ECLI:EU:C:2026:702

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Provisional text

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

NORKUS

delivered on 3 September 2026 (1)

Case C‑380/25

A.M.,

H.K.

Bellavista Società Agricola Ss

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation, Italy))

( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Social policy – Directive 1999/70/EC – Framework Agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP – Clause 5 – Measures to prevent the misuse of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships – Agricultural sector – Derogation from the national rules of ordinary law transposing Directive 1999/70 – National measure providing for conversion of fixed-term contracts into employment relationships of indefinite duration after 180 days of actual work in the same company, calculated over a 12-month period – Time limit of six months from the end of the working relationship for requesting conversion )

I. Introduction

1. In this request for a preliminary ruling, the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation, Italy) refers to the Court two questions on the interpretation of Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work. (2) The distinguishing feature of the case lies in the fact that the two questions addressed to the Court essentially concern the application of that clause to the agricultural sector.

2. The request has been made in proceedings between an Italian agricultural company and two of its employees concerning those employees’ request for their fixed-term employment contracts to be converted into employment relationships of indefinite duration. Those employees had been engaged for several years to carry out pruning, grape harvesting, cleaning of grounds or other field work under many fixed-term employment contracts without the conditions laid down in the national collective labour agreement for agricultural workers and floriculturists having been fulfilled, which relate, inter alia, to the number of actual working days calculated over a given period.

3. The case in the main proceedings therefore provides an opportunity for the Court to adopt a position not only on the application of Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement to the agricultural sector but also on the consideration to be given, in that context, to the specific characteristics of that sector, which have not so far been central to the nonetheless frequent requests of the Italian courts for interpretation of that clause. (3)

II. Legal framework

A. European Union law

4. Clause 1(b), Clause 3(1) and Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement, in addition to the first paragraph of Article 2 of Directive 1999/70, have particular importance in the present case.

B. Italian law

1. Legislative Decree No 368/2001

5. Article 10 of decreto legislativo n^o 368/2001 – Attuazione della direttiva 1999/70/CE relativa all’accordo quadro sul lavoro a tempo determinato concluso dall’UNICE, dal CEEP e dal CES (Legislative Decree No 368/2001 implementing Directive [1999/70], of 6 September 2001 (4) (‘Legislative Decree No 368/2001’), ^entitled ‘Exclusions and special rules’, in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings, provides, in paragraph 2 thereof:

‘Employment relationships between agricultural employers and fixed-term workers … shall be excluded from the provisions of this Legislative Decree’.

2. The CCNL

6. Article 18 of the Contratto collettivo nazionale di lavoro per gli operai agricoli e florovivaisti quadriennio 2006-2009 (National collective labour agreement for agricultural workers and floriculturists for the period 2006-2009), signed on 6 July 2006 between the employers’ organisations and trade unions of the agricultural sector (‘the CCNL’), provides:

‘For the purposes of this agreement, agricultural workers are those who carry out their work in agricultural undertakings and whose employment relationship is governed by this national agreement.

Depending on the nature of the relationship, agricultural workers are divided into workers with a contract of indefinite duration and fixed-term workers.

…

The following are fixed-term workers:

(a) workers employed under an individual fixed-term employment relationship, such as, for example, those who are employed to perform short-term, seasonal or casual work, or who are employed for phases of work or to replace absent workers who have the right to retain their position;

(b) fixed-term workers who are employed to perform several seasonal jobs and/or several phases of work during the year, to whom the company is in any case required to ensure that the number of days of employment exceeds 100 per year. In that case, in the individual contract referred to in Article 11, or in the agreements referred to in Article 24, it is necessary to indicate the likely periods of employment, for which the worker guarantees his or her availability, in order not to lose his or her job for the subsequent phases and the employment guarantee referred to above, except in proven cases of objective impediment;

(c) fixed-term workers originally employed under a fixed-term employment contract for more than 180 days of actual work, to be carried out within the context of a single continuous relationship.

…’

7. According to Article 20 of the CCNL:

‘Workers on a fixed-term contract who have worked 180 days in the same company over a period of 12 months from the date of recruitment are entitled to have their employment converted into a contract of indefinite duration under the same terms applying to workers originally employed on a permanent basis. The right to convert the relationship must be exercised, under penalty of forfeiture, within 6 months of the 180 days of actual work requirement having been met, by means of a written communication to be submitted to the employer. Once the employer has received such written communication from the worker within the deadline, it must notify the competent bodies that a new employment relationship of indefinite duration has been established.

The right to convert the employment relationship does not apply to:

(1) fixed-term workers originally employed under a fixed-term employment contract with a minimum guarantee of 100 days, referred to in point (b) of Articles 18 and 19 of this CCNL;

(2) fixed-term workers originally employed under a fixed-term employment contract entailing more than 180 days of actual work, to be carried out in the context of a single continuous relationship, referred to in point (c) of Articles 18 and 19 of this CCNL;

(3) fixed-term workers employed to replace absent workers who have the right to retain their position.’ (5)

3. National case-law

8. The referring court states that it has made clear, in its case-law on the interpretation of Article 5(4-ter) of Legislative Decree No 368/2001, (6) that the exception to the prohibition on exceeding the maximum limit of 36 months for fixed-term employment contracts is applicable, including in the agricultural sector, only where those contracts concern seasonal agricultural activities. (7) However, it explains that it noted in that case-law that an activity which is likely to continue and which does not depend on the ordinary schedule of normal tasks relating to that agricultural activity is not, in itself, regarded as a seasonal agricultural activity. (8) In that regard, the referring court adds that, in accordance with that case-law, it stated that the cyclical nature of the agricultural activity also does not permit derogation from the legislation applicable to fixed-term contracts, and that, on the contrary, it must be assumed that workers employed permanently in order to carry out tasks meeting the permanent needs of the seasonal activity must be permanent workers. (9)

III. The dispute in the main proceedings, the questions referred for a preliminary ruling and the procedure before the Court

9. A.M. and H.K. were employed by Bellavista Società Agricola Ss (‘Bellavista’), between May 2009 and April 2015, under 17 fixed-term employment contracts, and between December 2007 and April 2015, under 15 fixed-term employment contracts, respectively, in order to carry out pruning, grape harvesting, cleaning of grounds or other field work.

10. Those workers, in turn, brought separate actions before the Tribunale di Brescia (District Court, Brescia, Italy) seeking, inter alia, a declaration that their employment relationship with Bellavista be classified as a full-time employment relationship of indefinite duration and requesting that that company be ordered to reinstate them and pay them compensation.

11. After that court dismissed their actions, those workers brought separate appeals against the judgment of first instance concerning them before the Corte d’appello di Brescia (Court of Appeal, Brescia, Italy).

12. By judgment No 232 of 2020, the Court of Appeal dismissed those appeals.

13. A.M. and H.K. brought an appeal against that judgment before the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation), the referring court, claiming, in particular, that the national legislation governing fixed-term employment contracts in the agricultural sector infringed Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement in so far as it permits the unlimited renewal of such employment contracts. The appellants in the main proceedings request that that legislation be disapplied and that the general rules of Legislative Decree No 368/2001 be applied to them.

