Order of the Court of 6 October 2026.#DT v Eulex Kosovo.#Appeal – Arbitration clause – Determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Article 170b of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Request demonstrating that an issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Appeal allowed to proceed in part.#Case C-122/26 P.

1

By his appeal, DT seeks to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 21 January 2026, DT v Eulex Kosovo (T‑218/24, ‘the contested judgment’, EU:T:2026:34), by which that court dismissed his action seeking, primarily, on the basis of Article 272 TFEU, a declaration that the letters of 13 November 2023 and of 20 February 2024 from Eulex Kosovo, by which Eulex Kosovo terminated his employment contract and rejected his internal appeal against that termination, respectively, were unlawful, and compensation in respect of the damage he claims to have suffered as a result of those letters and other acts and, in the alternative, first, on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, the annulment of those letters and, secondly, on the basis of Article 268 TFEU, compensation in respect of the damage which he claims to have suffered as a result of those letters.

2

Under point (b) of the second paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal brought against a decision of the General Court relating to the performance of a contract containing an arbitration clause, within the meaning of Article 272 TFEU, is not to proceed unless the Court of Justice first decides that it should be allowed to do so.

3

In accordance with the third paragraph of Article 58a of that statute, an appeal is to be allowed to proceed, wholly or in part, in accordance with the detailed rules set out in the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where it raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law.

4

Under Article 170a(1) of the Rules of Procedure, in the situations referred to in the second paragraph of Article 58a of that statute, the appellant is to annex to the appeal a request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, setting out the issue raised by the appeal that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law and containing all the information necessary to enable the Court of Justice to rule on that request.

5

In accordance with Article 170b(1) and (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court’s decision on the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed is to be taken as soon as possible in the form of a reasoned order.

6

In support of his request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, the appellant submits that the three grounds of his appeal raise issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law.

7

The first ground of appeal, which is comprised of two parts, concerns errors of law allegedly committed by the General Court inasmuch as, first, it incorrectly declared that it lacked jurisdiction to examine the abolition of the appellant’s post and, secondly, it therefore declared all the pleas concerning the abolition of that post inadmissible, in breach of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and of Article 19 TEU. The second ground, which is comprised of two parts, alleges, first, that the General Court failed to apply the case-law on employment disputes concerning officials and other staff of the European Union and that it committed an error of law in holding, in essence, that Eulex Kosovo did not have to comply with its duty of care and, secondly, breach, inter alia, of the principle of legitimate expectations. The third ground alleges infringement of Articles 20, 21 and 47 of the Charter.

8

By the first part of his first ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court erred in law in holding, in paragraphs 37 to 43, 68, 119, 147, 170 and 185 of the contested judgment, that it lacked jurisdiction to examine the decision, provided for under the revised deployment plan of the Eulex Kosovo mission (‘the revised deployment plan’), to abolish the post filled by the appellant on the ground that that plan fell within the scope of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), so that the abolition of the post was the result of a ‘strategic choice’. According to the appellant, inasmuch as the mission was acting within the framework of the resources available to it, that decision constituted an act of administrative management not falling within the scope of the CFSP. Thus, the General Court failed to apply the case-law arising, inter alia, from the judgments of 19 July 2016, H v Council and Others (C‑455/14 P, EU:C:2016:569, paragraphs 54 and 55) and of 10 September 2024, KS and Others v Council and Others (C‑29/22 P and C‑44/22 P, EU:C:2024:725, paragraphs 127 and 128).

9

By the second part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court erred in law in holding, in paragraphs 35, 36, 68, 119 and 148 of the contested judgment, that the pleas directed against the decision to abolish his post under the revised deployment plan were inadmissible and that he could not challenge that abolition incidentally in the context of an action brought against the decision to terminate his contract. The General Court thus required the introduction of a separate action against the revised deployment plan, whereas such a requirement was not mandatory under the case-law on cases brought on the basis of Article 270 TFEU.

10

According to the appellant, the first ground of appeal raises, first, the issue of the scope of jurisdiction of the EU judicature under the CFSP and, specifically, that of whether decisions on reorganisation and abolition of posts taken under that policy are excluded from judicial review. That issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law inasmuch as it may affect many members of staff of CFSP missions or of EU agencies acting in that field.

