Condition No. 14 over Sam’s objection. Sam now
appeals, challenging both of these rulings.2
First, Sam argues that the superior court erred in denying his request to
add information from the minor victim’s confidential Office of Children’s Services
records to the presentence report. Sam’s requested additions to the presentence report
included information about the victim’s history of being sexually abused and the fact
that she communicated with other males on Facebook.
At sentencing, Sam argued that these facts were relevant because they cast
doubt on the twelve-year-old victim’s version of events. The superior court rejected
Sam’s request to add this information to the presentence report, concluding that the
victim’s history of being sexually abused and her communications with other males on
Facebook were irrelevant to whether she was sexually abused by Sam.3 The court,
however, included information in the presentence report that when the victim testified
2 Sam also challenges the imposition of Special Probation Condition No. 15(a), which
(as proposed in the presentence report) authorized warrantless searches of his person and
property for evidence of unapproved contact with minors. The superior court, however, did
not impose this probation condition at sentencing, and it does not appear in the judgment.
We therefore conclude that this issue is moot.
3 Cf. Alaska R. Crim. P. 32.1(f)(5) (stating in part that “if the court determines that
the disputed assertion is not relevant to its sentencing decision so that resolution of the
dispute is not warranted, the court shall delete the assertion from the report without making
any finding”).

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before the grand jury, she denied that Sam had engaged in any sexual penetration on
the night in question.4
On appeal, Sam now argues that the additional information should be
included in the presentence report because, according to Sam, these facts provide
important context for his offense.
But the superior court could reasonably find that the additional
information about the minor victim’s contact with other males was irrelevant to Sam’s
sentencing case. Moreover, the presentence report already included Sam’s version of
events — namely, statements by Sam and his mother that, on the night of the incident,
Sam went to the victim’s home only after she contacted him on Facebook and invited
him over. We therefore conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Sam’s request to add the requested information about the victim to the
presentence report.5
Second, Sam challenges Special Probation Condition No. 14, which
requires him, at the direction of a probation officer, to submit to warrantless searches of
his electronic devices, email, and social media accounts for unapproved contact with
minors under the age of sixteen. The parties agreed that, as part of his probation
conditions, Sam would be prohibited from contacting minors under the age of sixteen
unless in the immediate presence of an approved adult who knows the circumstances of
4 Sam was initially indicted on one count of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor and
one count of attempted first-degree sexual abuse of a minor in addition to one count of
first-degree burglary. AS 11.41.434(a)(1), AS 11.41.434(a)(1) & AS 11.31.100(a), and
AS 11.46.300(a)(1), respectively. He pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of second-degree
sexual abuse of a minor for engaging in sexual contact with the minor victim and one count
of first-degree burglary. As part of the plea agreement, the State dismissed the remaining
count of attempted first-degree sexual abuse of a minor.
5 See Davison v. State, 282 P.3d 1262, 1266 (Alaska 2012) (explaining that appellate
courts “review a trial court’s decision to include disputed factual allegations in a
presentence report for an abuse of discretion”).

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Sam’s crimes or with the permission of the probation officer or sex offender treatment
provider, if applicable. But Sam argues that the court had an insufficient basis for
imposing a search condition — that is, he argues that there is no nexus between his
offenses and his use of electronic devices or social media. Sam also argues that the
probation condition is not narrowly tailored.
But the superior court found that the search requirement was directly
related to the facts of Sam’s case. Sam told investigators and argued at sentencing that,
on the night of the incident, he went over to the victim’s home after she contacted him
on Facebook and invited him over. Based on this conduct, the superior court found that
there was “a direct nexus” between the facts of Sam’s case and the electronic means
through which he had contact with minors. The court also noted that Sam had “a history
of crimes of dishonesty” that made close monitoring, including searches of his digital
communications, essential to his success on supervision.
Sam also argues that Special Probation Condition No. 14 could be more
narrowly tailored by requiring reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite to a search. But
Sam did not raise this argument in the superior court and therefore must show plain
error.6 We find no plain error here. We have previously rejected the argument that the
Alaska Constitution prohibits the imposition of a probation condition authorizing
suspicionless searches when there is a direct relationship between the authorized
searches and the nature of the crime.7 And, as the State acknowledges, Special Probation
Condition No. 14 is limited to searches for evidence of contact with minors and further
limited to electronic searches of the specific applications or communications activity
listed.
6 See State v. Ranstead, 421 P.3d 15, 23 (Alaska 2018).
7 Compton v. State, 579 P.3d 850, 866-67 (Alaska App. 2025). We nonetheless noted
that trial courts retain the discretion to limit a probation search condition by conditioning
it on reasonable suspicion. Id. at 867.

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Given this record, we conclude that Special Probation Condition No. 14
bears a direct relationship to the particular facts of Sam’s offenses and is narrowly
tailored to the goal of monitoring his communications with minors.8
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court.9
8 See Ranstead, 421 P.3d at 20 (recognizing that a probation condition “that allows a
warrantless search must bear ‘a direct relationship’ to the nature of the defendant’s
conviction”) (quoting Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1242-43 (Alaska 1977));
cf. Echuck v. State, 2025 WL 554432, at *2 (Alaska App. Feb. 19, 2025) (unpublished)
(noting that the sentencing court did not make any case-specific findings to support its
conclusion that a probation condition authorizing warrantless searches was directly related
to the nature of Echuck’s offense and it was, therefore, “unclear whether the court found
the necessary ‘direct relationship’ between the nature of Echuck’s offense and searches for
electronic communications with minors”).
9 The parties note that page 2 is missing from the approved version of the presentence
report in the record before us. If this remains the case, either party may move to correct the
record in the superior court. See Alaska R. Crim. P. 36.