14. Bellavista lodged a cross-appeal.

15. The referring court states that Article 10(2) of Legislative Decree No 368/2001 excludes ‘employment relationships between agricultural employers and fixed-term workers’, which are covered by the employment contracts at issue in the main proceedings, from the scope of the general rules of that legislative decree which implemented Directive 1999/70. Under the CCNL, which governs those employment relationships, only workers on fixed-term contracts who have carried out 180 days of actual work on the same farm within 12 months of the date of recruitment are entitled to conversion of their employment relationship into a contract of indefinite duration. That right must be exercised within six months from the 180th day of actual work. It is common ground that the appellants in the main proceedings had not carried out more than 180 days of actual work in the 12 months since their recruitment and, in any event, had not exercised their right to conversion of their employment relationship into a contract of indefinite duration within the prescribed period.

16. The referring court notes that the Corte d’appello di Brescia (Court of Appeal, Brescia) held that it was incumbent on Member States to implement Directive 1999/70 in the absence of an ‘equivalent legal measure for the prevention of abuse which takes account of the needs of specific sectors and/or categories of workers’. However, the Corte d’appello di Brescia (Court of Appeal, Brescia), held that Article 20 of the CCNL was capable of ensuring that workers such as the appellants in the main proceedings receive the level of protection required by EU law, on the ground that the agricultural sector was indisputably characterised by seasonal and/or casual labour needs. That court considered that the choice made in that provision to tie the protection mechanism against the abuse of fixed-term contracts to an ‘external’ criterion, such as that of the maximum total duration of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships concluded during the year, and to provide, as a penalty for such use, for the re-classification of the fixed-term employment contract as an employment contract of indefinite duration, seemed to be appropriate.

17. In those circumstances, the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation), by decision of 12 May 2025, received at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 10 June 2025, decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Must Clause 5 of the [Framework Agreement] be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which the rules of ordinary law governing fixed-term employment relationships, enacted in order to implement [Directive 1999/70], are not applicable to employment relationships between agricultural employers and workers on fixed-term contracts?

(2) Must Clause 5 be interpreted as meaning that equivalent legal measures for the prevention of abuse, which take account of the needs of the agricultural sector, may include a measure laid down by the collective bargaining agreement signed by the social partners which provides for the right to convert a fixed-term contract into an indefinite-duration relationship in the case of an agricultural worker who performs 180 days of actual work on the same farm, to be calculated over 12 months from the date of recruitment, this being a right to be exercised within a six-month limitation period?’

18. Written observations were lodged before the Court by the appellants in the main proceedings, Bellavista, the Italian Government and the European Commission. At the hearing held on 13 May 2026, those same parties and interested parties responded to the questions for oral answer put by the Court.

IV. Analysis

A. Admissibility of the first question referred for a preliminary ruling

19. The Italian Government pleads the manifest inadmissibility of the first question referred for the following reasons.

20. In the first place, the Italian Government submits that that question concerns the fact that the CCNL derogates from the national rules of ordinary law and therefore actually relates to a possible difference in treatment between fixed-term workers in that sector and fixed-term workers in other sectors.

21. In the second place, that government submits, on the basis of that assumption, that the question is inadmissible, since it is not caught by either Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement or by Clause 4 thereof, as the latter clause refers only to differences in treatment between fixed-term workers and permanent workers.

22. I do not share the Italian Government’s objections to the admissibility of the first question referred.

23. I note that it follows from settled case-law that, in the factual and legislative context which the national court is responsible for defining and the accuracy of which is not a matter for this Court to determine, the questions submitted by the national court enjoy a presumption of relevance. (10) The Court may refuse to rule on a request for a preliminary ruling referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it and to understand the reasons for the referring court’s view that it needs answers to those questions in order to rule in the dispute before it. (11)

24. I do not consider that that presumption of relevance can be called into question in the present case. Indeed, it is clear from the order for reference that the questions referred do relate to measures adopted at national level aimed at preventing and penalising abusive recourse to successive fixed-term employment contracts within the meaning of Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement. It follows from that information that the referring court has shown the relationship between the requested interpretation of the Framework Agreement and the actual facts and purpose of the dispute in the main proceedings. Therefore, the first question referred to the Court is not hypothetical.

25. Moreover, the Italian Government’s argument based on the applicability of Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement to the dispute in the main proceedings relates to the substance of the first question referred rather than to the admissibility of that question, with the result that it should be examined in the context of the examination of the substance of that question. (12) By that question, the referring court seeks, in essence, to ascertain whether the national legislation at issue is compatible with that clause, in so far as that legislation provides that it is not to apply to workers in the agricultural sector.

26. I therefore propose that the Court should find that the first question for a preliminary ruling is admissible.

B. Substance

27. In the present case, the positions of the parties and of the interveners who submitted written and oral observations differ as to how the questions for a preliminary ruling are to be answered. The appellants in the main proceedings and the Commission submit that Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement precludes the national legislation at issue. Bellavista and the Italian Government take the opposite view.

28. In order to provide a useful answer to the referring court’s questions, I will offer, first of all, some brief general considerations on the scope of the Framework Agreement in the light of the Court’s case-law (Section 1), then I will analyse Clause 5 thereof in the light of the referring court’s doubts regarding the exclusion of the agricultural sector and of the Court’s case-law relating to that provision (Section 2). Lastly, I will examine the consideration to be given to the specific characteristics of that sector, in particular the seasonal nature of the activities and of the labour needs, by analysing, in that context, the measures provided for in the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings (Section 3).

1. Brief general considerations on the scope of the Framework Agreement in the light of the Court’s settled case-law

29. In the first place, I would point out at the outset that Clause 2 of the Framework Agreement, entitled ‘Scope’, provides, in paragraph 1 thereof, that ‘[it] applies to fixed-term workers who have an employment contract or employment relationship as defined in law, collective agreements or practice in each Member State’.

30. In the present case, it is clear from the order for reference that the appellants have been employed as vineyard workers by Bellavista under, respectively, 17 and 15 fixed-term employment contracts for periods of more than 6 and 7 years, respectively, and more specifically, from May 2009 to April 2015 and from December 2007 to April 2015. Therefore, there is scarcely any doubt that the employment relationships at issue in the main proceedings fall within the personal scope of the Framework Agreement under Clause 2 thereof. In that regard, the Court has already had occasion to rule in L.T. and Others (Social allowances in respect of fixed-term agricultural workers) (13) that the employment relationships of the fixed-term agricultural workers governed, in particular, by the CCNL fall within the scope of the Framework Agreement.