11

Secondly, that ground concerns the scope of effective judicial protection under Article 47 of the Charter for staff of CFSP missions and, in particular, the issue, significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law, of whether the decision abolishing a post must be the subject of a separate action or if it can be examined incidentally in an action brought against the decision to terminate the contract which follows from the former decision. According to the appellant, requiring a separate action in cases concerning the staff of CFSP missions, even though such a requirement does not apply to actions brought on the basis of Article 270 TFEU, risks creating unequal judicial protection of the staff concerned, having regard, inter alia, to the confidential nature of restructuring exercises in that field.

12

By the first part of his second ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court erred in law in holding that Eulex Kosovo had not failed to comply with its duty of care. He argues that, in paragraphs 179 to 181 of the contested judgment, the General Court incorrectly held that Eulex Kosovo was required to consider only the interest of the service, in disregard of its own case-law, in particular of the judgments of 10 October 2014, EMA v BU (T‑444/13 P, EU:T:2014:865, paragraphs 28 and 32), and of 24 April 2017, HF v Parliament (T‑584/16, EU:T:2017:282, paragraphs 119 and 120). The General Court thus accepted, inter alia in paragraph 150 of the contested judgment, an interpretation which unduly limits the employer’s obligations towards CFSP mission staff, contrary to the case-law applicable to officials and other staff of the European Union, relying on the ‘temporary nature’ of the mission and of the employment conditions.

13

According to the appellant, the first part of the second ground of appeal raises the issue of the scope of the duty of care in CFSP missions and, specifically, that of whether the General Court may exclude any reassignment obligation solely due to a mission’s ‘temporary nature’. That issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law inasmuch as, by so ruling, the General Court also disregarded the case-law in the judgment of 19 July 2016, H v Council and Others (C‑455/14 P, EU:C:2016:569, paragraphs 54 and 55), from which it follows that staff of CFSP missions are entitled to the same protection as officials and other staff of the European Union.

14

By the second part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court, in paragraphs 200 to 202 of the contested judgment, breached the principle of protection of legitimate expectations by holding that the existence of a contractual termination clause precluded the assurances given to the appellant from being able to give rise to a legitimate expectation as regards the maintenance of his employment contract. By so ruling, the General Court also disregarded the case-law on that subject, in particular the judgment of 11 April 2016, FN and Others v CEPOL (F‑41/15 DISS II, EU:F:2016:70, paragraph 85). According to the appellant, such a solution would create inconsistency between the protection of legitimate expectations of officials and other staff of the European Union whose contracts also contain a termination clause and that of contractual staff of CFSP missions.

15

By his third ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court, by subjecting him, as a member of staff of a CFSP mission, to less favourable treatment than that reserved to officials and other staff of the European Union, failed to comply with the principle of equal treatment laid down in Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter, and with his right to effective judicial protection provided for in Article 47 of the Charter. He argues that, while different employment regimes may justify variations in employment conditions, they cannot warrant the decisions applicable to CFSP mission staff being excluded from judicial review. He relies, in support of this, on the judgment of 17 July 2024, Montanari v EUCAP Sahel Niger (T‑371/22, EU:T:2024:494, paragraph 224), according to which, by virtue of the principle of equal treatment, the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the related case-law apply by analogy to CFSP mission staff who are in a situation comparable to that of staff members subject to the Staff Regulations. In the appellant’s view, clarification from the Court in that regard is necessary to prevent inconsistency in the case-law.

16

As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that it is for the appellant to demonstrate that the issues raised by his or her appeal are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (order of 29 April 2025, SC v Eulex Kosovo, C‑881/24 P, EU:C:2025:313, paragraph 14 and the case-law cited).

17

Furthermore, as is apparent from the third paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, read together with Article 170a(1) and Article 170b(4) of the Rules of Procedure, the request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must contain all the information necessary to enable the Court to give a ruling on whether the appeal should be allowed to proceed and to specify, where the appeal is allowed to proceed in part, the pleas in law or parts of the appeal to which the response must relate. Given that the objective of the mechanism provided for in Article 58a of that statute whereby the Court determines whether an appeal should be allowed to proceed is to restrict review by the Court to issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law, only grounds of appeal that raise such issues and that are established by the appellant are to be examined by the Court in an appeal (order of 29 April 2025, SC v Eulex Kosovo, C‑881/24 P, EU:C:2025:313, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited).

