Tyler Chance Bateman v. State of Alaska

NOTICE
Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska
Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of
Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this
memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition
of law, although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have. See
McCoy v. State, 80 P.3d 757, 764 (Alaska App. 2002).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
TYLER CHANCE BATEMAN,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF ALASKA,
Appellee.
Court of Appeals No. A-14245
Trial Court No. 3AN-21-07485 CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 7213 — August 12, 2026
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Kevin M. Saxby, Judge.
Appearances: Justin Gillette, Assistant Public Defender, and
Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Kayla H. Doyle, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Stephen J. Cox, Acting
Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Beach,
Judges.
Judge BEACH.

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Tyler Chance Bateman was convicted, following a jury trial, of first-
degree stalking and violating a protective order for his contact with K.H.1 Bateman was
sentenced to 2 years to serve.
Bateman now appeals his convictions and sentence, raising two claims.
First, Bateman argues that the superior court erred by failing to bifurcate his trial and
allowing the State to introduce evidence of his two prior convictions for violating
protective orders.2 Second, Bateman argues that the superior court erred by rejecting
his proposed mitigating factor that his conduct was among the least serious within the
definition of the offense because (according to Bateman) he did not make any explicit
or implicit threats of physical harm against K.H.3
For the reasons explained in this opinion, we reject Bateman’s challenges
to both his convictions and his sentence.
Background facts and proceedings
In the early 2010s, Bateman became fixated on then-teenager K.H.,
contacting her repeatedly via social media.4 K.H. initially responded to Bateman,
although he was unknown to her. Soon the messages from Bateman became sexual in
1 Former AS 11.41.260(a)(1) (2021) and AS 11.56.740(a)(2), respectively. The jury
also found Bateman guilty of second-degree stalking, but this verdict merged into the first-
degree stalking conviction. AS 11.41.270.
2 Bateman had previously violated two protective orders, one obtained by K.H. and
one obtained by his ex-girlfriend, K.D.
3 See AS 12.55.155(d)(9).
4 It is unclear when Bateman first contacted K.H. In her testimony, K.H. estimated
that she was between fourteen and sixteen years old when Bateman first contacted her on
social media, placing this contact between 2010 and 2012. However, in letters he sent from
jail discussing K.H., Bateman inconsistently stated that his initial contact with K.H.
occurred in either 2014 or 2016.

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nature, so K.H. stopped responding and blocked him from having access to her social
media accounts.
Bateman did not stop trying to contact K.H. He made new social media
accounts under different variations of his name and messaged her repeatedly. K.H.
consistently blocked Bateman’s new accounts as she became aware of their creation.
In August 2021, K.H. learned that Bateman was tagging her friends and
her brother in social media posts about her. Upon learning of Bateman’s posts, K.H.
unblocked Bateman so that she could see what he had been posting about her; she found
lengthy direct messages sent to her through Facebook Messenger, posts about her on
Bateman’s Facebook page, and pictures of her on his Instagram account. Bateman had
apparently taken the pictures from social media posts made by K.H.’s friends.
The Facebook Messenger messages that Bateman had sent K.H. contained
extensive fantasies about a life with K.H. and repeatedly stated that he wanted to
impregnate her. The messages also contained graphic descriptions of sexual acts that
Bateman wanted to do to K.H., disparagements of K.H.’s then-boyfriend, and remarks
suggesting that he (Bateman) would confront him (the boyfriend). In the messages,
Bateman indicated that he had learned everything about K.H. that he could from what
she had posted publicly, including her date of birth, details about her family, where she
was from, that she had a dog, and her preferred beverage. Bateman implored K.H. to
tell him more details about herself.
Bateman described occasions where he claimed to have seen K.H. in real
life, including once when he observed her while she was working at a coffee shop. He
told K.H. that if he saw her again in person, he would approach her. Bateman also told
K.H., who worked as a nurse after leaving her job at the coffee shop, that he would
injure himself so that he could see “such a hot nurse.”
The messages also contained descriptions of instances when Bateman had
contacted K.H.’s friends, boyfriend, and brother. Bateman told K.H., “[I]f I have it my
way, I’m going to be your last relationship[.]” He additionally informed K.H. that he