31. In the second place, as regards Clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement, that provision contains the obligation (‘the effective and binding adoption’) on the Member States to adopt one or more of the measures listed in points (a) to (c), since equivalent legal measures do not already exist in the Member State concerned. (14) The Member States enjoy a certain discretion in that regard, since they have the choice of relying on one or more of the measures set out in that provision, or on existing equivalent legal measures, while taking account of the needs of specific sectors and/or categories of workers. (15) The Court has taken the view that, in that way, Clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement assigns to the Member States the general objective of preventing such abuse, while leaving to them the choice as to how to achieve it, provided that they do not compromise the objective or the practical effect of the Framework Agreement. (16)

32. As regards the scope of Clause 5(2)(b) of the Framework Agreement, I would emphasise that it is only ‘where appropriate’ that the Member States and/or social partners must act in accordance with that provision. Therefore, as the Court has stated in its settled case-law, that provision in principle leaves it to the Member States to determine the conditions under which fixed-term employment contracts or relationships are to be regarded as contracts or relationships of indefinite duration. (17) That same provision explicitly provides for that measure penalising such abuse without, though, making it an obligation on the Member States. (18) However, since neither Directive 1999/70 nor the Framework Agreement provides for the adoption of specific punitive measures of an effective, dissuasive and proportionate nature, the Court has, in its case-law, established such a requirement so as to guarantee the practical effect of that directive. It has therefore repeatedly recalled that, where EU law does not lay down any specific sanction should instances of abuse nevertheless be established, ‘it is incumbent on the national authorities to adopt measures which must be not only proportionate, but also sufficiently effective and a sufficient deterrent to ensure that the provisions adopted pursuant to the Framework Agreement are fully effective’. (19)

33. The Court added that ‘where such misuse has nevertheless taken place, a measure offering effective and equivalent guarantees for the protection of workers must be capable of being applied in order duly to punish that abuse and nullify the consequences of the breach of EU law. According to the very wording of the first paragraph of Article 2 of Directive 1999/70, the Member States must “take any necessary measures to enable them at any time to be in a position to guarantee the results imposed by [that] Directive”’. (20)

34. In that connection, it should be borne in mind that it is not for the Court to give a ruling on the interpretation of provisions of national law, that being exclusively for the national courts having jurisdiction, which must determine whether the requirements set out in Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement are met and whether the effectiveness of that clause is guaranteed by national legislation, as interpreted by the national courts. (21) It will therefore be for the referring court to assess to what extent the conditions for application and the actual implementation of the national provisions at issue in the main proceedings render the latter an appropriate measure for preventing and, where necessary, punishing the misuse of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships. (22) That said, the Court, when giving a preliminary ruling, may, where appropriate, provide clarification designed to give the referring court guidance in its assessment. (23)

35. It is in the light of those considerations that I will analyse the questions posed by the referring court.

2. The interpretation of Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement in the light of the referring court’s doubts regarding the exclusion of the agricultural sector (first question referred)

36. By its first question for a preliminary ruling, the referring court seeks to ascertain, in essence, whether Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which the rules of ordinary law governing employment relationships aimed at preventing and penalising abusive recourse to successive fixed-term employment contracts adopted for the purposes of transposing that framework agreement are not applicable to the agricultural sector.

37. I note, in the first place, that the protection of fixed-term workers from abuse is at the heart of Directive 1999/70 and the Framework Agreement annexed to it. The minimum protective provisions provided for in that agreement are designed to prevent the status of employees from being insecure (24) and therefore to prevent their situation from being precarious as a result of their employment under fixed-term contracts for a lengthy period. (25) That category of employees is thus at risk, for a substantial part of its members’ working life, of being excluded from the benefit of stable employment, which is, however, as the Framework Agreement makes clear, a major element in the protection of workers. (26) In particular, Clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement seeks to implement one of the objectives pursued by that framework agreement, namely to place limits on successive recourse to fixed-term employment contracts or relationships, a category regarded as a potential source of abuse to the disadvantage of workers, by laying down as a minimum a number of protective provisions designed to prevent the status of employees from being insecure. (27)

38. I note, in the second place, that the Court has already ruled on national legislation excluding application of the measures provided for in Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement in certain sectors and, in particular, in the maritime, entertainment arts, operatic and orchestral foundations, education or public health sectors of activity. (28) In particular, the Court held that the application of different rules to a specific economic sector on account of its special characteristics is not, a priori, prohibited. (29) In that context, it refers to paragraph 8 of the general considerations of the Framework Agreement, according to which fixed-term employment contracts are a feature of employment in certain sectors, occupations and activities which can suit both employers and workers. (30)

39. In that regard, first, as the Court has repeatedly held, Clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement, the third paragraph of its preamble (31) and paragraphs 8 and 10 of its general considerations (32) give Member States the discretion, when implementing the agreement, to take account of the particular needs of specific sectors and/or categories of workers involved, provided that that is justified on objective grounds. (33) Second, I note that the first paragraph of Clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement refers to ‘national law, collective agreements or practice’, and provides that social partners may also introduce the measures to be provided for at national level referred to in points (a) to (c) of that provision.

40. In the present case, although the national legislation excludes fixed-term employment relationships between agricultural employers and fixed-term workers from the application of the general rules transposing Directive 1999/70, those employment relationships are converted by the CCNL, which covers the employment contracts of the appellants in the main proceedings.

41. In particular, as regards the exclusion of the agricultural sector provided for in the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, the referring court stated that that exclusion originates, in historical terms too, from the peculiarity of agricultural work, which often includes activities taking place at certain times of the year or dependent on natural events, so that the size of the workforce required is ordinarily variable.

42. The Italian Government has submitted that that exclusion can be explained by the structural peculiarities of that sector, namely the seasonal nature of production, the unpredictable weather, the lack of continuity of employment and the high mobility and natural rotation of the workforce.

43. In that regard, I do not doubt that the seasonal nature of certain agricultural activities may entail, for the employer concerned, temporary, but recurring recruitment requirements.

44. It follows that Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement does not, in principle, preclude national legislation which excludes, in the agricultural sector, the application of the national rules of ordinary law implementing Directive 1999/70 aimed at preventing and penalising abusive recourse to successive fixed-term employment contracts by converting them into an employment contract of indefinite duration.

45. It is clear from the settled case-law of the Court that, in order for national legislation to be regarded as compatible with the Framework Agreement, the domestic law of the Member State concerned must include, in that sector, another effective measure to prevent and, where relevant, punish the abuse of successive fixed-term employment contracts. (34)

46. The question therefore arises whether, according to the case-law of the Court cited in the previous paragraph, such derogation rules contained in collective agreements are capable of fulfilling the requirements arising from Clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement and therefore of being effective in preventing and, where appropriate, duly punishing the abuse of fixed-term employment contracts and in nullifying the consequences of the breach of EU law, which is the subject of the referring court’s second question.

47. In the light of those considerations, I consider that Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation under which the rules of ordinary law governing fixed-term employment relationships aimed at preventing and penalising abusive recourse to successive fixed-term employment contracts, which were adopted in order to implement Directive 1999/70, are not applicable to employment relationships between employers and fixed-term workers in the agricultural sector, and which lays down specific rules applicable to that sector, provided that those specific rules fulfil the requirements arising from that clause, which it is for the referring court to verify.

3. The consideration to be given to the specific characteristics of the agricultural sector and the existence of preventive and/or punitive measures provided for in the legislation at issue in the main proceedings (second question referred)

48. By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement must be interpreted as precluding a collective agreement applicable in the agricultural sector which provides that the right to conversion of fixed-term employment contracts into employment relationships of indefinite duration is subject to the condition that the agricultural workers perform, on the same farm, at least 180 days of actual work calculated over 12 months from the date of recruitment, and that those workers must exercise that right, under penalty of forfeiture, within 6 months of completing 180 days of actual work.

49. In order to provide the referring court with guidance in assessing the adequacy of that condition aimed at preventing and, where appropriate, penalising abusive use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships within the meaning of Clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement, I will examine, first, the specific requirements of the general rule laid down in the first paragraph of Article 20 of the CCNL and, second, the exclusions provided for in the second paragraph of that article, in the light of the Court’s case-law. (35)

(a) Does the general measure set out in the first paragraph of Article 20 of the CCNL constitute an adequate preventive and/or punitive measure within the meaning of Clause 5(1)(b) and (c) of the Framework Agreement?

50. I would point out at the outset that it is not apparent from the file before the Court that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings provides for measures relating to the number of renewals, within the meaning of Clause 5(1)(c) of the Framework Agreement. However, I consider that the measure provided for in the first paragraph of Article 20 of the CCNL is likely to comprise both a legal measure equivalent to the measure preventing the misuse of successive fixed-term employment contracts set out in Clause 5(1)(b) of the Framework Agreement, which relates to the maximum total duration of such contracts, and a measure that punishes that misuse. The two conditions laid down in that provision must therefore be examined separately.

(1) The condition relating to the calculation of 180 days of actual work in the same company over a 12-month period

51. In order better to understand the condition relating to the calculation of 180 days of actual work in the same company over a 12-month period, I consider it useful to note some factors which are apparent from the Italian Government’s answers to the questions put by the Court at the hearing.

52. First, when asked to clarify the ratio legis of that condition, the Italian Government explained that it takes into account a certain continuity of working days which is guaranteed to workers without regard to seasonal considerations, since the maximum period of 180 days of actual work is not tied to the seasonal production cycle. (36)

53. Next, when asked about the meaning of the terms ‘over a period of 12 months from the date of recruitment’ used in the first paragraph of Article 20 of the CCNL, that government stated that they designate a period of time enabling it to be verified, over a significant and continuous period, whether the contract is being used to meet permanent needs. (37) It explained that the right to conversion of the employment relationship provided for in that provision is subject to the completion of at least 180 days of actual work in order to discourage abusive and repeated recourse to fixed-term employment contracts. More specifically, the Italian Government indicated, first, that the reason why such a period of work was adopted was to establish a quantitative threshold for the incorporation or insertion of the worker concerned in the organisation of the company so as to substantiate the recognition of a right to stabilisation of the employment relationship. On the other hand, that government stated that the days of ‘actual’ work requirement met the need to prevent excessive and unjustified protection of the worker concerned, to the detriment of the employer. A calculation based on calendar days made it possible to quickly arrive at 180 days when those ‘actual’ days are relevant in view of the fragmented nature of agricultural work. (38)

54. Lastly, when the Italian Government was asked to explain the arrangements for monitoring or recording the days actually worked, it listed, first, the worker’s social security account statements accessible on the National Social Security Institute (INPS) portal, which show, for each year and by employer, the declared days of work; second, the lists of names of agricultural workers of each employer, administered and published by the INPS and updated on the basis of information sent by the employers concerned (39) and, third, the payslips which must correspond to the days declared by the employers. The Italian Government further added that those arrangements are mandatory, thereby ensuring an adequate level of reliability with possibilities of verification. However, it stated that that system is based on the employer’s ‘self-declaration’ of the days actually worked, without ex ante control either by the labour inspectorate or by the INPS but with the possibility of ex post control by either of those bodies. According to that government, a false declaration in the system could render the employer criminally liable.

55. As regards, in the first place, the statements relating to the ratio legis of the requirement of a maximum duration of 180 days of actual work, I would emphasise that the idea of that maximum duration seems to be to limit the right to conversion of the employment relationship to long-term work carried out in the agricultural sector. I consider, however, that, since, as is apparent from the Italian Government’s statements, such a maximum period does not correspond to the completion of a season or a complete seasonal production cycle (from November to October of the following year), (40) that condition does not appear, in principle, sufficient to distinguish agricultural workers engaged to meet temporary seasonal needs (for example, harvesting during a single season) from those employed to cover permanent needs during a complete agricultural season, namely over the four seasons. (41) It is therefore for the referring court to assess in concreto which agricultural activities are seasonal by distinguishing them from those which, within the same agricultural sector, are not, in fact, seasonal activities, in order to determine whether the appellants in the main proceedings were engaged as agricultural workers in order to meet temporary seasonal needs or, on the contrary, to cover permanent needs.

56. As regards in the second place, the clarifications relating to the meaning of the terms ‘over a period of 12 months from the date of recruitment’, I would point out that the calculation of 180 days of actual work from the date of conclusion of the first fixed-term employment contract until the end of that period does not appear, in principle, to substantially reduce the effectiveness of that condition. (42)

57. I observe, however, that, in the joined cases which gave rise to the judgment in Fiamingo and Others, (43) which concerned a specific sector, namely the maritime sector, the Court ruled on national legislation which bore some similarity to the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings. (44) In those cases, the referring court was seeking, inter alia, to ascertain whether Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement precluded national legislation which provided for the conversion of fixed-term employment contracts into employment relationships of indefinite duration only where the worker concerned had been employed continuously under such contracts by the same employer for a period longer than one year, the employment relationship being considered to be continuous where the fixed-term employment contracts were separated by time lapses of less than or equal to 60 days.

58. The Court ruled that that national legislation did not preclude, in principle, Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement. It held that such legislation was likely to comprise both a legal measure equivalent to the measure preventing the misuse of successive fixed-term employment contracts set out in Clause 5(1)(b) of the Framework Agreement, which relates to the maximum total duration of such contracts, and a measure that punishes that misuse. (45) In particular, the Court pointed out, in paragraph 73 of that judgment, that it was for the referring court to satisfy itself that the maximum duration of one year provided for by the national legislation was calculated in a manner that did not substantially reduce the effectiveness of the prevention and punishment of the misuse of successive fixed-term employment contracts. It added that that might arise if, rather than being calculated on the basis of the number of calendar days covered by those employment contracts, the maximum duration was calculated on the basis of the number of days’ service actually completed by the worker concerned. In that paragraph of that judgment, the Court held that that would be the case where, ‘for example’ (emphasis added), as a result of the low volume of crossings, the number of days’ service actually completed by the worker concerned was considerably lower than the number of calendar days covered by the employment contracts.

59. In that regard, I note that, although that example takes into account the specific circumstances of the joined cases which gave rise to the judgment in Fiamingo and Others, in the present case, the situation is analogous, that is to say that, owing to the specific characteristics of the agricultural sector, the number of days actually worked is lower than the number of calendar days covered by the fixed-term contracts at issue in the main proceedings.

60. Therefore, in the light of paragraph 73 of the judgment in Fiamingo and Others, the question arises whether the condition relating to the maximum duration of 180 days of actual work over a period of 12 months from the date of recruitment of the fixed-term workers concerned substantially reduces the effectiveness of the prevention and/or punishment of the misuse of successive fixed-term employment contracts. (46)

61. In that regard, I note that, in itself, the requirement of days of actual work laid down in the national legislation is not contrary to Clause 5(1)(b) of the Framework Agreement, since it enables a certain continuity to be established in the undertaking so as to substantiate the recognition of a right to stabilisation of the employment relationship. However, were the referring court to conclude, first, that the calculation based on days of actual work relates, in fact, to the current calendar year at the time of the conclusion of the first fixed-term employment contract at issue (47) and, second, that the days of actual work completed in the previous calendar year would not be taken into account for the purposes of that calculation, that requirement cannot be accepted. In that case, the effectiveness of the prevention and/or punishment of misuse of successive fixed-term employment might vary depending on the date of conclusion of that contract (48) and, consequently, would not comply with Clause 5(1)(b) of the Framework Agreement.

62. In the third and last place, as regards the arrangements for monitoring or recording the days actually worked, it must be stated that, as the Italian Government itself explained, such monitoring depends solely on the employer’s declaration, without the national authorities being able to carry out any ex ante control. It is true, as that government also explained, that it would be possible to implement an ex post control mechanism carried out by those authorities and, therefore, any false declaration could render the employer criminally liable. However, we do not have sufficient information to be able to guide the referring court in its assessment of whether those arrangements for monitoring days actually worked ensure that the national provisions adopted pursuant to the Framework Agreement are fully effective.

63. Thus, to conclude, the condition relating to the calculation of 180 days of actual work in the same undertaking over a period of 12 months from the date of recruitment seems to me, in principle, capable of preventing and/or punishing the abusive use of fixed-term contracts in the agricultural sector, provided that that maximum period makes it possible to distinguish agricultural workers engaged in order to meet temporary seasonal needs from those who perform tasks of a permanent or long-term nature, that it is calculated in a manner which does not reduce the effectiveness of that prevention and/or punishment, and that there are effective controls to prevent and/or punish the abusive implementation of that condition, which it is for the referring court to verify.

(2) The condition relating to the exercise of the right to conversion of the employment relationship within 6 months of completion of the 180th day of actual work, under penalty of forfeiture of that right

64. I would point out at the outset that, in the case which gave rise to the order in Berkizi-Nikolakaki, (49) the referring court asked, in particular, whether the Framework Agreement was to be interpreted as precluding national legislation providing that a worker’s application to convert a succession of fixed-term employment contracts that may be considered abusive into an employment contract of indefinite duration had to be made to the competent authority within a time limit of two months from the date of entry into force of the national legislation in question.

65. The Court held that the answer to that question could be clearly inferred from its case-law (50) and ruled that the Framework Agreement did not preclude such national legislation, provided that that time limit is not less favourable than that concerning similar domestic actions regarding employment law (principle of equivalence) and does not render impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness), which it was for the referring court to determine. (51)

66. As regards, in the first place, the principle of equivalence, it is not apparent from the information provided to the Court that the time limit of six months from the completion of the 180th day of actual work laid down in the first paragraph of Article 20 of the CCNL for the applicants concerned to make an application for the conversion of their successive fixed-term employment contracts into an employment contract of indefinite duration is contrary to that principle. It is, however, for the referring court, which alone has direct knowledge of those deadlines within the area of domestic law, to determine.

67. As regards, in the second place, the principle of effectiveness, the Commission submitted that the time limit laid down in the first paragraph of Article 20 of the CCNL may render impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of the rights conferred by the Framework Agreement.

68. In that regard, I note that that time limit has two main elements, namely, first, the point from which it starts to run and, second, its six-month duration.

69. As regards the duration, I consider that a six-month time limit is sufficient to enable the worker to make an application for conversion of the fixed-term employment contract into an employment contract of indefinite duration. Therefore, that duration does not, as such, give rise to doubts in the light of the principle of effectiveness.

70. As regards the point from which the time limit in question starts to run, that is to say, the day following the 180th day of actual work completed, I note that, since the system relating to the arrangements for monitoring or recording the days actually worked is based on the employer’s ‘self-declaration’ of the days actually worked, it is for the referring court to satisfy itself, in the light of the principles of legal certainty and foreseeability, that the worker was informed that the maximum period of 180 days of actual work had been completed and, therefore, that the 6-month time limit had started to run.

71. Moreover, the Commission submitted in its written observations that the fact that the fixed-term employment relationship is not automatically converted into an employment relationship of indefinite duration makes it possible for abuse to be punished only at the request of the worker, who is the weaker party in the employment relationship. However, the condition of submitting a written request to the employer in order to exercise the right to conversion of the employment relationship does not seem to me to be a complex procedure capable of infringing the principle of effectiveness, since the worker concerned knows that he or she has that right. In that regard, I note that paragraph 8 of the general considerations of the Framework Agreement states that fixed-term employment contracts are a feature of employment in certain sectors, occupations and activities which can suit both employers and workers.

72. I therefore consider that the second condition laid down in the first paragraph of Article 20 of the CCNL cannot be regarded as infringing the principle of effectiveness. However, it is for the referring court in the case in the main proceedings to determine whether, in the light of the two main elements of that condition, their implementation infringes the principle of effectiveness, so that the persons concerned can convert their successive fixed-term employment contracts into employment relationships of indefinite duration where those employment contracts are abusive.

73. In the light of the foregoing considerations on the conditions laid down in the first paragraph of Article 20 of the CCNL, I consider that Clause 5(1)(b) of the Framework Agreement must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, provided that that maximum period makes it possible to distinguish agricultural workers engaged to meet temporary seasonal needs from those who carry out work on a permanent or long-term basis; that it is calculated in a manner which does not reduce the effectiveness of that prevention and/or punishment; that there are effective controls to prevent and/or punish the abusive implementation of that condition; and that the arrangements for exercising the right to convert fixed-term employment contracts into employment relationships of indefinite duration do not infringe the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, which it is for the referring court to assess.

(3) The exclusions provided for in the second paragraph of Article 20 of the CCNL

74. I would point out at the outset that the referring court does not ask the Court to assess the compatibility of the exclusions provided for in the second paragraph of Article 20 of the CCNL with EU law. However, for the sake of completeness and in order to provide the referring court with a useful answer, it seems appropriate to me to take them into account for the present analysis and to make a few brief observations concerning them.

75. When asked to clarify at the hearing the reasons why the right to conversion of the employment relationship laid down in the first paragraph of Article 20 of the CCNL does not apply to the first two categories of workers referred to in the second paragraph of that article, the Italian Government explained that the objective of those exclusions is to limit the conversion of the employment relationship only to cases where the succession of fixed-term employment contracts is used for permanent or long-term needs. (52)

76. As regards the first exclusion, which concerns fixed-term workers initially engaged under an employment contract with a minimum guarantee of 100 days, which expressly relates to workers engaged ‘to perform several seasonal jobs and/or several phases of work during the year, to whom the company is in any case required to guarantee a number of employment days exceeding 100 per year’, (53) the Italian Government explained that the contracts concerned by that exclusion must state the weeks of employment during which the worker is required to be available, thereby establishing a de facto continuity which guarantees the worker some stability, while taking into account the specific characteristics of agricultural work.

77. As regards the second exclusion, which concerns fixed-term workers initially engaged under an employment contract of more than 180 days of actual work to be performed within a single and continuous employment relationship, the Italian Government stated that in that scenario, a single fixed-term contract is concluded for a fixed period, thereby making it possible to avoid the conclusion of successive fixed-term employment contracts.

78. In the present case, as is apparent from the Italian Government’s explanations, the seasonal nature of those activities appears to explain the exclusion of those two types of employment contract from the right to conversion into an employment relationship of indefinite duration, which is therefore reserved for workers who fulfil the conditions laid down in the first paragraph of Article 20 of the CCNL.

79. However, I would point out, as the Commission rightly submitted in its written observations, that the relationship between the exclusions provided for in the second paragraph of Article 20 of the CCNL and the conditions laid down in the first paragraph of that article is not easy to grasp. Although the employment contracts provided for in connection with those exclusions offer fixed-term workers more security and stability, it is not clear from the legislation at issue in the main proceedings that recourse to those two types of employment contract referred to in the first and second exclusions is limited, in particular, by restrictions on the number of renewals, in accordance with Clause 5(1)(c) of the Framework Agreement.

80. Lastly, the third exclusion provided for in the second paragraph of Article 20 of the CCNL concerns fixed-term workers engaged to replace absent workers who have the right to retain their position. In that regard, I note that the Court has already held that appointments made for the purposes of temporarily replacing a worker in order to meet the employer’s temporary staffing needs comply, in principle, with Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement, provided that fixed-term contracts are not renewed for the fixed and permanent performance of tasks intended to meet that employer’s fixed and permanent staffing needs. (54)

81. In any event, I would point out that it is for the referring court to assess whether the conditions for the application and effective implementation of the legislation at issue in the main proceedings, taken together, constitute a measure adequate for the prevention and punishment of the abusive use of successive fixed-term employment contracts, within the meaning of Clause 5(1)(b) of the Framework Agreement.

82. That said, in the event that the referring court concludes that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings does not contain any measures required by Clause 5(1)(b) and (c) of the Framework Agreement, it still needs to verify whether the recourse, in the agricultural sector, to successive fixed-term employment contracts may be justified by an objective reason within the meaning of Clause 5(1)(a) of that framework agreement. (55)

(b) Does the general measure provided for in the first paragraph of Article 20 of the CCNL constitute an adequate prevention and/or punitive measure within the meaning of Clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement?

83. I would point out at the outset that it is apparent from paragraph 7 of the general considerations in the Framework Agreement that the signatory parties to that agreement took the view that the use of fixed-term employment contracts based on objective reasons is a way to prevent abuse. (56) In that regard, it follows from the Court’s case-law that the concept of ‘objective reasons’, within the meaning of Clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement, must be understood as referring to precise and concrete circumstances characterising a given activity, which are therefore capable, in that particular context, of justifying the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts. According to the Court, those circumstances may result, in particular, from the specific nature of the tasks for the performance of which such contracts have been concluded and from the inherent characteristics of those tasks or, as the case may be, from pursuit of a legitimate social policy objective of a Member State. On the other hand, the Court has made clear that a national provision which merely authorises recourse to successive fixed-term employment contracts in a general and abstract manner by a rule of statute or secondary legislation does not accord with those requirements. (57) The Court held that such a provision, which is of a purely formal nature, does not permit objective and transparent criteria to be identified in order to verify whether the renewal of such contracts actually responds to a genuine need, is capable of achieving the objective pursued and is necessary for that purpose. Such a provision therefore carries a real risk that it will result in misuse of that type of contract and, accordingly, is not compatible with the objective of the Framework Agreement and the requirement that it have practical effect. (58)

84. In the present case, the Italian Government has submitted that the agricultural sector is characterised by the seasonal nature of production, the unpredictability of the weather, the lack of continuity of employment and the high mobility and natural rotation of the workforce. It states, from the outset, that that entails temporary and specific needs which can be effectively met only by recourse to fixed-term employment contracts, without that implying insecurity of employment. (59)

85. In that regard, I would point out that it follows from the case-law of the Court that the temporary employment of a worker in order to satisfy the employer’s temporary and specific staffing requirements may, in principle, constitute an ‘objective reason’ within the meaning of Clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement. (60) As I have already stated above, it is clear that the seasonal nature of certain agricultural activities may entail, for the employer concerned, temporary but recurring recruitment requirements. (61) By contrast, it follows from that case-law that it cannot be accepted that fixed-term employment contracts may be renewed for the purpose of the performance, in a fixed and permanent manner, of tasks which fall within the normal activity of the sector of activity at issue. In that regard, the Court stated that compliance with Clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement requires that it be specifically verified that the renewal of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships is intended to cover temporary needs. (62)

86. I note, in the first place that, in principle, the purpose of the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, taken as a whole, that is to say, in the light of the conditions laid down for the exercise of the right to conversion of the employment relationship and of the exclusions from that right, seems to be, given the specific characteristics of the agricultural sector, to distinguish employment relationships intended to cover temporary needs from those intended to cover the performance, in a fixed and permanent manner, of tasks which fall within the normal activity of the sector of activity at issue. However, it is apparent from the order for reference that the conclusion of the successive employment contracts at issue in the main proceedings does not seem to have been in response to the agricultural employer’s merely temporary needs but rather to its permanent and fixed needs. (63) In that regard, as the Commission stated, it is apparent from the national file that some of the contracts concluded with the appellants in the main proceedings concerned ‘proven and continuous technical, productive and organisational needs, including in the context of seasonal work’. (64) I also note that the appellants in the main proceedings maintained in their written observations that, where their job was specified in their employment contracts, it is apparent that they were engaged to perform the tasks ‘cleaning of grounds’ and ‘field or gardening work’ respectively, those activities being, in their view, customary and ongoing activities in the agricultural production sector and, in particular, the wine-growing sector. (65)

87. In the second place, I note that the various fixed-term employment contracts concluded with the appellants in the main proceedings who were engaged resulted in the performance of similar tasks over several years and covered almost all the calendar years concerned. Consequently, those employment relationships may have met a need which was not temporary, but, on the contrary, long-lasting. Therefore, it will be for the referring court to determine whether the conclusion of the successive employment contracts at issue in the main proceedings has met the simple temporary needs of the employer, or has fallen within the employer’s permanent needs. (66) It is for the national authorities and courts responsible for implementing the measures transposing Directive 1999/70 and which are called upon to rule on the classification of successive fixed-term employment contracts to consider in each case all the circumstances at issue, taking account, in particular, of the number of successive contracts concluded with the same person or for the purposes of performing the same work, in order to ensure that fixed-term relationships are not abused by employers. (67)

V. Conclusion

88. In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the answer to the questions raised by the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation, Italy) should be as follows:

(1) Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work, concluded on 18 March 1999, contained in the Annex to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP,

must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude national legislation under which the rules of ordinary law governing fixed-term employment relationships aimed at preventing and penalising abusive recourse to successive fixed-term employment contracts, which were adopted in order to implement Directive 1999/70, are not applicable to employment relationships between employers and fixed-term workers in the agricultural sector, and which lays down specific rules applicable to that sector, provided that those specific rules fulfil the requirements arising from that clause, which it is for the referring court to verify.

(2) Clause 5 of that framework-agreement

must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude a collective agreement applicable in the agricultural sector which provides that the right to conversion of fixed-term employment contracts into employment relationships of indefinite duration is subject to the condition that the agricultural workers perform, on the same farm, at least 180 days of actual work calculated over 12 months from the date of recruitment, and that those workers must exercise that right, under penalty of forfeiture, within 6 months of completing 180 day of actual work, provided that

– that maximum period makes it possible to distinguish agricultural workers engaged in order to meet temporary seasonal needs from those who perform tasks of a permanent or long-term nature;

– it is calculated in a manner which does not reduce the effectiveness of that prevention and/or punishment;

– there are effective controls to prevent and/or punish the abusive implementation of that condition, and

– the arrangements for exercising the right to convert fixed-term employment contracts into employment relationships of indefinite duration do not infringe the principles of equivalence and effectiveness,

which it is for the referring court to verify.

1 Original language: French.

2 Framework agreement concluded on 18 March 1999 (‘the Framework Agreement’), contained in the Annex to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (OJ 1999 L 175, p. 43).

3 As regards the agricultural sector, the Court has interpreted Clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement in the judgment of 8 May 2025, L.T. and Others (Social allowances in respect of fixed-term agricultural workers) (C‑212/24, C‑226/24 and C‑227/24, EU:C:2025:341).

4 GURI No 235, of 9 October 2001.

5 It is clear from the legal framework described in the order for reference that the national collective agreements of 25 May 2010 and of 22 October 2014 reproduce, in essence, the wording of Article 20 of the CCNL.

6 The referring court explains that, in its case-law, it has interpreted Article 5(4-ter) of Legislative Decree No 368/2001 in cases where Article 10(2) of the legislative decree at issue in the main proceedings was not applicable owing to the fact that the employer was a non-economic public body and did not have the status of agricultural landholder within the meaning of national law.

7 The referring court states that, according to Article 5(4-ter) of Legislative Decree No 368/2001, the provisions of that article on the conversion of fixed-term contracts into employment relationships of indefinite duration at the end of successive fixed-term employment contracts exceeding a specified total duration ‘do not apply to seasonal activities.’.

8 The referring court cites the judgment of the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation) No 34561 of 11 December 2023 (Rv. 669564-02).

9 The referring court cites judgment of the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation) No 26196/2024 of 7 October 2024. The judgment of the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation) No 25393/2024 of 23 September 2024 is also cited in the case file in the possession of the Court.

10 See judgments of 15 May 2003, Salzmann (C‑300/01, EU:C:2003:283, paragraph 31), and of 29 January 2026, Fondazione Teatro alla Scala di Milano (C‑668/24, ‘the judgment in Fondazione Teatro alla Scala di Milano’, EU:C:2026:60, paragraph 35).

11 See, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2023, Ministero dell'Istruzione et INPS (C‑270/22, EU:C:2023:933, paragraph 34).

12 See, by analogy, judgment of 4 September 2025, Gnattai (C‑543/23, EU:C:2025:653, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

13 See, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2025 (C‑212/24, C‑226/24 and C‑227/24, EU:C:2025:341, paragraph 43).

14 As a reminder, the three measures listed in Clause 5(1)(a) to (c) of the Framework Agreement relate, respectively, to objective reasons justifying the renewal of such employment contracts or relationships, the maximum total duration of those successive employment contracts or relationships and the number of renewals of such contracts or relationships. See, inter alia, to that effect, judgments of 26 November 2014, Mascolo and Others (C‑22/13, C‑61/13 to C‑63/13 and C‑418/13, ‘the judgment in Mascolo and Others’, EU:C:2014:2401, paragraph 74; of 19 March 2020, Sánchez Ruiz and Others (C‑103/18 and C‑429/18, ‘the judgment in Sánchez Ruiz and Others’, EU:C:2020:219, paragraph 83); and of 13 May 2026, Commission v Italy (Absence of measures to prevent misuse of FTCs) (C‑155/25, EU:C:2026:405, paragraph 31).

15 As I stated in my Opinion in Obadal (C‑418/24, EU:C:2025:772, point 53). On the relationship between points 1 and 2(b) of Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement, as developed in the settled case-law of the Court, drawing a distinction between the types of measures envisaged (preventive and punitive) and the different rules applicable to them, see points 50 to 55 of that Opinion.

16 See, in particular, the judgments of 15 April 2008, Impact (C‑268/06, EU:C:2008:223, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited), and of 14 April 2026, Obadal (C‑418/24, ‘the judgment in Obadal’, EU:C:2026:291, paragraph 43).

17 See, in particular, the judgments of 4 July 2006, Adeneler and Others (C‑212/04, ‘the judgment in Adeneler and Others’, EU:C:2006:443 (paragraphs 81 and 91), and in Obadal (paragraph 44).

18 See, in particular, to that effect, the judgments in Adeneler and Others (paragraphs 81 and 91), and in Obadal (paragraph 43).

19 See the judgments in Adeneler and Others (paragraph 94), and in Obadal (paragraph 45).

20 See the judgments in Adeneler and Others (paragraph 102), and in Obadal (paragraph 46).

21 See, recently, the judgment in Obadal (paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).

22 See, in particular, the judgment in Sánchez Ruiz and Others (paragraph 90). See, also, the judgment in Obadal (paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

23 See, in particular, the judgments in Sánchez Ruiz and Others (paragraph 91), and in Obadal (paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).

24 See, in particular, to that effect, the judgments in Adeneler and Others (paragraph 63); of 15 April 2008, Impact (C‑268/06, EU:C:2008:223, paragraph 88); and of 23 April 2009, Angelidaki and Others (C‑378/07 to C‑380/07, ‘the judgment in Angelidaki and Others’, EU:C:2009:250, paragraph 73).

25 Paragraph 6 of the general considerations of the Framework Agreement states that employment contracts of an indefinite duration are the general form of employment relationships and contribute to the quality of life of the workers concerned and improve performance.

26 See judgment of 22 November 2005, Mangold (C‑144/04, EU:C:2005:709, paragraph 64).

27 See, to that effect, the judgments in Adeneler and Others (paragraph 63); in Mascolo and Others (paragraph 72); of 25 October 2018, Sciotto (C‑331/17, ‘the judgment in Sciotto’, EU:C:2018:859, paragraph 30); and in Obadal (paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).

28 See, regarding those specific sectors, the judgments of 3 July 2014, Fiamingo and Others (C‑362/13, C‑363/13 and C‑407/13, ‘the judgment in Fiamingo and Others’, EU:C:2014:2044); in Mascolo and Others; of 26 February 2015, Commission v Luxembourg (C‑238/14, EU:C:2015:128); of 14 September 2016, Pérez López (C‑16/15, EU:C:2016:679); in Sciotto; of 8 May 2019, Rossato and Conservatorio di Musica F.A. Bonporti (C‑494/17, EU:C:2019:387); and in Fondazione Teatro alla Scala di Milano.

29 See the judgments in Sciotto (paragraphs 46 to 48) and in Fondazione Teatro alla Scala di Milano (paragraph 52).

30 See the judgment in Fondazione Teatro alla Scala di Milano (paragraph 52). As a reminder, the second paragraph in the preamble to the Framework Agreement states that ‘the parties to this agreement recognise that contracts of an indefinite duration are, and will continue to be, the general form of employment relationship between employers and workers’, and that ‘fixed-term employment contracts respond, in certain circumstances, to the needs of both employers and workers’.

31 According to the third paragraph of the preamble to the Framework Agreement, ‘this agreement sets out the general principles and minimum requirements relating to fixed-term work, recognising that their detailed application needs to take account of the realities of specific national, sectoral and seasonal situations’. Emphasis added.

32 Paragraph 10 of the general considerations of the Framework Agreement states that ‘[it] refers back to Member States and social partners for the arrangements for the application of its general principles, minimum requirements and provisions, in order to take account of the situation in each Member State and the circumstances of particular sectors and occupations, including the activities of a seasonal nature’.

33 See the judgments of 7 September 2006, Marrosu and Sardino (C‑53/04, EU:C:2006:517, paragraph 45), and in Sciotto (paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

34 See the judgments in Sciotto (paragraph 60) and in Fondazione Teatro alla Scala di Milano (paragraph 54).

35 See points 31 to 35 of this Opinion.

36 The Italian Government stated at the hearing that the lack of connection between the maximum period of 180 days and the seasonal element was explained by the fact that consideration of the full agricultural season would entail a rule providing for 365 days of work and not 180 days of work as provided for by the measure at issue.