18

Accordingly, a request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must, in any event, set out clearly and in detail the grounds on which the appeal is based, identify with equal clarity and detail the issue of law raised by each ground of appeal, specify whether that issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law and set out the specific reasons why that issue is significant according to that criterion. As regards, in particular, the grounds of appeal, the request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must specify the provision of EU law or the case-law that has been infringed by the contested judgment or order, explain succinctly the nature of the error of law allegedly committed by the General Court, and indicate to what extent that error had an effect on the outcome of the contested judgment or order. Where the error of law relied on results from an infringement of the case-law, the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed must explain, in a succinct but clear and precise manner, first, where the alleged contradiction lies, by identifying the paragraphs of the contested judgment or order which the appellant is calling into question as well as those of the ruling of the Court of Justice or the General Court alleged to have been infringed and, second, the concrete reasons why such a contradiction raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (order of 29 April 2025, SC v Eulex Kosovo, C‑881/24 P, EU:C:2025:313, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).

19

In accordance with the principle that the burden of proof lies with the appellant requesting that an appeal be allowed to proceed, the appellant must demonstrate that, independently of the issues of law invoked in his or her appeal, the appeal raises one or more issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law, the scope of that criterion going beyond the contested judgment and, ultimately, beyond the appeal itself (see, to that effect, order of 29 April 2025, SC v Eulex Kosovo, C‑881/24 P, EU:C:2025:313, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).

20

In order to demonstrate that that is the case, it is necessary to establish both the existence and the significance of such issues by means of concrete evidence specific to the particular case, and not simply an analysis of a general nature (order of 29 April 2025, SC v Eulex Kosovo, C‑881/24 P, EU:C:2025:313, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).

21

In the present case, it should be noted, in the first place, that the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed states clearly and in detail the three grounds relied on in the appeal, claiming, as regards the first, errors of law allegedly committed by the General Court in declaring itself to lack jurisdiction to examine the decision to abolish the appellant’s post and in dismissing as inadmissible the pleas in law raised in that respect, thereby infringing Article 47 of the Charter, as regards the second, the disregarding by the General Court of the case-law on employment disputes concerning officials and other staff of the European Union, an error of law committed by the General Court in holding, in essence, that Eulex Kosovo was not required to comply with a duty of care and a breach, inter alia, of the principle of legitimate expectations and, as regards the third, infringement of Articles 20, 21 and 47 of the Charter.

22

In the second place, it must be held that the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed sets out, to the requisite standard, the nature of the alleged errors of law the General Court is to have committed and the extent to which those alleged errors affected the outcome of the contested judgment. In addition, with the exception of the second part of the second ground of appeal, the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed also sets out the specific reasons why the errors the General Court is alleged by the appellant to have committed, if established, each raise an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law.

23

First, as it was observed in paragraph 8 above, it is apparent from that request that the appeal be allowed to proceed that the error of law alleged in the first part of the first ground of appeal consists in the fact that, in paragraphs 37 to 43, 68, 119, 147, 170 and 185 of the contested judgment, the General Court held, inconsistently with the Court of Justice’s case-law, that a reconfiguration of the Eulex Kosovo mission by the revised deployment plan involving the abolition of posts was directly linked to the strategic choices made under the CFSP. Consequently, the General Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to examine and assess the lawfulness of the revised deployment plan, including the decision to abolish the post filled by the appellant. According to that request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, if such an error had not been committed, the appellant could have challenged before the General Court the decision to abolish his post. That line of argument, in the appellant’s submission, also concerns the right to effective judicial protection under Article 47 of the Charter.

24

Moreover, by maintaining that the issue of the scope of the jurisdiction of the EU judicature to hear and determine disputes concerning decisions on reorganisation and the abolition of staff posts adopted under the CFSP is liable to concern many staff of CFSP missions or EU agencies acting in that field, and that the uniform application of the rules governing the jurisdiction of the EU judicature contributes to the consistency of EU law, the appellant submits that the issue of law thus raised goes beyond the scope of his appeal, since the response to be provided is likely to produce effects going beyond those of solely the present case.

25

In so doing, the appellant sets out the specific reasons why that issue is significant with respect to the unity and the consistency of EU law.

26

Secondly, as was observed in paragraph 9 above, it is apparent from the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed that the error of law alleged in the second part of the first ground of appeal relates, in essence, to the fact that the General Court purportedly held, in paragraphs 35, 36, 68, 119 and 148 of the contested judgment, that the pleas directed against the decision, envisaged in the revised deployment plan, to abolish the appellant’s post were inadmissible on the ground that that abolition could not be challenged incidentally in an action brought against the termination of his contract, but had to be the subject of a separate action. However, the requirement to bring a separate action is not mandatory in cases under Article 270 TFEU.