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had told her brother that he (Bateman) was “going to use the next 1,000 days doing
everything within [his] power to ensure that [K.H.] regret[ted] not giving [him] a
chance.”
On August 10, 2021, K.H. applied for, and was granted, an ex parte
protective order, effective for twenty days. Bateman was served with the order, but this
did not stop him from contacting K.H. Shortly after K.H. obtained the protective order,
her family members received several letters from Bateman about K.H. One envelope
was addressed to K.H.’s brother and contained a letter addressing K.H.’s brother and a
letter addressing K.H., and the other three letters were addressed to K.H.’s parents.
The letter to K.H. included references to personal details about K.H., such
as her vehicle make and her dog’s name. Bateman told K.H., “I will always be here for
you no matter what and even if I die I’ll be looking out for you there too. . . . As long
as I’m alive you’ll never be alone.” At the time he wrote the letters, Bateman was
incarcerated for a different crime, and he acknowledged that he was not “supposed to
be on social media” and that he was “looking at 4-10 months” but “could max . . . out
at 2 years.”
K.H. reported the contacts to the police. The responding officer contacted
K.H. and documented the letters. The officer then contacted Bateman at the jail, and
Bateman acknowledged that he had been served with the protective order and admitted
to sending the letters. The officer later testified that he “made it very clear to [Bateman]
that [K.H.] did not want any further contact with him at any point in time.” Bateman
was subsequently charged with and pleaded no contest to one count of violating a
stalking or protective order for sending the letters; a conviction was entered on
August 30, 2021.5 As part of his sentence, Bateman was ordered to have no contact with
K.H., K.H.’s family, or K.H.’s boyfriend, and to obey all active protective orders. K.H.
was granted a long-term protective order on August 30, 2021.
5 Anchorage Municipal Code (AMC) 08.30.105(A)(2).

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On September 13, K.H. received a call from an unknown number. It was
Bateman calling her from the correctional facility; K.H. declined the call and reported
the violation. The responding officer contacted Bateman, who acknowledged that he
had called K.H. despite the protective order.
Two days later, K.H. reported to the police that she had received five
letters from Bateman. The letters described Bateman’s desire to marry K.H. and father
her children; Bateman also stated that he may have been “obsessed” with her. Bateman
told K.H. that if she did not marry him, he had “nothing better to do but make [her]
regret it for the rest of [her] life.” Portions of the letters were sexually graphic,
describing oral and anal sexual fantasies and Bateman’s desire to impregnate K.H.
The responding officer again contacted Bateman, and Bateman again
admitted that he had been served the protective order. Bateman also told the officer that
he was aware of the conditions of the protective order and knew the letters violated the
conditions but did not intend to stop contacting K.H.
The next day, Bateman sent K.H. another letter. Bateman updated K.H.
on his criminal cases and told her that he “[s]houldn’t have to be punished for how [he]
fe[lt] about someone. Pretty stupid really.” Bateman signed the letter, “Prisoner of your
love[.]” Bateman also sent two letters to K.H.’s parents: one addressed to “House of
[H.]” and one addressed to “Kbear.” Bateman told K.H.’s family that he could be “the
bad guy” and “the necessary evil,” and that he would continue his pursuit of K.H. In
the letter to K.H., Bateman speculated that she was “trying to punish [him] to see how
much [he] c[ould] take before giving up on [her].” He told K.H. that he was not going
to stop contacting her.
The following week, Bateman sent a letter to K.H.’s parents complaining
about the way K.H. was treating him. He wrote that he had “a different kind of anger
now” and that K.H. “underestimate[d]” him.
Bateman sent three letters to K.H. from jail on September 27. The first
letter included graphic sexual content and reiterated several times that he wanted to

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impregnate her. Bateman warned K.H. that she would “regret never giving [him] the
time of day” and that he would name his daughter after her, “buy the house next door
so [she couldn’t] escape [him],” and have sexual intercourse with her friends so she
would know what she was missing. Bateman ended the letter by telling K.H., “Marry
me, [K.H.] Or don’t. You’ll regret not marrying me forever.” The second letter
described Bateman’s masturbating while thinking about K.H., bondage and group sex
scenarios, and his ethnic preferences for his sexual partners. The third letter focused
primarily on his incarceration status and included a brief description of a prior
protective order that involved his ex-girlfriend, K.D.
On September 29, a detective contacted the jail in which Bateman was
incarcerated and asked that Bateman’s mail be inspected for further attempts to contact
K.H. Bateman was again warned not to attempt to contact K.H. or her family and was
reminded that he was also prohibited from having a third party attempt to contact them
on his behalf.
On October 20, the jail intercepted two letters in which Bateman again
attempted to contact K.H.’s family. A correctional officer contacted the authorities, and
Bateman was notified that the letters would not be sent out and that he would be sent to
segregation for disobeying direct orders. Bateman became angry, called the officer a
derogatory name, and threatened that, when he (Bateman) was released from
incarceration, he was going to go to the officer’s house and “get” him. When the officer
told Bateman that he could not send any more letters and that there was still a protective
order in place, Bateman again became angry and told the officer that the officer could
not stop him from sending out letters and that he could “do whatever he want[ed].”
Bateman was charged with two counts of first-degree stalking (under
theories of stalking in violation of a protective order and recidivist stalking), one count
of second-degree stalking, and one count of violating a protective order based on his

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contact with K.H.6 Near the end of trial, the State dismissed one of the first-degree
stalking counts — specifically, the count that alleged stalking in violation of a
protective order. Bateman was ultimately found guilty of first-degree stalking under the
recidivist stalking theory, second-degree stalking, and violating a protective order.7 The
court merged the verdict for second-degree stalking into the first-degree stalking
conviction. The court sentenced Bateman to 2 years of incarceration, with no time
suspended.
This appeal followed.
Why we conclude that the superior court’s denial of Bateman’s motion to
bifurcate was not an abuse of discretion
Bateman was initially charged with two counts of first-degree stalking
based on two different theories. One of the theories was that Bateman committed
second-degree stalking after having previously been convicted of stalking or violating
a protective order.8 (The second theory was that Bateman committed second-degree
stalking in violation of a protective order.)9
Prior to trial, Bateman moved for a bifurcated trial, requesting that the jury
not be informed that Bateman had twice previously been convicted of stalking or
violating a protective order (once as to K.H., pursuant to Bateman’s no contest plea in
August 2021, and once as to K.D. in 2010) during the first phase of trial and only
consider the prior convictions during a second phase. Bateman argued that the evidence
6 Former AS 11.41.260(a)(1) (2021), AS 11.41.260(a)(5), AS 11.41.270, and
AS 11.56.740(a)(2), respectively.
7 Former AS 11.41.260(a)(1) (2021), AS 11.41.270, and AS 11.56.740(a)(2),
respectively.
8 AS 11.41.260(a)(5).
9 Former AS 11.41.260(a)(1) (2021).

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of his prior convictions was likely to be used as improper propensity evidence under
Alaska Evidence Rule 404(b) and was more prejudicial than probative under Alaska
Evidence Rule 403.
The superior court denied Bateman’s motion to bifurcate the trial on
multiple grounds and concluded that Bateman’s prior convictions were independently
relevant for non-propensity purposes of establishing K.H.’s fear and Bateman’s reckless
disregard of that fear. The court explained:
The nature of the first-degree stalking statute is not really
just a recidivist or an increase the punishment type [of]
statute. It is a statute in which the legislature is recognizing
that the crime itself is different because of the element of
violating a court order or having been previously convicted
of the same crime or a similar crime. That is a much scarier
situation potentially for a victim.
The court went on to weigh the probative value against the prejudicial
nature of the evidence, finding that both the fact of the prior conviction involving K.H.
and its underlying details were more probative than prejudicial:
Everything that has happened between [K.H. and Bateman]
is relevant to explain — is potentially relevant at least, to
explain her fear. . . . As long as what she’s doing is
explaining why she was afraid, what has happened in the
past that makes her afraid on the date in question, when she
receives these new contacts, that’s very relevant. It’s part of
the story. And to tell her she can’t testify about those things
significantly changes the story in a way that is potentially
deceptive, in my mind, to the jury, and withholds
information that they’re entitled to consider. . . . I don’t find
any of that to be unfairly prejudicial because it’s the course
of dealings between the parties, and it’s what got them to the
point that we’re at today.
The court found that the exact details of the 2010 conviction involving
Bateman’s ex-girlfriend, K.D., were potentially unfairly prejudicial. However, the court
reasoned that the fact of that conviction was relevant both to prove the prior conviction
element and to show that “[Bateman] knew he was wrong because he had already been

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convicted.” Furthermore, the court determined that, because the evidence showed
Bateman knew his conduct was wrong, the evidence was not merely cumulative.
On appeal, Bateman renews his argument that the superior court erred in
denying his motion to bifurcate his trial and in allowing the State to present evidence
of Bateman’s prior convictions.
While bifurcation of prior convictions is generally encouraged, it is not
required in circumstances where the defendant’s prior crimes are independently
relevant and where the trial court concludes that the probative value of the prior offenses
is not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.10 We conclude that the superior
court’s denial of Bateman’s motion to bifurcate was not an abuse of discretion.11 The
superior court could reasonably determine that evidence of Bateman’s prior convictions
was admissible for non-propensity purposes and not more prejudicial than probative.
To prove stalking in the second degree, the State had to show (1) that
Bateman knowingly engaged in repeated acts of nonconsensual contact involving K.H.
or a family member of K.H. and (2) that, by engaging in the repeated acts of
nonconsensual contact, Bateman recklessly placed K.H. in fear of death or physical
injury of herself or a family member.12 To prove stalking in the first degree (under the
theory that was not dismissed), the State had to show that Bateman was guilty of
stalking in the second degree plus the additional element that he had been previously
convicted of stalking or violating a protective order.13
10 Ross v. State, 950 P.2d 587, 591 (Alaska App. 1997); see Ward v. State, 2009
WL 5154103, at *4-5 (Alaska App. Dec. 30, 2009) (unpublished).
11 See Ostlund v. State, 51 P.3d 938, 942 (Alaska App. 2002) (concluding that a trial
court’s decision on whether to bifurcate proceedings is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion).
12 See AS 11.41.270(a)-(b).
13 See AS 11.41.260(a)(5).

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The superior court found that Bateman’s 2021 conviction was probative
of K.H.’s fear of death or physical injury and Bateman’s reckless disregard of the risk
that he was placing K.H. in fear.14 In finding that the prior conviction was relevant to
K.H.’s fear, the court reasoned,
[When] a person . . . is willing to violate a court order or to
recommit a crime that they’ve already been convicted of, . . .
the victim has . . . already exhausted every logical recourse
they can take to protect themselves, except perhaps the final
one of buying a firearm and getting ready to fight for your
life if you genuinely are afraid of death or physical injury.
Accordingly, the court held that, because the prior conviction was probative of both the
victim’s fear and the defendant’s recklessness, the jury was entitled to hear this
evidence.
We have previously approved of similar reasoning, holding that evidence
of prior convictions was independently relevant to show the mental state of the
defendant or of the victim. For example, in Johnson v. State, Johnson was charged with
first-degree stalking.15 At trial, the State was permitted to introduce evidence of
Johnson’s prior conviction for child molestation.16 The evidence was introduced
through the testimony of the victim’s mother; she testified that she had found Johnson’s
prior conviction on the internet.17 The trial court ruled that the prior conviction for child
molestation was relevant because it potentially formed part of the basis for the victim’s
14 See Alaska R. Evid. 404(b)(1) (“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible if the sole purpose for offering the evidence is to prove the character of a person
in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It is however, admissible
for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”).
15 Johnson v. State, 390 P.3d 1212, 1217 (Alaska App. 2017).
16 Id.
17 Id.

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fear of Johnson, as the victim’s mother had informed him of the conviction.18 We
affirmed this ruling on appeal.19
Similarly, here the superior court’s reasoning was supported by both the
evidence and litigation of the case. K.H. repeatedly testified that her fear was magnified
because Bateman had shown a willingness to violate court orders, even after being
convicted for violating court orders. Bateman’s messages and letters to K.H. and her
family demonstrated that he willfully disregarded the protective order and any criminal
penalties he might face for violating the protective order. Moreover, at trial, Bateman
challenged the State’s evidence of both his mental state and K.H.’s fear; he contended
in closing argument that his letters and messages were meant to be romantic gestures to
K.H., that he did not perceive a risk that she would be afraid, and that K.H. herself was
actually more annoyed than afraid. The court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
that Bateman’s prior conviction involving K.H. was independently and directly relevant
to these two disputed elements of the crime and was inextricably a part of the course of
conduct underlying the charges.20
As to Bateman’s 2010 conviction relating to his ex-girlfriend K.D., the
superior court found that the conviction was probative of Bateman’s intent and whether
he recklessly disregarded the risk that he was placing K.H. in fear.21
Bateman referred to the 2010 conviction when writing to K.H. and her
family and made clear over the course of several letters that K.D. had similarly obtained
a protective order against him. In a letter to K.H.’s mother, Bateman referenced K.D.’s
18 Id. at 1218.
19 Id.
20 See Carpentino v. State, 38 P.3d 547, 552 (Alaska App. 2002) (reviewing trial
court’s Alaska Evidence Rule 404(b)(1) ruling for abuse of discretion).
21 See Johnson, 390 P.3d at 1218.

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protective order against him, writing, “I’m one to talk, my ex has one against me[.]”
And in a letter to K.H., Bateman told her that K.D. had obtained a protective order
against him.
Bateman also compared his feelings for K.H. to his past feelings for K.D.,
warning K.H. to learn from K.D.’s mistakes and telling K.H. that he felt “even more
strongly” for her than he did for K.D. In a later letter, Bateman warned K.H., “Be with
me. Or end up like [K.D.]”
The court reasonably found that Bateman’s repeated references to K.D.
and her protective order against him showed that he was aware of and actively making
the connection between his past conviction for violating a protective order and his
current non-consensual contact with K.H. And the court reasonably concluded that his
communications about this prior conviction to K.H. and her family made the conviction
relevant to her fear of Bateman.
Regardless, the trial record as a whole reflects that the references to these
two convictions were brief, and the majority of the State’s case was focused on the sheer
volume of communications Bateman sent to K.H., which contained repeated references
to Bateman being in jail, his pending criminal charges, and the protective orders K.H.
and K.D. had obtained against Bateman. In closing, the State’s arguments regarding
Bateman’s prior convictions were brief and related only to K.H.’s fear, Bateman’s
reckless disregard of that fear, and the element of the crime requiring a prior conviction.
Finally, the jury was exposed to other unchallenged evidence of
Bateman’s criminal history. For example, Bateman wrote to K.H. and her family and
called K.H. from the Anchorage Correctional Facility. And Bateman’s messages and
letters to K.H. and her family went into great detail about his incarceration, past charges,
and potential sentences.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the court did not abuse its
discretion in declining to bifurcate Bateman’s trial with respect to Bateman’s prior
convictions. Furthermore, we conclude that, to the extent the court erred in admitting

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evidence of Bateman’s prior conviction related to K.D., this error was harmless in light
of the admissibility of evidence of the 2021 conviction and the underlying conduct
involving K.H.
Why we conclude that the superior court did not err in rejecting
Bateman’s proposed mitigating factor
On appeal, Bateman claims that the superior court erred in rejecting his
proposed mitigating factor that his conduct was among the least serious within the
definition of the offense.22 Specifically, Bateman argues that his conduct was “least
serious” because (according to Bateman) he did not make any explicit threats of harm
against K.H.
The Alaska Supreme Court has held,
The existence or non-existence of an aggravating or
mitigating factor is a mixed question of law and fact. . . . Any
factual findings made by the court regarding the nature of
the defendant’s conduct are reviewed for clear error, but
whether those facts establish that the conduct is among the
least serious under AS 12.55.155(d)(9) is a legal question.[23]
Here, the superior court found that Bateman’s letters “quickly moved into
explicit sexual fantasy, with Bateman describing in detail the sexual experiences he
fantasized about having with K.H.” The court also found that Bateman “threatened to
pay another woman to seduce [K.H.’s boyfriend] so that K.H. could see that her
boyfriend was really a cheater at heart. In addition to these letters, Mr. Bateman
contacted several of K.H.’s friends and family in efforts to get K.H. to respond.” The
court additionally noted the following:
The letters’ themes included but are not limited to, K.H.
having Mr. Bateman’s babies and making a family together,
22 See AS 12.55.155(d)(9).
23 Michael v. State, 115 P.3d 517, 519 (Alaska 2005).

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sexual acts such as cunnilingus and anilingus, bondage, and
group sex verging on gang rape, general manipulation,
threats, assertions to K.H. [that she] . . . could not stop him
from contacting her, and disparaging comments about her
boyfriend.
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the superior court’s
findings are not clearly erroneous.24 Bateman sent hundreds of communications to K.H.,
her family, and friends over a four-month period and refused to stop when contacted by
law enforcement. These messages were extremely sexually explicit and made what can
reasonably be considered implicit, if not explicit, threats. Bateman repeatedly warned
K.H. that she would regret rejecting him and that his presence in her life was
inescapable. We agree with the superior court that, based on this record, Bateman’s
conduct was not among the least serious within the definition of the offense.25
Why we remand this case for the limited purpose of correcting the
judgment
The State notes on appeal, and Bateman acknowledges in his brief, that
his judgment reflects that the wrong charge was dismissed. Toward the end of trial, the
State elected to withdraw what had been Count I, which charged Bateman with first-
degree stalking under the theory that he had committed the crime of stalking in violation
of a protective order.26 However, when the State filed a motion to dismiss the withdrawn
charge, it erroneously dismissed Count II, which charged Bateman with first-degree
24 See id. (“The determination of whether the defendant’s conduct is among the least
serious conduct within the definition of the offense involves a two-step process: the court
must (1) assess the nature of the defendant’s conduct, a factual finding, and then (2) make
the legal determination of whether that conduct falls within the statutory standard
of ‘among the least serious conduct within the definition of the offense.’”).
25 See id.
26 Former AS 11.41.260(a)(1) (2021).

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stalking under the theory that he had a previous conviction for stalking.27 The jury had
already found Bateman guilty of this charge, and it is clear from the transcripts that the
parties intended to dismiss Count I, not Count II.
Under Alaska Criminal Rule 36, “[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders,
or other parts of the record, and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission,
may be corrected by the court at any time[.]”28 Therefore, we remand Bateman’s case
for the limited purpose of correcting the judgment.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, we AFFIRM Bateman’s convictions and
sentence. However, we REMAND his case for the limited purpose of correcting the
judgment to reflect the correct conviction.
27 AS 11.41.260(a)(5).
28 See Graybill v. State, 522 P.2d 539, 541-42 (Alaska 1974).