37 The Italian Government explained, in response to a question asked by the Court at the hearing that the ‘date of recruitment’ coincides with the date of conclusion of the first fixed-term employment contract signed between the same parties, the days of actual work being counted until the end of the 12-month period, even if several fixed-term employment contracts have been concluded successively during that period.

38 According to the Italian Government, agricultural activity is structurally fragmented throughout the agricultural season, which traditionally extends from November to October of the following year.

39 According to the Italian Government, the system in question is the ‘Unimens Post Agri’ system. The Italian Government stated that the data recorded may be verified by the Ministry of Labour and the INPS. There were also ‘UniLav’ forms kept at employment offices which are accessible via the information system of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy.

40 I rather understand that statement of the Italian Government as meaning that the condition of 180 days of actual work aver a 12-month period does not take into account the completion of a full seasonal production cycle but seems to take into account the seasonality which characterises a considerable part of the agricultural sector’s activity.

41 However, that distinction seems rather to result from the relationship between the general rule and its exceptions. See point 78 of the present Opinion.

42 The Commission submitted that, contrary to the general rules applicable ratione temporis to other sectors not excluded from the application of Legislative Decree No 368/2001, the first paragraph of Article 20 of the CCNL provides for the maximum duration of fixed-term employment contracts to be expressed not in calendar days but in days of actual work and that that is also the case with the subsequent general rules laid down in decreto legislativo 15 giugno 2015, n. 81 – Disciplina organica dei contratti di lavoro e revisione della normativa in tema dimansioni, a norma dell’articolo 1, comma 7, della legge 10 dicembre 2014, n. 183 (Legislative Decree No 81/2015 on the comprehensive regulation of employment contracts and revision of legislation on professional obligations, in accordance with Article 1(7) of Law No 183 of 10 December 2014 of 15 June 2015 (GURI No 144 of 24 June 2015, Ordinary Supplement No 34; ‘Legislative Decree No 81/2015’).

43 As a reminder, in that case, seafarers had been recruited by an Italian company to work on ferries making sea crossings between two ports situated in Italy. Those seafarers had concluded successive fixed-term employment contracts with their employer for one or several voyages up to a maximum term of 78 days. Following the termination of their employment contracts upon their disembarkation, they had brought an action before the competent national court seeking, in particular, the conversion of their employment relationship into a relationship of indefinite duration.

44 In that case, the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation) had indicated in the account of the legal framework given in its order for reference that the seafarers’ employment contracts were not subject to Legislative Decree No 368/2001 but to the Navigation Code.

45 See the judgment in Fiamingo and Others (paragraph 70).

46 For the sake of completeness, I would point out that it is clear from the file available to the Court that Article 5(4bis) of Legislative Decree No 368/2001, which contained the general rules applicable ratione temporis, provided for the automatic conversion of fixed-term employment relationships into employment relationships of indefinite duration where the maximum duration of 36 months was exceeded. The referring court states that that maximum duration was reduced, subsequently, to 12 months by Legislative Decree No 81, except in certain circumstances where provision is made for the possibility to set a period which must not in any event exceed 24 months. That court states that Article 29(1)(b), of Legislative Decree No 81/2015 maintained the exclusion of ‘employment relationships between agricultural employers and fixed-term workers’.

47 At the hearing, the Commission submitted that it is clear from the observations of the appellants in the main proceedings that Article 8 of the Contratto provinciale di lavoro per gli operai agricoli et florovivaisti della provincia di Brescia (Provincial Collective Agreement for agricultural workers and floriculturists of the Province of Brescia), signed on 17 April 2008 between the provincial employers’ organisations and trade unions in the agricultural sector, makes the right to conversion of contracts subject to a maximum duration of 150 working days of continuous work or to 180 working days of non-continuous work in a period of one ‘calendar year’. Therefore, the Commission takes the view that the national, provincial or collective agreement, makes it difficult, or even impossible, to fulfil the conditions required to exercise that right. It is for the referring court to verify that.

48 In particular, workers engaged at the beginning of the calendar year would find it easier to fulfil the conditions of the national measure at issue in the main proceedings than those engaged later in the year.

49 Order of 18 January 2011 (C‑272/10, EU:C:2011:19).

50 See the judgment in Angelidaki and Others (paragraphs 168 to 176), and orders of 12 June 2008, Vassilakis and Others (C‑364/07, EU:C:2008:346, paragraphs 138 to 150) and of 24 April 2009, Koukou (C‑519/08, EU:C:2009:269, paragraphs 73 to 81 and 92 to 102).

51 See, to that effect, order of 18 January 2011, Berkizi-Nikolakaki (C‑272/10, EU:C:2011:19, paragraph 61).

52 The Italian Government stated at the hearing that the appellants in the main proceedings were not employed, during the period at issue in the main proceedings, as workers falling within one of those first two categories of workers.

53 See Article 18(b) of the CCNL reproduced in point 6 of the present Opinion.

54 See, to that effect, the judgments in Mascolo and Others (paragraph 101), and in Sánchez Ruiz and Others (paragraphs 72, 75 and 77 and the case-law cited).

55 See, by analogy, the judgment in Sciotto (paragraph 37).

56 See the judgment in Sciotto (paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).

57 See, to that effect, the judgments in Angelidaki and Others (paragraphs 96 and 97); in Sánchez Ruiz and Others (paragraphs 66 and 67); and in Sciotto (paragraphs 39 and 40).

58 See, in particular, the judgments in Angelidaki and Others (paragraphs 98 and 100); in Mascolo and Others (paragraph 88); in Sánchez Ruiz and Others (paragraph 68); and in Sciotto (paragraph 40).

59 The Italian Government stated that, in the Italian agricultural sector, nearly 90% of the workforce is engaged under fixed-term employment contracts.

60 See, in particular, the judgments in Angelidaki and Others (paragraphs 102); in Mascolo and Others (paragraph 91); and in Sciotto (paragraph 47).

61 See points 8, 42 and 43 of the present Opinion.

62 As regards, in particular, the operatic and orchestral foundations sector, see, by analogy, the judgment in Sciotto (paragraphs 49 and 50).

63 Sectoral and seasonal activities are two types of different activities even if they may overlap. Certain specific sectors, such as, in the present case, the agriculture sector or, in particular, the tourism sector, may have temporary and permanent workforce needs.

64 Moreover, it is apparent from the file available to the Court that, in half of the fixed-term contracts concluded between the employer and A.M., the section provided for specifying the tasks that A.M. was to perform does not appear to have been completed.

65 The referring court itself states that an activity which may be permanent and does not depend on the seasonal schedule of tasks customary in that agricultural activity but on the permanent needs of that activity cannot, in itself, be regarded as a seasonal agricultural activity. It is clear from the information in the case file and in particular from the case-law of the referring court referred to in the legal framework set out in its order for reference that those permanent needs would relate, in particular, to operational needs which continue throughout the year, such as the care, repair and maintenance of machines and, in general, the preparation of the complete new season, with the result that workers employed in a stable manner in such activities must be workers of indefinite duration and not fixed-term workers, even where the productive activity, as such, taken as a whole, is of a seasonal nature. See point 8 of the present Opinion.

66 See the judgment in Sciotto (paragraph 52).

67 See the judgment in Fiamingo and Others (paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).

Opinion of Advocate General Norkus delivered on 3 September 2026.###

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