27

Thus, it must be found, first, that that alleged error could have had an impact on the outcome of the contested judgment, inasmuch as, were the Court of Justice to hold that such an error had been committed, the pleas in law raised by the appellant and relating to that plan might be declared admissible. Secondly, in claiming that the issue of whether the staff of CFSP missions are required to bring a separate action, in contrast to the actions brought by officials and other members of staff in disputes falling under Article 270 TFEU, is of significance for the purposes of the unity, consistency and development of EU law, the appellant sets out the specific reasons why that issue goes beyond to scope of his appeal.

28

Thirdly, it is apparent from paragraph 12 above that the first part of the second ground of appeal concerns the error of law allegedly committed by the General Court, in paragraphs 179 to 181 of the contested judgment, in holding that Eulex Kosovo had not failed to comply with its duty of care since that agency was required to take into consideration only the interest of the service. The General Court is also alleged to have held, erroneously, that Eulex Kosovo was not under any reassignment obligation due to the ‘temporary nature’ of the staff employment conditions, in disregard of the case-law, inter alia, arising from the judgments of 10 October 2014, EMA v BU (T‑444/13 P, EU:T:2014:865, paragraphs 28 and 32), and of 24 April 2017, HF v Parliament, T‑584/16 (EU:T:2017:282, paragraphs 119 and 120). The appellant also relies on the judgment of 19 July 2016, H v Council and Others (C‑455/14 P, EU:C:2016:569, paragraphs 54 and 55), from which it follows that staff of CFSP missions enjoy the same protection as officials and other staff of the European Union. The appellant argues that that error was liable to affect many members of staff of CFSP missions.

29

In so doing, the appellant sets out the specific reasons why the issue of law he raises by the first part of the second ground of appeal goes beyond his appeal and is significant with respect to the unity and the consistency of EU law. The response to that issue is likely to have consequences going beyond the present case, since, in the absence of any examination by the Court of Justice, the contested judgment could allow, when posts within CFSP missions or in EU agencies acting in that field are reorganised, the guarantees granted to the staff of those entities to be circumvented.

30

Fourthly, as regards the third ground of appeal, alleging failure to comply with the principle of equal treatment and with the right to effective judicial protection, the applicant relies on the judgment of 17 July 2024, Montanari v EUCAP Sahel Niger (T‑371/22, EU:T:2024:494, paragraph 224), from which it follows that that principle requires that certain provisions of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and of the case-law relating to the EU civil service be applied by analogy to staff members of CFSP missions, where such staff members are placed in a situation comparable to that of officials and other staff of the European Union. According to the appellant, by excluding the staff of CFSP missions from judicial review, whereas a dispute on the abolition of a post would fall, in respect of officials and other staff of the European Union, under Article 270 TFEU, the General Court failed to comply with that principle. Therefore, the appellant submits that clarification from the Court of Justice is necessary in order to ensure the consistent application of that principle.

31

In so doing, the appellant sets out the specific reasons why the issue of equal treatment raised in the third ground of appeal goes beyond his appeal and is significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law.

32

By contrast, as regards the second part of the second ground of appeal, alleging breach of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations, the appellant takes issue with the General Court for failing to apply the case-law following from the judgment of 11 April 2016, FN and Others v CEPOL (F‑41/15 DISS II, EU:F:2016:70, paragraph 85), in holding that, on account of the existence of a contractual termination clause, the assurances given to the appellant could not give rise to a legitimate expectation as to the maintenance of his employment contract. The appellant however restricts himself to raising that alleged error of law and to developing general arguments, without setting out the specific reasons why such an error, if it were established, would raise an issue significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law and which would justify allowing the appeal to proceed.

33

Therefore, it must be held that, as regards the second part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant did not comply with all the requirements referred to in paragraph 18 above.

34

In the light of the matters set out by the appellant, it must be held that the present request that the appeal be allowed to proceed demonstrates to the requisite legal standard that the first ground of appeal, the first part of the second ground of appeal and the third ground of appeal raise issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law.

35

Having regard to the foregoing considerations, it is appropriate to allow the appeal to proceed in part, restricting the examination of that appeal to the first ground, the first part of the second ground and the third ground, to which the response must relate, and not to allow it to proceed as to the remainder.

36

Under Article 170b(4) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where an appeal is allowed to proceed, wholly or in part, having regard to the criteria set out in the third paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the proceedings are to continue in accordance with Articles 171 to 190a of those rules.

37

Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to proceedings on appeal pursuant to Article 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the judgment or order which closes the proceedings.

38

Accordingly, since the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed must be granted in part, the costs must be reserved.

On those grounds, the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) hereby orders: